This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271626Z May 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, NEA/ARN, NP/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2009 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP ETRD SY EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU AGREES NEW NON-PROLIFERATION TEXT FOR SYRIA 
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 0338 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  On May 26, the EU agreed to new 
non-proliferation language for inclusion in the draft 
EU-Syria Association Agreement.  Last December, EU member 
states rejected an ad ref text negotiated by the European 
Commission for including non-proliferation language that was 
too watered down from the EU's model text.  As EU president 
since January, Ireland has been working to devise new 
language that would meet member state concerns and respond to 
issues raised by Syria (e.g. reference to a nuclear weapons 
free zone).  The new language, obtained by USEU and at para 7 
below, has not been shown to Syria.  The EU proposal is to 
commit Syria to take steps to set up an effective export 
control system, and to ratify and implement all international 
agreements on non-proliferation.  It is unlikely that EU 
members could agree on any substantive changes to the text, 
and EU negotiators will basically present Damascus with a 
take-it-or-leave-it proposition.  Syria may balk at the text 
and walk away; should it instead seize the opportunity to 
demonstrate that it is not isolated internationally, an 
EU-Syria Association Agreement could be initialed as early as 
mid-June.  End Summary. 
 
EU Agrees Non-Proliferation Language for Syria 
----------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) On May 26, EU Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 
ended months of internal wrangling and agreed on revised 
non-proliferation language for inclusion in the EU's 
Association Agreement with Syria.  Last November, the EU 
endorsed "model" non-proliferation language that the 
Commission then negotiated with Syria, reaching ad ref 
agreement in December on language that was somewhat watered 
down from the Council's model text.  In January, EU member 
states rejected the Commission's negotiated language 
(reftel), putting the otherwise completed agreement on ice. 
Some EU members (and the Commission) argued that an agreement 
based on the negotiated text was worth more than insisting on 
more precise language and risking having Syria walk away from 
any agreement. Others (the UK, Netherlands, and Germany) 
insisted that the EU press Syria -- as a country of 
non-proliferation concern -- to agree to a comprehensive text. 
 
Irish bridge the gap 
------------------ 
¶3.  (C)  The Irish, as EU president since January, took two 
shots at bridging the gap between the two sides.  The first 
attempt earlier this year failed, but their second effort 
succeeded this week in garnering consensus support among all 
25 EU members.  USEU has obtained an informal copy of the 
agreed text (para seven below).  The new text is very similar 
to the (non-watered-down) model EU language originally agreed 
in November; in places even going further in specifying steps 
Syria will take in establishing an export control system. 
The agreed text also commits both parties to work toward a 
"Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction," an 
issue raised by Syria and a reference to Israel. 
 
Complex Next Steps, Even if Syria Agrees 
------------- 
¶4.  (C) Syria has not seen the new text yet; the Commission 
expects to present it to Damascus in the next few weeks.  The 
Commission Syria desk (protect) expects that the language 
will be difficult to sell.  A text, if agreed to by Syria, 
will require formal approval by Syria and the European 
Parliament (for the economic areas that are in the 
Commission's competence) and ratification by all 25 EU member 
states (for the political components of the text, including 
the non-proliferation portion).  According to the Council 
Secretariat, the EU and Syria have already discussed 
 
SIPDIS 
implementation, on an interim basis, of the economic portion 
of the agreement once the European Parliament approves it. 
At the same time, the Council expects to begin a "political 
dialogue" with Syria, to include non-proliferation, 
terrorism, and human rights issues. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶5.  (C)  It is possible that Syria will balk at the new 
language -- as reported reftel, Shara claimed he did not have 
complete SARG agreement on the text agreed ad ref in 
December.  On the other hand, if Syria can find a face-saving 
way to accept the new language, Damascus will have in hand 
public proof that it is not isolated in the international 
community.  This may be a powerful incentive in light of the 
recent imposition of U.S. sanctions.  At this point, the 
decision rests entirely with Damascus.  Given the 
difficulties the EU faced in reaching consensus on this 
latest text, it is unlikely to be able to agree on any 
substantive changes to it.  The Commission will thus have 
virtually no latitude in its negotiations, and Syria will be 
given a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.  Should Syria 
conclude that having an agreement now is worth accepting the 
new language, an agreement could be initialed sometime in mid 
to late June -- perhaps coinciding with the NATO summit in 
Istanbul or the US-EU summit in Ireland. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment continued.  From the EU perspective, the 
non-proliferation language gives Brussels leverage to put on 
hold the trade component of the agreement for political 
purposes.  For example, should Syria not meet EU expectations 
to establish an effective export control system, including 
for dual-use goods, the EU would have grounds for withdrawing 
(or not implementing) selected trade provisions of the 
agreement. 
 
¶7.  (C) Text of EU agreed language on non-proliferation. 
(Please note the text was shared informally with USEU; and 
protect the fact that we have received the text.) 
 
Begin Text: 
 
Preamble 
 
Considering that the proliferation of weapons of 
mass-destruction and their means of delivery, both to state 
and non-state actors, represents one of the most serious 
threats to international stability and security. 
 
Article 3 bis 
 
The Parties reiterate their shared objective to pursue a 
mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of 
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical 
and their delivery systems.  They agree to promote jointly 
the signature, ratification and implementation by all 
Mediterranean partners of all non-proliferation instruments, 
including the NPT, CTBT, BWC and CWC. 
 
Article 4 
 
The Parties agree to co-operate and to contribute to 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
nuclear, biological and chemical, and their means of delivery 
through meeting in full their existing obligations under 
international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and 
agreements and other relevant international obligations 
including United Nations Security Council resolutions and 
ensuring effective implementation.  The Parties agree that 
this provision constitutes an essential element of this 
agreement. 
 
They also agree to cooperate to this end by: 
 
- Taking steps towards the signature, ratification, or 
accession, as appropriate, and full implementation of the 
other relevant international instruments; 
 
- Setting up effective national systems of export, transit 
and en-use controls of WMD-related goods and technologies, 
including dual use, and containing enforcement procedures 
with appropriate penalties. 
 
The political dialogue as set out in Article 5 will accompany 
and consolidate the elements in this article. 
 
End Text 
 
SCHNABEL