This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 000752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR SDELISI, LAROIAN, MRAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
DS/OP/AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR EAID ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: WHITHER THE MDC 
 
REF: A. HARARE 716 
     ¶B. HARARE 649 
     ¶C. HARARE 401 
     ¶D. 3/16/04 E-MAIL FROM BESMER TO RAYNOR 
     ¶E. 2003 HARARE 2412 
     ¶F. 2003 HARARE 1359 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The fledgling opposition MDC is suffering 
from some basic but critical problems: infighting within the 
higher ranks, insufficient communication and consultation 
with the broader membership, despondency, and increasing 
criticism from within the party.  These factors coupled with 
ZANU-PF's increasingly aggressive posture and upper hand in 
all aspects of political life in Zimbabwe are reducing public 
confidence in the MDC's ability to bring about political 
change.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Institution Building 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On April 4 - 5 the MDC leadership participated in an 
organizational strengthening workshop in which consultants 
presented a strategy and program to assess the talents of MDC 
leadership and staff to position them appropriately within 
the organization.  The MDC President, Vice-President, 
Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, National 
 
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Chairman and Treasurer, the so-called "top six", participated 
in the exercise which included a personality assessment.  MDC 
MP Roy Bennett, who helped organize the workshop, said that 
the talents and leadership positions of President Morgan 
Tsvangirai, the Secretary General Welshman Ncube, and the 
 
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Deputy Secretary General Gift Chimanikire were confirmed. 
The others did less well, but it was unclear what immediate 
impact the exercise would have on their positions.  Bennett 
said most officials would undergo the assessment in a major 
reorganization of the party to occur in the coming months. 
 
¶3. (C) The party is being reorganized with a focus on 
contesting the March 2005 general Parliamentary elections. 
The "top six" will focus on strategy, and an elections 
coordinator will oversee all of the party's operations.  The 
coordinator will head up an elections directorate, which is 
to be organizationally located within the President's office. 
 During the April 4 - 5 meeting, it was decided that MDC 
staffer and CEO of First Mutual (a local insurance company), 
Ian Makoni, would be the elections coordinator.  Bennett said 
Makoni's role in that position was decided by the MDC 
leadership, rather than by personality assessment. 
 
¶4. (C) The consultants, Dren Nupen, Mandlha Mutungu and Alan 
Bruce, are senior members of the South Africa's ruling 
African National Congress (ANC), who have reportedly worked 
on organizational strengthening with the ANC for several 
years.  Bennett said that the initiative for the consultants 
and reorganization came from within the MDC, and funding for 
the consultants came from the Swedes and Norwegians.  The 
initiative to bring in outside consultants to help the MDC 
reorganize itself came out of organizational conflicts that 
surfaced most notably after the June 2003 failed "final push" 
(Ref F).  The results of the workshop and way forward with 
restructuring were presented to the 37-member MDC national 
executive on April 10 - 11.  The consultants will reportedly 
continue to work with the MDC for the foreseeable future. 
 
Elections Playing Field 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In an April 29 briefing to Harare-based diplomats, MDC 
President Morgan Tsvangirai reiterated the party's five 
demands for leveling the elections playing field: end 
political violence, repeal repressive legislation, establish 
an independent elections commission, open the voters' roll 
early and hold voting on a single day, and restore ballot 
secrecy.  Although he said these reforms were essential, 
Tsvangirai did not explain how the party was going to press 
 
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for them.  Tsvangirai said the party was focused on preparing 
for the March 2005 elections, but was still considering a 
boycott and would decide later whether to participate. 
 
Planning Mass Action 
-------------------- 
¶6. (C) MDC staff members said that during the April 4 - 5 
workshop, the leadership approved plans for mass action, but 
groundwork to carry out that effort was still in its infancy. 
 Dennis Murira, personal assistant to the Party Chairman and 
mass action coordinator said that the primary purpose of the 
planned demonstrations would be to influence the government 
to acquiesce to the MDC's elections demands. 
 
¶7. (C) MDC Director of Presidential Affairs, Gandi Mudzingwa, 
said it would take considerable time to organize for mass 
action.  The strategy envisioned three phases: strengthen 
grassroots support at the village level (April to May), 
consolidate, test and review party structures (June to July), 
and stage mass action in about August.  Mudzingwa 
acknowledged that party morale was at a low point, but he 
compared the party's present low-morale to the low point 
before the successful March 2003 stayaway, after which the 
party had a major rebound. 
 
¶8. (C) Mudzingwa and Murira said that mass action would be 
carried out with a broad alliance of civic groups: the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the Zimbabwe 
Liberators' Platform (ZLP), the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA), and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition 
(Crisis).  Each organization would be expected to mobilize 
its memberships to participate.  The MDC would invite other 
NGOs to participate.  The MDC hoped that ZLP with its 
connections to the security forces would be able to 
discourage the police and army from responding violently. 
The officials said that previous stayaways (work stoppages) 
did not effectively influence the government and that protest 
marches were required. 
 
