This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2014 
TAGS: PTER PHUM PGOV PINR PINS SNAR KJUS CO OAS ELN
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN PARAMILITARY PEACE PROCESS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On May 14, Ambassador and Peace Commissioner 
Restrepo discussed the paramilitary peace agreement.  The 
paramilitary leaders have a month to concentrate.  Restrepo 
speculated they agreed after almost destroying the talks 
because:  (1) the government had followed a consistent line 
and put forward a written, almost take-it-or-leave-it 
proposal, (2) they had been "startled" by recent tough public 
comments by the ambassador, (3) the elimination of Castano 
had increased their confidence they could hold together, and 
(4) they may be feeling the effects of government military 
and police efforts.  Restrepo is pleased that paramilitary 
silence after the signing has allowed the government to spin 
the agreement, but worried that the signers may be having 
second thoughts.   Paramilitary leaders remain resistant to 
concentrating their troops without a guarantee against jail 
time and extradition.  Restrepo does not expect the draft 
"Law for Justice and Reparation," which provides for 
mandatory jail time, to be softened when it is considered 
during the congressional session that begins on July 20. 
Restrepo reiterated that extradition was not on the table and 
that the April 27 presidential declaration embodies GOC 
policy.  End Summary. 
 
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Paramilitary Change of Heart? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Carlos Castano's ouster from the peace process 
reflected a hardening of the paramilitary position and a 
strengthening of the narcotics trafficking influence.  Why 
then did the ten commanders of the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) 
and United Self Defense Forces (AUC) agree on May 12 and 13 
to concentrate in a 400 square km zone in Cordoba (map 
emailed to WHA/AND)?  Restrepo speculated that several 
factors caused the change: 
 
-- Castano was not only a source of tension among leaders; 
they also didn't trust him.  With his elimination, they 
became more confident of their ability to stick together. 
From that stronger position, they could agree to Restrepo's 
concentration proposal. 
 
-- The Ambassador's public comments in Semana magazine that 
(that the ouster of Castano revealed the paras to be nothing 
more than narco-terrorists, thieves and murderers with no 
claim to being treated as political actors) startled them. 
 
-- The GOC has followed a tough, consistent line, solicited 
the May 12 meeting with the AUC/BCB and presented the written 
the concentration proposal on an almost take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.  Restrepo commented that, although they have positions 
on issues, the para leaders had no coherent negotiating game 
plan. 
 
-- Almost in passing, Restrepo also speculated that the paras 
might be feeling the effects of government military and 
police pressure.  (Interestingly, during the conversation, 
Restrepo received a call from the Minister of Defense who 
wanted to make sure that a planned operation against an 
upper-mid level para/drug dealer would not overthrow the 
peace deal at this sensitive stage; Restrepo told him to 
launch the operation.) 
 
¶3. (C) Restrepo said that Don Berna had eliminated four 
persons of importance to Castano that that Castano had, in 
return, killed someone close to Don Berna (presumably 
"Danilo").  This had precipitated the attack on Castano. 
Restrepo expressed the belief, but said he didn't have 
conclusive proof, that Castano was dead.  He noted that 
Castano's disappearance relieved the BCB, which had feared 
Castano would give information to authorities about their 
drug trafficking activities. 
 
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Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶4. (C) Concentration of leaders:  The first step is 
concentration of leaders and bodyguards (estimated to be 
about 25 leaders and 400 persons in all).  Restrepo said that 
there had been informal agreement that the commanders would 
concentrate within one month.  In the meantime, Restrepo will 
work with the security forces and the OAS to prepare the 
area.  The GOC must demonstrate within the first few days of 
concentration that the paramilitaries will be completely 
prohibited from any illicit activities and held accountable 
for cease-fire violations.  If not, the concentration zone 
risks becoming another FARC-like farce.  He stressed that OAS 
verification will be crucial. 
 
¶5. (C) Concentration/demobilization of cadre:  Restrepo would 
like to concentrate/demobilize around 5,000 paramilitaries 
before the end of the year.  Restrepo said that the 
paramilitary leaders continue to resist concentration of 
cadre until they receive written guarantees against jail time 
and extradition.  Restrepo said that he would continue to 
refuse to negotiate, in spite of repeated efforts by the 
paramilitary leaders, the draft "Law for Justice and 
Reparation," which calls for mandatory jail time for anyone 
guilty of a serious, violent crime.  Congress will review the 
bill during the session that begins on July 20.  Although 
paramilitary supporters (lawyers, lobbyists, etc.) are 
seeking to soften the bill, Restrepo does not expect them to 
be successful.  Castano stressed that concentrated leaders 
would still be fully under the legal jurisdiction of Colombia 
and, if the law were passed while they were concentrated, 
they would become immediately subject to it. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Restrepo said that the para leaders continued to claim 
that the FARC will re-enter the areas they currently control 
if they demobilize and that they must have the freedom to 
defend those areas.  In response to the ambassador's 
rejection of the idea that the paras play any positive role 
and assertion that that the danger of vacuums was 
overestimated, Restrepo agreed that "the paras are not 
necessary."  Restrepo has asked the para leaders for a map of 
areas they think the FARC might try to move into, both as a 
negotiating tactic and to provide information to the ministry 
of defense.  In any event, Restrepo agreed with the 
ambassador that concentration zones for cadre must be small 
enough to remove any practical operational capability from 
the paras, whether against the FARC or anyone else. 
 
------------------------ 
No Change on Extradition 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) In response to the ambassador's question, Restrepo 
reaffirmed the April 27 presidential declaration that 
extradition is not on the table and assured that no 
concessions of any kind had been made in this regard. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Restrepo clearly is unable to completely explain the 
sudden change in direction of the para leaders; up to very 
recently he had thought that the talks were on the rocks.  If 
we had to add an element to what he told us, it would be the 
presidential declaration of April 27, which amounted to an 
ultimatum to the paras and clearly ruled our extradition and 
jail time as subjects for negotiation.  In our view, that may 
have been the key variable. 
 
¶9. (C) But it is also clear that the para leaders are still 
in full negotiation mode.  Getting them to actually 
concentrate will be a challenge, and getting their cadre to 
concentrate will be a bigger one.  Then getting 
demobilization will be still harder. 
 
¶10. (C) Embassy recommends that the Department, in its public 
statements and third-country diplomacy, emphasize the need 
for the paras to completely fulfill their promises: 
cessation of violence, concentration of leaders within a 
month, and concentration of cadre sometime after that. 
 
¶11. (C) Embassy also notes Restrepo's emphasis on the OAS 
role.  We agree.  Embassy recommends that Department work to 
ensure adequate funding and staffing for the Caramagna effort 
here.  Embassy is prepared to work closely with Washington 
agencies on the issue. 
WOOD