This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002211 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2014 
TAGS: PREL EI EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: BRUSSELS VIEW OF IRELAND'S EU PRESIDENCY: A 
HOME-STRETCH REPORT 
 
REF: DUBLIN 686 
 
Classified By: USEU/POL O'Hara, reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
1.(C) Summary: As we approach next month's US/EU summit, we 
give the Irish a tentative B  in how they've been dealing 
with issues of concern to the US.  In general, we find the 
Irish to be reactively helpful honest brokers on most issues, 
but they have pushed their own agenda on the mid-East and 
Africa even if this means isolating the US.  For most issues, 
from the war on terrorism, the Balkans, ESDP, and getting the 
EU to have a common asylum policy, the Irish have sought to 
be constructive and helpful.  Even though the Irish are a 
"small" country Presidency with a very stretched Brussels 
presence, they have been attentive to transatlantic 
relations. End Summary 
 
"Reactively Helpful" "Honest Brokers" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In our interactions with the Irish Presidency in 
Brussels, we have found them "reactively helpful." They have 
not been particularly forthright in tipping us off about 
potential problems, but if we raise issues and concerns with 
them, they are responsive. (The Council and the Commission 
and other PermReps remain better sources of "early warning.") 
As is likely the case in Dublin, we found our Irish 
interlocutors friendly and open. 
 
-- In particular, the Irish have been quite good about 
ensuring that US views are considered in internal EU 
discussion. For example, under the Irish Presidency's 
leadership, a French-led "rush" to lift the EU arms embargo 
against China was successfully slowed down.  The Irish have 
been working to kick this issue down to the Dutch Presidency 
or possibly later. This has been in the US interest and the 
Irish deserve credit for their efforts (as does the lobbying 
of our embassies in member states). 
 
-- Similarly, the Irish took pains to ensure that US views on 
nonproliferation were heard during the EU's decision-making 
process -- even as the Irish Presidency never wavered from 
its commitment to multilateral disarmament.  While this meant 
that Irish and US objectives were at times at odds, their 
apparent sincerity in playing "honest broker" by ensuring 
that our views were given a proper hearing -- alongside their 
own -- in EU policy debates, is appreciated. 
 
-- For the most part, the Irish did not push "effective 
multilateralism"  as hard as we might have anticipated.  The 
Commission and some EU member-states in Brussels see this 
concept as an effort to assert EU influence through the UN 
and other institutions to counterbalance US influence.  We 
note that the Dutch have stressed that this will be theme for 
their forthcoming EU Presidency later this year. 
 
Pushing their Agenda 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (C//NF) However, when the Irish decide to drop their 
broker role and step up to pursue national or EU priorities, 
they sometimes have done this against US interests.  On the 
May 6 Palestinian UNGA resolution on the status of the 
occupied Palestinian territory, the Irish cut a deal with the 
Palestinians, railroaded some member states (e.g. the 
Netherlands, ref) with an end result that isolated the US. 
The Irish Presidency did something similar at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights last month, when they cut a deal 
on Sudan with the African Union and then imposed the deal on 
other EU members.  As with the UNGA resolution, the Irish 
determination to push their "deal" within the EU and on 
others left the US isolated. 
 
Out of step with the US on Russia? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) At a recent US/EU task force, the Irish Presidency 
revealed ambivalence about a joint US/EU statement at the 
Summit recognizing joint US/EU actions in the former Soviet 
Union.  Irish reps expressed concern that this could be seen 
by Moscow as anti-Russian.  At the May 21 EU/Russia Summit, 
the Irish seemed content to pocket Russia's acceptance of EU 
enlargement and not worry about "deliverables" for Moscow 
until the Dutch host their summit with Russia in the fall. 
 
GME/Mid-East: reactive but how helpful? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) While we can appreciate that the Irish have not 
picked transatlantic fights over the Mid-East, they (and most 
other members) have been hesitant to embrace a Greater 
Mid-East Initiative too warmly.  The Presidency has been 
virtually invisible in Brussels so far, letting the 
Commission take the lead in discussing GME with the U.S. 
However, under Irish leadership, the Irish led an effort to 
forge a new EU strategy to the region, crafting helpful 
language on the need for political and economic reform and an 
enhanced role for women in the region, as well as on EU 
readiness to achieve "complementarity" with the U.S.  Similar 
language was also inserted in the conclusions from the EU's 
May 5-6 Euromed ministerial with Arab countries in Dublin. 
From the EU perspective, the Irish have performed well in 
this defensive mode, remaining mildly responsive to our GME 
initiative while maintaining a separate profile for the EU's 
ties to the Arab world. 
Constructive and helpful on ongoing "big issues" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶6. (C) Nonetheless, on balance the Irish have tried to move 
ahead in positive ways on a number of US interests. On ESDP, 
the Irish, based in part on their Partnership-for-Peace 
experience, have been very constructive in moving discussions 
of EU/NATO relations out of the rancorous political arena to 
technical experts level talks with a focus on practical 
details.  The progress made to date on Bosnia transition owe 
much to this pragmatic approach.  The Irish have been 
positive in US/EU interactions at the OSCE -- most recently 
at the US/EU OSCE experts level consultations in Brussels and 
also the recent OSCE anti-Semitism meeting in Berlin.  The 
Irish have also been helpful on Liberia, strengthening asset 
freeze measures in the Balkans, getting internal EU agreement 
on asylum directives, and wrapping up internal EU agreement 
to go ahead with the common EU asylum procedures. 
 
Cyprus/EU: On the Irish watch but not Dublin's "fault" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Irish Presidency seems to have dodged the bullet 
for the EU's decision to admit a divided Cyprus into the EU 
on May 1. Although no one in the Council was willing to stand 
up and be counted prior to the referenda, the Irish leaned 
further forward than most in expressing support for the Annan 
plan and calling for a united Cyprus.  Currently, the 
Brussels blame game is pointing to the Greek Cypriots, who 
now represent Cyprus as full EU members as the "spoilers" of 
this historic enlargement round. The Irish did put on a good 
show in Ireland of welcoming the new members and as such have 
been as appropriately supportive of the need to celebrate the 
EU's 10 new members.  We don't foresee major decisions on 
Turkey's candidacy during the Irish Presidency, although we 
expect this to be a huge issue for the US and the EU during 
the Dutch Presidency. 
 
Counter-Terrorism 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Following the March 11 Madrid train bombing, the 
Irish succeeded in turning European fears about domestic 
vulnerabilities into a far-reaching commitment to "get 
serious" about the war on terrorism.  Within days of the 
attack, the Irish had drafted a proposal calling on EU member 
states to speed implementation of previously agreed (but 
politically sensitive) measures to protect European citizens 
from terrorist attacks.  They also advocated certain new 
measures, such as the creation of an "EU CT Czar," to make 
the EU a more effective and better coordinated player in the 
war on terrorism.  The refined proposal emerged two weeks 
later as an ambitious and detailed declaration by EU leaders 
at their March 25 Summit in Brussels.  This was a significant 
achievement for a Presidency with so little bureaucratic 
capacity for dealing with such a complex and sensitive policy 
area.  In so doing, the Irish also helped to reinvigorate EU 
efforts in ways that should lead to a robust package in thisarea for the US/EU 
Summit. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶9. (C) Our EU interlocutors are pleased to have a more normal 
Presidency after what they tended to see as Italy's eratic 
leadership.  The Irish have been relatively successful at 
being a good "European" presidency. In particular, the Irish 
worked quite hard to "celebrate" EU enlargement, and have 
tried to move the EU constitutional process forward -- 
despite deep member-state disagreements.  As a result, as the 
Irish seek to exercise their "political will" to move US/EU 
summit deliverables through the EU political process, they 
should be in a better position to deliver than the Italian 
Presidency. 
 
Foster