¶9. (C) Murira said protests would take place in high-density 
suburbs nationwide as church-led events in which MDC members 
would march from a church to a city hall or a police station 
where they would deliver petitions, cards or flowers urging 
non-violence.  Murira said there would be "rolling" mass 
actions for as long as the MDC could sustain them, until and 
unless the government acquiesced to any of the opposition's 
demands. 
 
Organizational Conflicts 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) MDC Mayors, MPs, provincial chairpersons, councilors, 
and street-level activists have described organizational 
weaknesses that afflict the party.  Frequent complaints were 
that one or more leaders is leaking information to ZANU-PF, 
that the leadership imposes decisions on the membership 
without consultation, that public statements have not been 
cleared properly, that candidates were not selected properly, 
that MDC MPs have fought with MDC staff members over party 
responsibilities, and that general communication has broken 
down between the leadership and provincial structures and 
between the leadership and the membership.  Officials who 
distrust and or despise each other uniformly agreed that the 
early April series of meetings and workshops to address 
organizational issues was a good idea and they would accept 
the outcome of that process. 
 
¶11. (C) Mudzingwa suggested in advance of the workshop that 
the solution to the rift problem between MDC staffers and MPs 
was to "ignore" the MPs because getting them involved in mass 
action and other planning was "stupid" -- presumably 
logistically cumbersome and prone to leaks.  Mudzingwa said 
there was a need to make the party more command oriented, 
rather than overly consultative. 
 
¶12. (C) Just two months ago, party leaders maintained 
publicly and privately that there were only "perceived 
divisions" within the MDC, not actual ones.  As the local 
media, including the independent press, has exposed 
internecine rifts, they have become more candid. 
 
Membership Despondent 
--------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) MDC Mayors, MPs, provincial chairpersons, councilors, 
and street-level activists have commented that the MDC 
membership is despondent, frustrated, disillusioned and 
depressed.  Morale was low after the March 27 - 28 defeat in 
the Harare suburb of Zengeza and people were confused about 
threats to boycott the March 2005 polls.  Having fought hard, 
they did not understand why the party might not contest the 
elections.  The officials said that members in both urban and 
rural areas felt ignored because they have received no 
communication from the leadership in many months, angry 
because they felt the leadership had abandoned the membership 
and the party's principles in favor of fancy cars and nice 
houses in Harare, and suspicious because Tsvangirai wanted to 
talk to Mugabe -- a move that many members thought smacked of 
selling-out, a la ZAPU. 
 
Adventurist Inclinations 
------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) Several MDC interlocutors including Tsvangirai have 
suggested that rogue MDC elements were inclined to mount 
armed resistance to the GOZ.  Some MDC officials have 
commented that they spent significant time trying to dissuade 
rogue and youthful elements within the party from such 
inclinations.  Officials have suggested that despite their 
discouragement, youths either from within Zimbabwe or from 
the thousands of young MDC members in South Africa, could 
strike out on their own, outside the command and control of 
the party leadership.  Two different officials even suggested 
that an army mutiny was possible.  There are rumors that 
unnamed ex-Zimbabwean farmers residing in Zambia were willing 
to fund an armed struggle against Mugabe. 
 
Talks Ongoing? 
-------------- 
 
¶15. (C) There has been no recent indication that ZANU-PF 
would engage in formal dialogue with the MDC.  Nevertheless 
MDC officials, notably Welshman Ncube, have suggested 
dialogue is still possible.  Reporting on conversations the 
ANC consultants had had with members of Mbeki's cabinet, on 
April 27 Bennett said that Ncube had visited Mbeki numerous 
times over the past several months and had presented Mbeki 
with a draft constitution that was reportedly approved by 
both Ncube and Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa. 
Bennett was optimistic that once South African elections were 
behind him, Mbeki wanted to deliver progress on the Zimbabwe 
crisis.  (Ncube himself paints a much more limited picture of 
the status of his discussions with Mbeki and Chinamasa.) 
 
¶16. (C) Welshman Ncube has suggested privately that there was 
consensus within SADC countries that Mugabe must talk. 
(Note: Conversations with Botswanan (Ref C) and Zambian (Ref 
D) diplomats here revealed sympathies for the need for 
reform, but no indication that SADC countries would be 
willing to publicly encourage Mugabe to talk or resolve the 
political crisis.  End note.)  Ncube predicted in March that 
the rules for formal dialogue would be laid down and formal 
talks would restart in the near future.  He said the MDC did 
not want to engage the ruling party on substantive issues 
before formal talks began for fear that that engagement could 
be construed as "talks" - further delaying the start of real 
negotiations. 
 
¶17. (C) Lower-level MDC officials or those outside Harare 
expressed deep skepticism about talks.  They could not 
understand the purpose of talks with Mugabe except as an 
opportunity for MDC President Tsvangirai to sell-out the 
membership and join ZANU-PF. 
 
Criticism from Within 
--------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) While there was no real public or private debate on 
Tsvangirai's leadership of the MDC, critics of the MDC 
 
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President from within the party have in recent weeks been 
more bold in attacking Tsvangirai in the press.  On March 24, 
maverick MDC MP for St. Mary's Job Sikhala lashed out at 
Tsvangirai during a Zengeza campaign rally held by Harare 
 
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North MP Trudy Stevenson.  Sikhala said the MDC's threat to 
boycott the March 2005 polls was dangerous, self-defeating, 
and gave ammunition to the party's enemies (Ref A).  He 
asserted that Tsvangirai lacked a strategy to rule, and that 
the MDC leadership had a tendency to pre-empt positions 
without taking stock of the consequences. 
 
¶19. (U) In early April a group calling itself "MDC Supporters 
for Democracy" (MSD) wrote a letter to Tsvangirai, sending a 
copy to the government-controlled weekly the Sunday Mail, 
criticizing the imposition of Makore as the MDC candidate in 
Zengeza.  The leader of the group, Kurauone Chihwayi, was a 
frequent and controversial letter-writer to the Sunday Mail. 
Chihwayi called for Tsvangirai and Matongo to resign, and 
said MSD would continue to guard against abuse and 
dictatorship within the MDC. 
 
¶20. (SBU) In Johannesburg on April 19, Zimbabwean MDC youths 
residing in South Africa reportedly criticized Tsvangirai 
repeatedly for lack of a strategy at an MDC public meeting. 
 
Financial Crisis 
---------------- 
 
¶21. (C) Compounding nearly all of the party's myriad problems 
is the collapse of its financial base.  The mainstay of its 
revenue source, the commercial farm sector, has all but 
evaporated.  The GOZ's recent take-over of Bennett's 
Charleswood estate was just the latest manifestation of the 
ruling party's priority of choking off MDC revenue.  Even 
outside the agricultural sector, businesses are pressed to 
contribute to or conduct business on favorable terms with the 
ruling party -- and are punished if perceived to be 
opposition sympathizers.  As a result, the party is unable to 
sustain meaningful operations in many parts of the country -- 
in part from intimidation and in part from lack of resources. 
 The Mashonaland West Provincial Chairman told Poloff in 
April, for example, that the party had totaled its only car 
dedicated to the province and had no means to purchase a 
replacement.  MDC officials have complained that legal fees 
from the Tsvangirai treason trial, the elections challenge 
and other cases are the biggest drain on the MDC's scarce 
resources.  MDC officials have repeatedly made requests to 
Poloff for funds, saying that their lack is a prime 
constraint to party activities. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶22. (C) The MDC is suffering from a myriad of organizational 
problems, and is operating within a repressive political 
environment.  These are major challenges for a young 
opposition party, but the deterioration of the economy and 
widespread anger against ZANU-PF provide a giant unifying and 
motivating force in its favor.  The party as a whole seems to 
be lacking in its ability to coordinate its members and 
galvanize public frustration toward political change. 
Confidence in the party at many levels appears to be at an 
all-time low.  Getting substantial numbers of Zimbabweans 
into the streets to demonstrate may prove an insurmountable 
challenge. 
 
¶23. (C) Continued: Threatening to boycott the March 2005 
polls might publicize the gross unevenness in the electoral 
playing field, but boycotting the 2005 polls would shut the 
MDC out of parliament, its most visible public presence. 
While ZANU-PF appears to have some concern for its electoral 
legitimacy, such concerns do not make ZANU-PF inclined to run 
a fair election or to share power with the MDC.  All 
indications are that ZANU-PF would be happy if the MDC 
disappeared in the next election. 
 
¶24. (C) Continued: The conflict between MPs and technocrats, 
the lack of effective communication and consultation with the 
membership, and general feelings of despondency are serious 
problems that the party would need to resolve in order to 
achieve any programs requiring massive coordination. 
Mudzingwa's suggestion to ignore MPs because what they asked 
for was stupid was a startlingly naive suggestion on dealing 
with the problem.  The benefits of restructuring based on 
advice from the ANC consultants may not be fully realized for 
some time. 
 
¶25. (C) Continued: An armed "adventurist" resistance to the 
GOZ by a rag-tag group of youths would be doomed to failure 
at the hands of government security forces.  Such resistance 
would likely result in violent retribution against MDC 
leaders and members.  Notwithstanding the suggestion of 
adventurism by various MDC leaders, we have no evidence that 
the risk is real or that any actual preparations are 
underway.  The real question is who might command such 
activities -- it wouldn't be the MDC. 
SULLIVAN