This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

311338Z May 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/REA, INR/NESA 
TEL AVIV FOR RLEBARON 
RIYADH FOR TUELLER 
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2014 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KU
SUBJECT: (U) ELECTORAL REFORM:  THE DEBATE CONTINUES 
 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (B, D). 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  Reducing the number of electoral 
constituencies is one of the leading political issues in 
Kuwait.  The concept is that larger constituencies will make 
vote-buying harder and dilute the influence of tribes.  PM 
Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad has announced that the GOK will settle 
this matter before the summer parliamentary recess (i.e. by 
early July), but many scenarios are circulating, making it 
difficult to achieve consensus around a specific plan in so 
short a time.  The specifics matter:  depending on the voting 
mechanism adopted, the result could be more or less 
democratic than the current electoral process.  End Summary. 
 
(U) Parochialism 
---------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Although all Members of Parliament (MPs) are 
supposed to represent the entire country in the National 
Assembly, in reality they are often narrowly focused on the 
issues of their districts and their own ideological agendas. 
Their parochialism is not surprising, given that it is 
possible to be elected with fewer than one thousand votes. 
 
¶3. (U) The Constitution sets the number of elected MPs at 50, 
but does not specify the number of constituencies.  Until 
1980, Kuwait was divided into ten districts, each electing 
five members.   Many commentators believe that the increase 
to 25 districts in 1980 only served to promote narrow 
tribalism, as the smaller districts allowed candidates to win 
election with fewer votes from a higher concentration of 
relatives and fellow-tribesmen. 
 
(U) Redrawing The Map 
--------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) The redrawing of the electoral map is at the top of 
the agenda in the National Assembly.  31 MPs have reportedly 
agreed on the principle of reducing (and thereby enlarging) 
the number of electoral constituencies.  (NOTE: The top two 
vote-getters in each constituency are elected to office, for 
a total of 50 elected MPs.  In addition, Cabinet Ministers 
are ex-officio MPs.  The total number of MPs is currently 65, 
so 33 is an absolute majority in the National Assembly.  END 
NOTE.)  The concept of the proposed change is to make 
electoral corruption more difficult and dilute tribal 
influence, by increasing the size of constituencies.  The GOK 
was widely perceived as throwing money around to influence 
the July 2003 elections.  Many current MPs were voted into 
office with barely 1,000 votes, and well over half were 
elected with fewer than 2,000; the voting system is 
single-round, first-two-past-the-post.  Constituencies 
average 3,000-6,000 eligible voters (Kuwait has a total of 
approximately 137,000 eligible voters:  male citizens over 21 
who have been citizens for over 20 years; members of the 
armed forces and security forces are not allowed to vote). 
Various proposals are circulating; most would see the number 
of constituencies reduced to ten or five.  The devil is in 
the details:  according to some proposals, each voter would 
cast ballots for two candidates in a district where the top 
five candidates would be elected; the result would be no/no 
significant increase in votes needed for election (see para. 
10), but it is not clear that MPs grasp this point. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The National Assembly, MPs tell us, may hold a 
special session on electoral reform on June 5.  Prime 
Minister Shaykh Sabah assured the National Assembly that the 
GOK was very serious about addressing this issue before the 
Assembly recesses for the summer, probably early in July.  A 
May 24 local English-language daily, however, cited a 
Government source as expecting the issue of political 
redistricting to be carried over into the 2004-05 session of 
Parliament. 
 
(U) Reduction Advocates and Opponents 
------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) A majority of MPs--14 Islamists, 6 members of the 
Popular Action Bloc, 5 Independent Liberals, and aproximately 
6 pro-Government and Government-leaning members--support a 
reduction in the number of constituencies.  There is no 
consensus among them on the exact makeup of a new system, but 
most appear willing to support a reduction to 10 districts. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Most of the MPs opposing a reduction are from the 
pro-Government bloc or are pro-Government-leaning 
Independents, but they also include 4 Islamists.  After 
numerous meetings with over half of the MPs, we estimate 18 
MPs oppose a reduction; a few actually want to increase the 
number to 30 districts, but that notion is unlikely to gain 
traction.  Arguments in support of the status quo include: 
 
- constituencies should be kept small to allow an MP to "make 
a difference" in his district; 
 
- political campaigns, which now are funded completely by the 
candidates, would become too expensive if there were 
fewer/larger districts, forcing candidates to find funding 
from unpalatable groups, illegal sources, or even foreign 
countries; 
 
- fewer/larger districts would lead to an outcry for 
legalizing political parties.  Some fear that might lead to a 
"Lebanonization" of Kuwaiti politics, in which intelligence 
agencies, the police, and violence would have great influence 
on elections, and tribes would resort to criminal tactics to 
retain parliamentary seats. 
 
(U) The GOK Position 
-------------------- 
¶8. (C) The GOK was reluctant to weigh in seriously on the 
issue until a few months ago.  It has now offered two 
proposals, both recommending 10 districts.  These and 11 
other proposals are now before the National Assembly's 
five-member Interior and Defense Affairs Committee.  The 
Committee, chaired by MP Mohammed Al-Fajji, will present its 
recommendations on or before June 2.  Al-Fajji told PolOff 
that the GOK proposals have some supporters in Parliament, 
but that most MPs favor various other plans.  (NOTE: No 
matter what recommendation emerges from the Committee, the 
National Assembly could choose, by majority vote, to review 
any proposal--and if it had that many votes, it could pass 
the proposal.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶9. (C) Al-Fajji assured PolOff the plan that goes to the full 
National Assembly for a vote will call for 10 electoral 
constituencies.  There are many different ten-constituency 
proposals on the table, differing in the geographic 
distribution of districts, the number of seats in each 
district (they would have to average five per district, but 
some districts could be larger than others), and how many 
votes each voter would be permitted to cast:  some proposals 
would give each voter only two votes.  (NOTE: now, each voter 
can cast two votes, and the top two finishers in the district 
are elected; it is permissible to cast only one vote*-a 
practice referred to as &one-eyed8 voting; it is not/not 
permitted to cast both votes for one candidate.  END NOTE.) 
 
(SBU) One Seat, One Vote -- Or It Doesn't Compute 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶10. (C) There is a crucial relationship between the number of 
votes each voter is allowed to cast and the number of seats 
in the district.  Now, each voter has a say in 100% of his 
district's parliamentary representation (two votes, two 
seats).  Under a two votes/five seats scenario, each voter 
would have a say in only 40% of his district's parliamentary 
representation.  The result, as can be shown by simple 
arithmetic, would be that no/no increase in votes would be 
needed for election (the top finisher would doubtless win 
more votes than now, but the candidates finishing third 
through fifth would be elected, whereas in the current system 
they are losers). 
 
¶11. (C) A five votes/five seats scenario (i.e. "one seat, one 
vote") would accomplish the stated purpose of reform, i.e. 
raise significantly the number of votes required for 
election.  This would truly diminish the effects of tribal 
politics and make electoral corruption more costly.  By 
making it more difficult for tribal connections to determine 
the outcome of elections, such a system could heighten the 
importance of substantive political agendas instead of tribal 
affiliation; this could indeed foster demands for the 
legalization of political parties--which most political 
spheres other than the GOK already support. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT:  Unless/until MPs achieve consensus in 
support of one specific scenario,  the GOK will face little 
pressure to come to closure on electoral reform. 
URBANCIC