This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000825 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EAP/J 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  05/19/14 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID CE JA NO LTTE
SUBJECT:  Ambassador and Special Envoy Akashi discuss 
peace process, upcoming Co-Chairs meeting in Brussels 
 
Refs:  Colombo 809, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a May 19 meeting with Ambassador 
Lunstead, visiting Japanese Special Envoy Akashi was 
relatively upbeat about the peace process based on his 
discussions with the GSL and LTTE.  The Ambassador and 
Akashi also discussed the June 1 Co-Chairs meeting in 
Brussels, agreeing it was a well-timed opportunity to 
reiterate international support for the peace process 
and to review donor assistance issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador Lunstead, the DCM, and polchief met 
May 19 with Yasushi Akashi, Japan's Special Envoy on Sri 
Lankan issues.  Yutaka Kikuta and Hajime Ueda, Director 
and Deputy Director, respectively, of the MFA's 
Southwest Asia Division joined in the meeting.  Akashi 
related that his latest visit (May 15-19) to Sri Lanka 
had gone well.  He had met with President Kumaratunga, 
who had underscored her desire that the GSL and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) resume talks 
soon.  S.P. Thamilchelvam, the LTTE's political chief, 
had also reiterated support for getting back to talks 
when he met with Akashi in the LTTE-controlled northern 
town of Kilinochchi on May 18.  Akashi and the 
Ambassador agreed that it was important that the GSL and 
the LTTE carefully lay the groundwork for possible 
talks.  The Ambassador noted that he often stressed that 
talks needed to be prepared for in "a structured and 
substantive" manner.  Kumaratunga appeared to understand 
this and to recognize that she had not organized the GSL 
effectively enough during past peace processes. 
 
¶3.  (C) Akashi related that he was heartened that 
Kumaratunga had recently named former Sri Lankan 
Ambassador to the U.S. and UN official Jayantha 
Dhanapala to head the GSL's Peace Secretariat.  He 
thought that Dhanapala was an inspired choice due to his 
"methodical and professional" nature.  In discussing the 
GSL's embryonic peace process team, both Akashi and the 
Ambassador Lunstead agreed that Foreign Minister 
Kadirgamar was potentially a problematic player.  On 
this point, Akashi remarked that Kadirgamar clearly took 
a much more skeptical approach toward the LTTE than some 
others in the GSL.  The Ambassador noted that it was 
important that President Kumaratunga provide strong 
policy guidance because Kadirgamar often took a 
legalistic approach and seemed to look for reasons not 
to move items forward.  Akashi said he hoped that 
Kadirgamar received the right message from European 
Union Commissioner for External Relations Christopher 
Patten when the two meet on May 25. 
 
¶4.  (C) Regarding the June 1 Tokyo Process Co-Chairs 
meeting in Brussels, Akashi said it was important for 
the international community to use the meeting to send a 
strong signal of support for the peace process. 
Ambassador Lunstead agreed, commenting that the meeting 
could also usefully review the way forward on donor 
assistance for the north and east.  Given the positive 
news that both sides were committed to resuming talks, 
Brussels might be a good time for the Co-Chairs to 
stress the need for accelerated assistance to the north 
and east, but also to reiterate the need for steps to be 
taken by local parties, most particularly the LTTE, to 
allow unhindered assistance delivery to those in need. 
The Tigers had to understand that there were standards 
of behavior.  The Ambassador remarked that the group 
still had a very long way to go.  There were still 
killings being perpetrated by the LTTE and new reports 
were emerging that children were being forcibly inducted 
despite a number of releases made last month.  In 
addition, the LTTE's hard-line tactics during the April 
parliamentary election had given the group a real black 
eye.  The group could have probably won nearly as many 
seats without such tactics and it was important that it 
start to adhere to democratic practices.  Akashi took 
that point on board, but commented that it was important 
to keep the LTTE hooked on the peace process as a means 
of "educating" them.  In response to Ambassador's 
question, Akashi said that he did not raise these issues 
during his meeting with the LTTE. 
 
¶5.  (C) COMMENT:  In his meetings with the GSL, Akashi 
clearly heard many of the same points that A/S Rocca and 
the Norwegian facilitators picked up during their recent 
visits (see Reftels).  Based on all of these high-level 
interactions, our overall sense is that the peace 
process appears to be on a slow glide toward a 
resumption of talks.  That said, everyone agrees that 
the situation remains extremely fragile.  Local politics 
(the JVP, UNP, etc.) could intrude in a negative manner. 
At the same time, it is always difficult to fathom what 
is going on in the mind of the LTTE.  That said, the tea 
leaves generally seem favorable at this time and the 
June 1 Co-Chairs meeting can help firm things up. 
Mission will provide its ideas on areas the Co-Chairs 
meeting can usefully focus on via Septel next week.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶6. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD