This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 002091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RPM WAKE, RUSSELL; EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM OSCE EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON OSCE 
 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The EU hosted a U.S. delegation headed by 
USOSCE Ambassador Stephan M. Minikes for the biannual U.S.-EU 
"COSCE" consultations on the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on May 7.  Key findings were: 
 
--U.S.-EU Coordination within OSCE: cooperation between the 
U.S. and EU in Vienna is excellent.  Especially with EU 
enlargement, early consultation is important in order to 
avoid policy differences between the U.S. and EU that third 
countries (such as Russia) could exploit; 
 
--2004 Human Dimension Conferences: the Berlin anti-Semitism 
conference and the companion conference on racism and 
xenophobia planned for September display OSCE leadership on a 
fundamental issue -- how to build cohesive but diverse 
societies; 
 
--Moldova/Transnistria: Russia is stonewalling on 
Transnistria for fear of losing influence in the region; 
engagement at ministerial and head-of-state level is 
necessary for a solution; 
 
--Belarus: the U.S. and EU should keep linking closer 
relations with Belarus to progress on human rights/democracy, 
and send a tougher message on that to the GOB; 
 
--South Caucasus: recommendations on how and whether the EU 
Neighborhood Policy covers the region are set for June; 
 
--Central Asia: the Kazakhs must be informed as soon as 
possible of the reforms required for U.S. and EU support of 
their candidacy for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship; 
 
--Ukraine: U.S. and EU concerns on Ukraine are almost 
identical, and EU has confronted Ukraine on democracy/media 
freedom issues; 
 
--The Balkans: the EU, OSCE and UN all have a role in Kosovo; 
OMIK institution-building efforts should continue; 
 
--2004 OSCE Economic Forum: free markets and the rule of law, 
not more seminars, are needed in the OSCE area; the OSCE 
Economic Dimension's stress on good governance is appropriate; 
 
--2004 Annual Security Review Conference: high-level 
political participation is key to the success of this 
conference; 
 
--OSCE Personnel Issues: choosing a new SecGen and other 
personnel issues merit close U.S. and EU attention; 
 
--OSCE Budget: almost no one wants their assessment to go up, 
some (e.g. Russia) want substantial cuts.  No one yet has 
clear idea how to square this circle; 
 
--Sofia Ministerial: the EU said focus on priority issues -- 
Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Chechnya -- would result in 
higher-level turnout and increased public recognition of the 
OSCE.  The U.S. proposed a Ministerial declaration on 
tolerance and OSCE endorsement of the Container Security 
Initiative. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
¶2. (U) 
 
EU Delegation 
------------- 
 
Ireland (current EU Presidency): 
 
Barbara Jones, Director of Russia, Eastern Europe, OSCE and 
Council of Europe Section, MFA Dublin 
Peter Fitzpatrick, Deputy Director, OSCE and Council of 
Europe Section, MFA Dublin 
 
The Netherlands (successor to Ireland in EU Presidency): 
 
Frank van Beuningen, Policy Coordinator, Security Policy 
Department/OSCE Desk, MFA The Hague 
Willemijn Kallenberg, Senior Policy Officer, Security Policy 
Department/OSCE Desk, MFA The Hague 
 
European Commission: 
 
Gilbert Dubois, Head of Unit for OSCE and Council of Europe, 
DG External Relations 
Keith Sangway, Desk Officer for OSCE, DG External Relations 
Eero Vuohula, Adviser, Unit for OSCE and Council of Europe, 
DG External Relations 
 
EU Council Secretariat: 
Stefano Tomat, OSCE and CoE Desk Officer 
 
U.S. delegation 
--------------- 
 
Stephan M. Minikes, Ambassador to the OSCE 
Daniel Russell, Office Director, EUR/RPM 
Bruce Connuck, Political Counselor, USOSCE Vienna 
Lee Litzenberger, Political Officer, USEU Brussels 
Todd Huizinga, Political Officer, USEU Brussels 
 
------------------------------------ 
Early U.S.-EU Consultation Important 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) USOSCE Ambassador Minikes stated that early 
consultation with the EU in the OSCE has become even more 
important since the May 1 enlargement of the EU to 25 member 
states.  The U.S. wants to engage with the EU before its 
positions become set in stone, he said.  Barbara Jones, 
Director of the Russia, Eastern Europe, OSCE and Council of 
Europe Section of the MFA Dublin, agreed, saying that it 
should be an EU policy goal not to let gaps between the U.S. 
and EU emerge -- particularly on difficult issues.  It is 
important, she said, not to let third countries exploit 
U.S.-EU differences. 
 
¶4. (C) Jones said that EU enlargement would have "a powerful 
effect" on the EU role in the OSCE.  She said the EU OSCE 
Working Group would ask EU FonMins in June for a mandate to 
do a strategic assessment of EU policy on the OSCE.  She said 
EU member states are discussing internally various papers on 
the topic, and that they might meet at the end of May to 
discuss the way forward.  The July-December Dutch EU 
presidency, she said, would likely be tasked with finishing 
the assessment. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Coordination on Approach to Russia? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The discussion shifted to U.S.-EU coordination on 
engaging Russia in the OSCE.  Jones, who is in charge of 
coordinating Irish EU presidency preparations for the May 21 
EU-Russia summit, said she was pessimistic about Russian 
intentions toward the OSCE.  She said the key question is 
whether the new Russian FonMin, Sergei Lavrov, will change 
the Ivanov MFA's coolness toward the OSCE.  On the positive 
side, Jones said that in his two meetings with the EU so far, 
Lavrov had "talked the talk of effective multilateralism." 
On Chechnya, Jones said all indications are that the Russians 
will keep "forum shopping," and might favor Council of Europe 
engagement over that of the OSCE.  In conclusion, Jones said 
that the EU had just presented Russia with a framework for 
dialogue based on the St. Petersburg Summit Joint Declaration 
of May 2003, emphasizing convergence with EU standards on 
democracy, respect for human rights and related issues. 
 
¶6. (C) Minikes said it is necessary to concentrate on areas 
in which engagement with Russia would be productive.  On some 
issues Russia is simply not willing to engage, as often 
reflected in the Russian OSCE Mission in Vienna's lack of 
guidance from Moscow.  On difficult issues, such as Chechnya, 
Moldova, and Georgia, ministerial-level or presidential 
engagement would be necessary to make progress. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Anti-Semitism Conference Shows OSCE Leadership 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (C) Referring to the demographic perspectives for the EU, 
Minikes said the April 28-29 Berlin anti-Semitism conference 
and the companion Brussels meeting on racism and xenophobia 
planned for September are bringing OSCE into a leadership 
role on one of the fundamental issues for Europe's as well as 
America's future: how to build cohesive societies that 
respect and integrate diversity.  Both sides agreed that the 
success of the Berlin conference entailed a responsibility to 
work hard to make the Brussels conference relevant as well. 
On the idea of appointing a Special Representative on 
Anti-Semitism, Minikes said the U.S. does not want to create 
a new OSCE bureaucracy, but is not closed to the idea of a 
part-time representative modeled on Ahtisaari's role in 
Central Asia.  Jones said Irish FM Cowan had reacted 
positively when Bulgarian FM Passy broached the idea, but 
that most in the EU favor revisiting the issue after the 
September racism conference. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Moldova/Transnistria: Russia Stonewalling 
------------------------------------------ 
¶8. (C) Discussion focused on Russian opposition to the 
proposed May 4 experts' meeting (to prepare a principals, 
meeting), and its resulting cancellation.  Both sides agreed 
that Russia is stonewalling on Transnistria for fear of 
losing influence in the region, and that engagement at 
ministerial and head-of-state level would be necessary for a 
solution.  Jones said the EU will raise Moldova (as well as 
Georgia and Chechnya) at the EU-Russia summit.  Frank van 
Beuningen, Policy Coordinator for the OSCE Desk in the Dutch 
MFA, asked whether the possibility of a Russia-NATO summit on 
the margins of the June NATO summit in Istanbul could be used 
as leverage to get the Russians to begin fulfilling their 
Istanbul commitments.  EUR/RPM Director Daniel Russell 
responded that Russia had made "zero movement" toward meeting 
its Istanbul commitments, both in Moldova and in Georgia.  He 
said a Russia-NATO summit would almost certainly not lead to 
progress on that front. 
 
¶9. (C) Minikes said he believed Putin had drawn a line in the 
sand on Moldova -- he was not going to do anything that would 
lessen Russian influence in Moldova by bringing it closer to 
the West.  The argument to make to Putin, said Minikes, is 
that Putin should make a deal now while a known quantity, 
Moldovan President Voronin, is still in office.  Only a 
high-level approach to Putin has a chance at success. 
Russell underscored that with his observation that Putin's 
having appointed his close associate, Deputy Head of 
Administration Dmitriy Kozak, as Russian Moldova negotiator 
made clear that the Russian MFA could not move on Moldova 
without Putin's involvement. 
 
¶10. (C) USOSCE PolCouns Bruce Connuck said that one reason 
Moscow is foot-dragging on Moldova is concern that an 
OSCE-brokered Moldova deal, that draws Moldova closer to 
Europe, might also further stimulate forces in Ukraine that 
want to distance Ukraine from Russia and align it more 
closely with the West.  Commission OSCE Unit Chief Gilbert 
Dubois underlined the need to keep pushing Ukrainian 
President Kuchma to help find a solution to the Transnistria 
problem.  Jones said the EU will raise the issue at the May 
18 EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council meeting in Brussels. 
 
¶11. (C) On approaching Voronin, Minikes raised the planned 
early June visit of OSCE ambassadors to Moldova and proposed 
that the visit be used to make clear to Voronin that the U.S. 
and EU will keep working for a solution.  Jones was open to 
this idea, but did not add any specifics. 
 
--------------------------- 
Belarus: EU Getting Tougher 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Jones said the May 12 meeting of the EU Working Group 
on Eastern Europe (COEST) will include three Belarus-related 
items.  First on the agenda will be the text of an EU public 
statement on the Pourgourides report.  Jones said EU member 
states were extremely upset by this "damning" report, which 
accuses GOB officials of criminal murder and which cannot be 
dismissed, coming as it does from the COE's parliamentary 
assembly.  The statement, said Jones, will be tough (but fall 
short of imposing sanctions).  Jones said the EU will call 
for an independent investigation and publication of the 
report in Belarus.  Some EU members are questioning the value 
of any further engagement with Belarus until this issue is 
resolved, but Jones said she would argue that engagement 
would be necessary to deliver the tough message.  Once there 
is an agreed text, Jones said, it will be blessed by the EU's 
Political and Security Committee Ambassadors on May 13. 
 
¶13. (C) Second on the May 12 COEST agenda, said Jones, will 
be the reply to Belarus FonMin Martynov on the step-by-step 
policy.  Jones was very pleased to have received the proposed 
U.S. reply to Martynov on May 6.  She said it had been 
circulated within the EU and is key to keeping the EU on the 
same track as the U.S. in its internal discussions.  Her 
initial impression was that the U.S. reply was a bit "soft." 
She indicated the EU might want to insert a reference to the 
Pourgourides report, or propose tougher language.  The EU 
COEST group would be working off the reply proposed by EU 
Minsk Heads of Mission and the U.S. text.  Jones hoped to get 
the EU reply cleared at the COEST, but said it might be 
difficult.  She appreciated U.S. willingness to coordinate 
both timing and substance and to have our missions in Minsk 
deliver the reply, or replies, on the same day. 
 
¶14. (C) Finally, Jones said the COEST will discuss plans for 
the May 25 visit of Belarusian opposition leaders/NGO reps to 
Brussels.  Plans now are for meetings with Irish FM Cowen, 
Chris Patten and Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen, plus a 
public press statement.  Jones said the EU does not want this 
cast as an anti-Lukashenko event, but as normal EU 
consultations with the opposition prior to elections. 
 
¶15. (C) Jones committed to contact us after the May 12 
meeting to coordinate follow-up.  She expressed great 
appreciation for the close cooperation with the U.S. on 
Belarus, adding that it had not been easy to get approval to 
do the recent joint U.S.-EU demarche in Minsk, but that the 
U.S. had thereby sent a "powerful message" to the EU that if 
the EU consulted with us, we would "play it straight."  She 
also praised coordination in Minsk between U.S. Ambassador 
Krol and his French counterpart.  Jones said she wanted to 
continue the coordination; she said there is "no daylight" 
between the EU and the U.S.:  EU policy remains: 
 
-- step-by-step; 
-- engagement to be able to deliver tough messages; 
-- ban on high level contacts; 
-- maximum pressure for GOB progress on human 
rights/democracy. 
 
¶16. (C) Van Beuningen stressed the importance of the October 
parliamentary elections.  Minikes said the U.S. had told 
Bulgarian OSCE CiO FonMin Solomon Passy that, if he did visit 
Belarus in late May as he had indicated, he must press the 
GOB to agree to an election conference, to issue a timely 
invitation to ODIHR to observe the elections, and to appoint 
opposition members to electoral commissions. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
South Caucasus and EU Neighborhood Policy 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Jones said the central question for the EU on the 
South Caucasus is whether and how the region would be 
included in the EU's aborning Neighborhood Policy for 
increasing assistance and coordination with Eastern European 
countries post-EU enlargement.  She said the Commission would 
issue a paper on the Neighborhood Policy on May 12 and EU 
CFSP HighRep Javier Solana is set to make recommendations on 
the Neighborhood initiative in June, including perspectives 
for the South Caucasus. 
 
¶18. (C) Minikes observed that the EU's ability to deal with 
frozen conflicts and other crises in the region appeared to 
him to be hampered by lack of guidance to EU OSCE missions in 
Vienna.  When a crisis occurred, Vienna missions tended to 
waste at least a week in indecisiveness and inaction.  Jones 
responded that she shared a sense of "bewilderment" as to 
what the OSCE role in conflict prevention could be. 
 
¶19. (C) Both sides agreed on the value of prospective OSCE 
field offices in Georgia, but noted Russian opposition and 
conflicting Georgian responses to the idea. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Kazakh Bid for 2009 Chairmanship: OSCE Leverage 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶20. (C) Minikes warned that as a practical matter, the OSCE 
decision on Kazakhstan's bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship 
has to be made by 2005 in order to have time to seek an 
alternative chair if necessary.  He said that the U.S. would 
not support the chairmanship bid of any country that holds 
political prisoners.  Connuck added that the Kazakhs should 
be told as soon as possible what reforms would be necessary 
to gain U.S. and EU support for its candidacy; the GOK would 
need time to implement those reforms.  He also urged that EU 
country embassies in Almaty consult on the ground with the 
U.S. Embassy, and that our missions on the ground make 
coordinated recommendations to Brussels and Washington on how 
to proceed concerning the Kazakh candidacy.  Minikes noted 
that a group of OSCE ambassadors (Canada, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Norway and Belgium) would visit Kazakhstan the third week of 
May, and that he would visit a week later -- it would be 
helpful to know the EU position on the Kazakh candidacy 
beforehand.  Jones agreed to draft a paper on the "basic 
levels of achievement" that Kazakhstan would have to 
accomplish in order to receive EU support for its candidacy. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Ukraine: U.S., EU Share Concerns 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) Jones reported that the EU-Ukraine Ministerial 
meeting in Dublin on April 29 had been "really difficult." 
She said the EU participants had "really blasted" Ukrainian 
FM Hryshchenko on media harassment and the need for an action 
plan for democratic reform, telling him that "your European 
ambitions are in your hands."  She said the EU left no room 
for doubt as to its demands that Ukraine start living up to 
European standards if it wants to have closer association 
with the EU.  She said the EU shares U.S. concern that the 
October presidential election be free and fair, and on the 
value of the OSCE Project Coordinator's Office in Kiev.  She 
said Irish FM Cowan and External Relations Commissioner 
Patten would raise the issue of the OSCE office with the 
Ukrainians. 
 
------------------------------- 
Kosovo: EU, OSCE Both Have Role 
------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) Both sides agreed that there is no reason to transfer 
OSCE capacity-building functions in Kosovo to the EU, a 
possibility UNMIK SRSG Harri Holkeri had raised.  Van 
Beuningen said the EU believes that OSCE, the EU and UN 
should continue their cooperation in Kosovo.  Jones said the 
EU does not have a position on the Holkeri proposal; there is 
no EU "takeover agenda."  Dubois noted that Holkeri would be 
a guest at the May 12-13 Council of Europe Ministerial -- it 
would be interesting to see what Holkeri would say there. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
OSCE Economic Forum: No Canned Speeches! 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Minikes proposed that this year's Economic Forum 
dispense with the usual canned national statements that take 
time and limit real exchange.  The EU interlocutors appeared 
to agree with the idea, but lacked the will to buck the 
expected resistance of many OSCE members.  Minikes stressed 
that Economic Forum events should be relevant to real-life 
needs; what is needed are not more seminars, he said, but 
freedom, rule of law and access to capital for the many 
potential entrepreneurs who are squelched not by lack of 
business savvy, but by lack of freedom and opportunity. 
Commission OSCE Unit Adviser Eero Vuohula responded that, for 
those very reasons, he greeted the OSCE Economic Dimension's 
current emphasis on good governance.  Jones said the key is 
to get OSCE field workers, in following up Economic Dimension 
conferences, to think beyond their fields of specialization 
and build on colleagues' efforts in other fields -- thus 
putting into practice the OSCE doctrine of the 
interrelatedness of security, economy, and human rights. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Annual Security Review Conference 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶24. (C) Minikes reported that Secretary Ridge could not 
attend the 2004 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC), but 
that the DHS Deputy Secretary James Loy will attend.  Minikes 
stressed the importance of high-level political attendance, 
and Jones said Ireland is aiming for ministerial-level 
participation.  Minikes said the U.S. wants to use the ASRC 
to make practical progress on counter-terrorism efforts, for 
example, by ascertaining next steps for the OSCE border 
management concept and getting OSCE buy-in on the U.S.-EU 
Container Security Initiative. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Personnel Issues Deserve More Attention 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶25. (C) Minikes strongly stressed the importance of getting 
the right people in OSCE jobs.  He warned that OSCE SecGen 
Kubis may find another job and leave before his mandate 
expires in June 2005.  Minikes proposed that the U.S. and EU 
consult early about candidates to succeed Kubis.  Minikes 
hoped the EU would avoid deciding on a "EU candidate" too 
early, because that often resulted in the appointment of the 
EU default candidate, rather than finding the best person for 
the job.  The U.S. does not want to be put in the position of 
having no choices other than acquiescing to a pre-determined 
EU choice, or to casting a veto.  Both sides agreed that the 
mandate of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf 
Ekeus, which comes to an end on July 31, should be renewed. 
Minikes raised the importance of selecting quality OSCE Heads 
of Mission, both in the field and in Vienna, and Jones chimed 
in that candidate selection issues might be included in the 
EU policy paper on OSCE (see para 4).  Minikes also said 
that, if people in important OSCE positions are not 
performing satisfactorily, OSCE members should let them know. 
 An example of this is the performance of Bulgarian FM Passy 
as OSCE CiO -- he is not effectively dealing with human 
rights problems in Central Asia and generally avoids 
confrontation even if that means not dealing with important 
problems.  When that happens, OSCE members should send Passy 
the message that the CiO job was not being done right. 
-------------------------------- 
OSCE Budget: Keep Current System 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (C) Van Beuningen said the EU shares the U.S. positions 
(1) against the Russian proposal to scrap the contextual 
framework for reviewing scales of assessment and move to a 
merged, unitary scale; and (2) in favor of keeping the 
present scales of assessment system.  Both sides recognized 
the dilemma of how to deal with most states, insistence on 
not increasing their assessments, and others (e.g. Russia,s) 
insistence on substantial reductions, while maintaining 
proper financing for the organization. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Sofia Ministerial: Need Focus, Preparation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶27. (C) Minikes expressed concern about the Bulgarian CiO's 
not yet having started consulting other OSCE members on 
preparation for the Sofia Ministerial.  He said he had 
suggested that the CiO pull together some OSCE members to 
discuss Ministerial deliverables, and outlined U.S. ideas: 
(1) translating the Berlin Declaration on anti-Semitism and 
the prospective Brussels concluding document on racism and 
xenophobia into a Ministerial document on tolerance; (2) 
bringing the 55 OSCE members behind the Container Security 
Initiative; and (3) not pinning hopes for the Ministerial on 
settlement of regional conflicts. 
 
¶28. (C) Jones said we should apply the lessons of the 2003 
Maastricht Ministerial:  when there is focus, more Ministers 
show up and the public takes notice.  She suggested the Sofia 
focus should be Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, and Chechnya. 
 
FOSTER