This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

050818Z May 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2009 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAO ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE'S GROWING REGIONAL ENEMIES LIST 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 743 (B) HARARE 726 (C) GABORONE 676 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Soaked in anti-imperialist rhetoric and 
conspiracy theories, Zimbabwe's  official press continues to 
view other nations exclusively through the prism of the 
ruling party's "with-us-or-against-us" framework.  On the 
enemies list, the West has been joined by Botswana, Nigeria 
and, most recently, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, with Libya 
apparently next in line.  A front page story May 4 warns of 
coming pressure on the GOZ from selected African nations at 
the behest of the United Kingdom.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Botswana Tops the List 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.   (U) Since Gaborone distanced itself from SADC's public 
support for Zimbabwe on the margins of December's 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), it has 
found itself Zimbabwe's Public Enemy Number One in Africa. 
Recent transgressions spotlighted in lurid front page reports 
on Botswana include alleged targeting of Zimbabweans for 
floggings by Botswanan authorities, labor exploitation, the 
erection of border fences, and Botswanan support for VOA 
broadcasts (ref C).  Information Minister Jonathan Moyo's 
confrontation with the Botswanan Ambassador over such issues 
was given prominent coverage and official editorials 
alternately portray the GOB as seduced, bullied, or bought 
out by Western interests. 
 
Nigeria Running Second 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Nigeria has been a distant second to Botswana on 
the enemies list, more prominently featured but in less 
venomous terms.  Election violence, opposition crackdowns, 
and Abuja's open door to Zimbabwe's white farmer class are 
favorite themes in news coverage here, and editorials since 
CHOGM have pilloried Obasanjo repeatedly.  Most recently, an 
editorial in the Government-controlled Herald editorial on 
April 16 "condemned" Obasanjo's "grandstanding antics" in 
trying to attract Zimbabwe's white farmers, suggesting rather 
implausibly that were he an "impartial broker" on Zimbabwe he 
would have encouraged the farmers to remain in Zimbabwe to 
farm on "permissible" sizes of land.  (Note: After having 
their entire farms and investments seized, the farmers were 
technically eligible to apply for new plots under land 
reform.  End note.)  A Harare-based Nigerian diplomat 
confirmed that Obasanjo had been incensed by the GOZ's 
intransigent posture during the run-up to CHOGM and had since 
been inclined to keep his distance from Zimbabwe's crisis. 
 
Suspicious of Others 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Other African diplomats report that the GOZ 
monitors their governments' statements in the media and 
international fora religiously, calling in diplomats for a 
dressing down if such statements are deemed critical.  In 
February, Mugabe blasted an unnamed "majority" of his African 
counterparts for succumbing to Western influence and turning 
against African revolutionary causes.  The GOZ and the 
official press generally have remained cautiously respectful 
of the South African Government. 
 
¶5.  (U) The official press has reported Libya's rapprochement 
with the West in extremely negative terms, attributing it to 
neo-colonialist British pressure and Libyan economic 
desperation.  The ruling party-affiliated Sunday Mirror asked 
in a May 2 editorial "Has Gaddafi sold his soul to the West?" 
and forecast that his relations with Mugabe "seem destined to 
become difficult."  Until late last year, Mugabe counted 
Gaddafi as among his most prominent allies, and the official 
media trumpeted each of the frequent high level visits 
between Harare and Tripoli.  Harare-based diplomats in 
contact with the Libyan mission here tell us that its access 
to the GOZ has been reduced markedly since Gaddafi shook 
hands with Tony Blair. 
 
¶6.  (U) Foreign-based media, especially from South Africa, 
continues to be a principal enemy of the state.  The 
government press has given repeated play to Information 
Minister Jonathan Moyo's recent characterization of foreign 
correspondents and those who collaborated with them as 
"terrorists."  A Herald editorial (often a precursor to 
government policy) last week cast those who contributed to 
the portrayal of Zimbabwe in a negative light as "traitors" 
and urged that they be prosecuted for treason, in absentia if 
necessary (ref B). 
 
The "Un-African" SADC Parliamentary Forum 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.   (U) In his weekly pseudonymous column in the Herald on 
May 1, Information Minister Jonathan Moyo blasted SADC-PF 
Election Norms and Standards as an "un-African, anti-African 
case of ventriloqual nonsense from the West, by the West, all 
to reluctant Africa."  He suggested that the norms were 
forced on parliaments by "treacherous half-sons" and 
emphasized that they were invalid and non-binding. 
 
British Plot Exposed 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) In a front page feature on May 4, The Herald reported 
that the British Government was mounting a diplomatic 
campaign to engineer pressure on the GOZ through a series of 
high profile visits by regional leaders.  According to the 
article, Zambian President Mwanawasa, Malawian President 
Muluzi, South African Mbeki and the Prime Minister of 
Mauritius were expected to visit, while former Kenyan leader 
Daniel arap Moi would come as a special envoy of Kenyan 
President Kibaki.  The article closed with an assertion by an 
unnamed government spokesman that "there is peace and 
tranquility and the economic prospects are so good today that 
we do not believe any African country would want to spoil 
this for the benefit of the British." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Ruling party exploitation of its monopoly over the 
country's daily media  has become a central feature of GOZ 
foreign policy.  As in so many other sectors, this means that 
policy is driven as much if not more by the insidious 
Information Minister than by cabinet members formally 
assigned relevant portfolios.  The centrality of 
neo-colonialism and race to all media treatment of 
international relations is designed to fuel a seige mentality 
among domestic constituencies and to intimidate African 
neighbors into support for ZANU-PF.  The "expose" on the 
alleged British plot appears intended to pre-empt any 
diplomatic or public pressure by Africans and foreshadows a 
shrill response -- by Moyo, at least -- to any such 
approaches. 
 
¶10.  (C) Moyo continues to be an influential wild card in 
factional struggles within the ruling party.  Much of his 
effort lately appear geared against the camp of Speaker of 
the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was Zimbabwe's 
signatory to the SADC-PF Electoral Norms and Standards.  (For 
his part, the beleaguered Mnanagagwa appears unlikely to 
stand up for the SADC-PF standards; ref A.)  In the 
witch-hunt atmosphere engendered by Mugabe's anti-corruption 
campaign, Moyo remains one of the paralyzed party 
leadership's most confident operators.  His relentless and 
single-minded attack mode, which appears to suit Mugabe for 
now, may come back to haunt him later, though, as he lacks a 
natural constituency and continues to accumulate enemies at 
home and abroad. 
 
¶11.  (C) Zimbabwe's relations with Libya had grown more 
distant even before Gaddafi's westward shift, more for 
economic than political reasons.  Libya faced little prospect 
of meaningful returns on its $360 million reported fuel deal 
with Zimbabwe's parastatal, to which it had cut off supplies 
for non-payment.  Nonetheless, political relations until 
recently had remained close, at least in rhetorical terms, 
and Gaddafi's volte face presents a difficult challenge for 
the GOZ's indefatigable propaganda machine.  Zimbabweans will 
likely follow Gaddafi's treatment by the West closely in two 
contexts: the impact it will have on Africanist Gaddafi's 
solidarity with erstwhile close ally Mugabe and, perhaps more 
significantly, as an indicator of how quickly an 
international pariah can rehabilitate relations with the 
West. 
SULLIVAN