This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE, EUR A/S JONES, EUR PDAS 
RIES AND EUR/ERA ALLEGRONE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: USEU SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY VISIT JUNE 
1-2: EU ASPECTS 
 
 
¶1. Sensitive but unclassified -- entire text. 
 
¶2. Summary:  You are coming to Brussels during a time of 
transition in the EU as it absorbs its new members and moves 
towards a new Parliament, new Commissioners and a new 
Constitutional Treaty. At the same time, the EU under the 
Irish Presidency is in the home stretch towards the 
forthcoming US/EU Summit next month. In addition to 
co-chairing the Sri Lanka's Donor Co-Chair meeting, you will 
be meeting with EU foreign policy czar Javier Solana. You 
will also informally meet with Commission Foreign Relations 
Head and fellow Sri Lanka meeting co-chair Chris Patten. Both 
Solana and Patten are under consideration for future 
leadership positions in the "next" European Union.  Solana 
and his office are heavily involved in US/EU Summit 
preparations and Solana will be very interested in engaging 
with you on Iraq, the Mid-East Peace Process and Bosnia.  End 
Summary 
 
Co-Chair Chris Patten: Lame Duck, Or Future Commission 
President? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  There is real drama, from a Brussels perspective, about 
the future of your fellow European Commission Co-chair, Chris 
Patten, who is winding down his activities in Brussels as 
Commissioner for External Relations, and has already begun 
his next (unpaid) position at Oxford.  Patten has been a 
strong RELEX Commissioner, and very helpful in swaying his 
Commission colleagues to move on key US concerns in the 
Balkans and the fight against terrorism.  He played a crucial 
role in brokering a substantial EU commitment for Iraq 
reconstruction at the Madrid Conference, and also maintained 
Commission support for development needs in Afghanistan. 
Recently, Patten,s name has been frequently mentioned as a 
possible compromise candidate to replace Romano Prodi as the 
next President of the European Commission, but weak French 
language skills may hurt his chances of gaining French 
support ) despite the open backing of Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing. 
 
¶4.  On the margins of the conference, you may wish to raise 
other issues with Patten.  He will be keenly interested in 
our views on developments in the Middle East, and should be 
pressed to preview for you the Commission's Medium-term 
strategy for assistance to reconstruction in Iraq.  You 
should also sound him out on the availability of funds to 
assist the Palestinian Authrity should Sharon follow through 
on his promises to withdraw from Gaza.  Patten can be a 
useful channel to his Commission colleagues on other issues 
of immediate concern to the US, including Romanian adoptions 
(where Enlargement Commissioner Gunther Verheugen has the 
lead), although this issue does not fall directly in Patten's 
purview. 
 
EU's Transition Overload 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  Patten,s own transition mirrors a general sense of flux 
and change that permeates the EU at this moment.  At the 
beginning of May, the EU finalized its largest and most 
challenging enlargement, welcoming ten new members to the 
Union.  These ten countries, all significantly poorer and for 
the most part ardently transatlantic in their outlook, are 
likely to change the dynamic of the Union precisely at a time 
when many other changes are in the offing.  We should not 
expect that the entry of these new members will somehow tilt 
the EU to automatically become more pro-US. The Commission, 
the EU,s executive body, has already become a lame duck.  In 
the middle of June, the Irish Presidency will announce the 
agreed replacement for Prodi.  Whoever that is ) and the 
field still appears wide open ) will be charged with naming 
a new Commission.  Several of the most influential 
Commissioners (including Patten and Trade mandarin Pascal 
Lamy) have already announced they will not return to 
ministerial posts. 
 
¶6.  In June, voters across Europe will go the polls to elect 
a new European Parliament.   In every country, national 
issues dominate, while EU matters get second billing.  It is 
commonly assumed that these elections provide an ideal 
opportunity for a protest vote against sitting governments. 
Especially in countries where the ruling party joined the 
coalition in Iraq, their opponents are attempting to 
capitalize on widespread European disapproval of the US-led 
war to score points ) as we have seen so dramatically from 
Prodi,s campaign against Berlusconi in Italy. 
 
¶7.  In addition, the Irish Presidency is in the home stretch 
of efforts to finalize negotiations on a complicated 
Constitution that aims at streamlining the decision-making 
apparatus of a Union of 25 Member States.  The Irish hope to 
wrap up before their mandate ends in the last days of June, 
but the continent,s leaders remain mired in difficult 
questions of decision-making (what sort of qualified 
majorities will be applied, and what other issues will still 
require consensus decision-making).  Consumed in this effort, 
it is not surprising that Irish attention to the US-EU summit 
at the end of month has been spotty, despite a strong desire 
to make transatlantic relations a key focus of their 
Presidency. 
 
¶8.  If this weren't enough on their plates, the EU must still 
come to grips by the end of the year with one of its most 
difficult issues: whether to invite Turkey to begin accession 
negotiations.   There is little support for this move among 
the European electorate, despite the strategic importance of 
Turkey as a bridge to the neighboring Muslim world -- or the 
committed progress of the Erdogan government in meeting the 
Copenhagen political criteria or supporting a settlement in 
Cyprus.  Chris Patten will play a major role in a Commission 
recommendation due this fall; he is one of Turkey's strongest 
advocates. 
 
Solana: Secondary on Iraq, Key on ME Peace 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  A source of stability in this period of change is Javier 
Solana, the EU,s "High Representative for a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy," who functions as the de facto EU 
foreign minister.  As a synthesizer of the European 
cacophony, and a voice of the European mainstream, he has no 
equal on the EU scene.  If the constitution talks succeed, 
they will create a new position that combines Solana's 
current functions with those of Patten on the Commission, and 
Solana is likely to be asked to remain on in that role. 
 
¶10.  On Iraq, however, Solana,s role is tangential.  After 
their failure to craft a united position prior to the 
invasion, the EU wants desperately to speak with one voice in 
the decisions that will be made on the future.  But the EU,s 
"Big Three" on the Security Council are jealously guarding 
their own prerogatives.  That leaves Solana little room to 
maneuver.  He does not play a decisive role on talks in New 
York, but he can still make important contributions behind 
the scenes in his interaction with European leaders.  Your 
approach will be most effective if it blends advocacy with a 
willingness to listen and take European views into account. 
In this regard, you can expect Solana to marshall arguments 
about sovereignty and a lead role for the UN that enjoys 
broad support in European capitals, but you should also 
expect him also to test you for areas of flexibility in the 
US position.   He would most certainly welcome your thoughts 
 
¶11.  Solana plays a more pivotal role in Europe,s policies 
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict than he does on Iraq. 
The Contact Group meeting in London helped to paper over 
continued unease with the U.S. approach announced at the 
President,s meeting with PM Sharon.  The subsequent 
uncertainty caused by Sharon's failure to gain Likud 
endorsement for his disengagement plan, as well as the 
military actions in Rafah, have only reinforced Europe,s 
concerns that our approach is failing to deliver the 
hoped-for results.  Solana will be anxious to hear where we 
think the process is leading.  He will try to steer the EU to 
support any steps they believe will get the Road Map back on 
track. 
 
The Balkans, China Arms, and Iran's Nuclear Program 
------------------------------------------ 
¶12.  In your talks with Solana, you should also highlight 
three other areas where he has a keen interest and can play a 
decisive role: the Balkans, China arms embargo, and Iran. 
You should acknowledge his pragmatic role in ensuring that 
the transition from SFOR to an EU-led mission in Bosnia using 
NATO assets under the Berlin Plus arrangements is proceeding 
well.  He is also likely to express his concerns that the 
current stalemate in Kosovo is unsustainable. 
 
¶13.  Solana is on record supporting an end to the EU's arms 
embargo on China.  Our lobbying in European capitals has 
managed to deflect the momentum in favor of this French-led 
proposal, but it is unclear how much longer some of the 
countries will hold out.  You should make it clear to Solana 
that our concerns about the impact of such a decision remain, 
and that our study of other EU arms export controls indicate 
they are not a substitute for the current policy. 
 
¶14.  Finally, we will be facing another decision-point in the 
IAEA on Iran's nuclear program in the near future.  Solana 
was initially ignored by the British-French-German initiative 
on Iran, but has now adopted it as the EU's and his own.  He 
was grateful for a special intelligence briefing we offered 
him prior to his visit earlier this year, and accepts that 
Iranian compliance is far from complete and verifiable.  He 
will waffle on next steps as the EU awaits El-Baradei's next 
report, but you should press him on next steps should -- as 
we both expect -- the IAEA be unable to certify a complete 
and verifiable end to the Iranian enrichment program. 
 
Schnabel