This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002560 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR P, E, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA 
NSC FOR BRYZA AND MCKIBBEN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2014 
TAGS: ECIN ETRD PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY SAYS "NO THANKS" TO TDA FEASIBILITY STUDY 
ON SECOND BORDER GATE 
 
REF: ANKARA 2201 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
 
¶1.  (C) MFA Deputy Director General for Middle East Affairs 
Sakir Fakili told EconCouns May 5 that, while Turkish 
authorities appreciated the U.S. offer (reftel) for TDA to 
conduct a feasibility study on a second Turkish-Iraqi border 
crossing, they felt such assistance was unnecessary given 
that Turkey already has completed its own study.  Fakili 
reiterated the GOT view that its proposed crossing/route was 
the only viable option, as it would alleviate traffic 
congestion on the Iraqi side, facilitate control of the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, and create the conditions for 
a parallel rail line. 
 
 
¶2.  (C)   EconCouns said the U.S. interest was in encouraging 
Turkish-Iraqi trade, which promoted economic stability and 
development on both sides of the border.  It was up to 
Turkish and Iraqi authorities to determine the location of 
the crossing and relevant roads; the U.S. had offered the TDA 
feasibility study as a way to accelerate progress.  If the 
Turks and Iraqis could reach agreement and begin constructing 
a second crossing without U.S. help, that would be great, but 
it would be unfortunate if disagreement over location 
prevented trade from growing.  He added that choice of the 
route on the Iraqi side of a second border crossing would 
seem to be a decision for the Iraqis to make. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Fakili acknowledged the last point, but said Turkey 
would "insist" on its proposed route.  He added that the 
Turkish feasibility study had determined the total cost of 
the project -- including road and bridge construction on both 
sides of the border, as well as the border gate itself -- to 
be in the $70-80 million range.  Financing was an open 
question, and could be discussed if and when Iraqi 
authorities agreed to the Turkish proposal. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) On May 6, PolMilOff was called into the MFA by Iraq 
Department Head Serra Erarslan.  Eraraslan, on instruction 
from Deputy U/S Tuygan, complained that at the weekly border 
talks, the US side regularly asks Turkey to increase the 
throughput of trucks crossing the border, which Turkey tries 
to do.  However, she said, the US was unresponsive to Turkish 
requests to address the treatment of Turkish citizens, 
including truckers, and fees charged to Turks at Ibrahim 
Khalil and in northern Iraq.  She continued that Turkish 
efforts at relations with Iraq in the new era have not been 
favorably received by the US, and said the most important 
example was the second border gate.  Erarslan said that 
Turkey's impression was that because the KDP was rejecting 
the plan, the US was siding with the KDP.  In light of this, 
Erarslan concluded, continuing US requests to expedite trucks 
at Habur were creating tension with the GOT in Ankara, and 
that the GOT was "getting tired of it." 
 
 
¶5.  (C) PolMilOff replied that the US was decidedly not 
siding with anyone on the issue of a second gate, favored the 
establishment of the gate and increased Turkey-Iraq trade, 
and was, via the TDA offer, prepared to spend US tax dollars 
to help the Turks and Iraqis find middle ground, or at least 
short and medium term solutions.  Rejecting that assistance 
and insisting on one plan would lead to a continued deadlock 
on the issue.  Erarslan replied that if the Iraqis could not 
agree with the Turks on the details of a second gate, Turkey 
would drop the project and all sides would have to content 
themselves with Habur as the only crossing.  She expressed 
frustration that the Iraqis point the Turks to the US as the 
decisive party on Iraq issues, and when the Turks come to the 
USG, we point them back to the Iraqis.  She said Turkey felt 
it had no reliable interlocutor for these issues, and that US 
promises, including to stop the illegal charging of fees by 
the KDP and to institute the uniform 5 percent levy at Habur 
on April 15 were not being kept.  We promised to pass these 
points back to Washington. 
 
 
 
 
¶6.  (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN