Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04ANKARA2490, BANKING REGULATORY UPDATE: COURT RULING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04ANKARA2490.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA2490 2004-05-04 12:12 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

041212Z May 04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002490 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE FOR EB/IFD AND EUR/SE 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - RADKINS AND MMILLS 
NSC FOR MBRYZA AND TMCKIBBEN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON TU
SUBJECT: BANKING REGULATORY UPDATE: COURT RULING 
INVALIDATES BANK TAKEOVERS 
 
 
1. (Sbu) Summary: On April 29 the Turkish Court of Accounts 
reaffirmed its earlier decision overturning the bank 
regulatory agency's 2001 takeover of Demir Bank and Kent 
Bank.  While the decision provides yet another example of a 
questionable ruling by a Turkish court and damages the 
credibility of bank regulators, bank regulatory officials 
claim it will have little practical effect. Separately, 
bankers continue to wrangle with regulators over the 
IMF-sponsored draft amendments to the banking law tightening 
bank ownership requirements.  On state bank privatization, 
though private banks are now offering lower consumer loan 
rates than the state banks, the state-owned banks' role in 
triggering the lower rates is counter to the state bank 
privatization strategy agreed with the World Bank.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
Court Ruling Deals a Blow to Bank Regulators... 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
2. (Sbu) On April 29, the General Assembly of the Court of 
Accounts (Danistay) reaffirmed its earlier decision to 
invalidate the Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Agency's 
(BRSA) 2001 interventions to transfer to the deposit 
insurance fund Demir Bank and Kent Bank.  The Danistay's 
decision culminates a series of events which had greatly 
troubled the IMF, bank regulators and other post economic 
contacts.  As a result of an earlier IMF reform, all bank 
regulatory cases are heard in the first instance by the Tenth 
Chamber of the Danistay, which has specialized expertise in 
bank regulatory law.  The Tenth Chamber had ruled against the 
former owners, Halit Cingillioglu of Demir Bank and Mustafa 
Suzer of Kent Bank.  Upon appeal to the General Assembly of 
the Danistay, which includes many judges with no expertise in 
banking, the owners had obtained a ruling in 2003 
invalidating the BRSA's actions in taking over the two banks 
in 2001.  In December, the BRSA wrote to the Danistay asking 
them to review their decision.  IMF Resident Representative 
Odd Per Brekk told econoffs earlier this year that the IMF 
was very troubled by the Danistay decision, and high-level 
IMF officials had raised the issue with senior GOT officials. 
 Brekk even thought (hoped?) that the delay in the Danistay's 
response to the BRSA might be signalling that GOT pressure 
was causing the Danistay to back down. 
 
 
3. (Sbu) Brekk's hopes were in vain, however, as the General 
Assembly reaffirmed its ruling last week. Econoff met with 
the BRSA lawyers handling the case, Umut Gurgey and Enes 
Comez, and later with BRSA Vice President Ercan Turkan to get 
their reaction.  Turkan said it was a blow to the credibility 
of the BRSA, and would only exacerbate public perceptions 
that the BRSA takes unfair actions under pressure from the 
IMF. 
 
 
...But Has Little Practical Impact: 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
4. (Sbu) However, Turkan and the BRSA lawyers said that, for 
the time being at least, there is little practical 
consequence to the Danistay decision.  While the Danistay 
decision gives the former owners the right to reapply for a 
banking license, BRSA retains discretion whether or not to 
award one.  Turkan agreed with econoff that it would send a 
bad signal for the BRSA to award a new license to either of 
the former owners.  The lawyers and Turkan also said the 
Danistay ruling would allow Cinguoglu and Suzer to file new 
cases requesting compensation from the BRSA for the value of 
the seized banks.  The BRSA officials noted, however, that 
the owners would have to show there was value in the banks, a 
difficult claim to prove given that the deposit insurance 
fund (SDIF) had to inject significant funds to replenish the 
banks' capital. Turkan doubted any Turkish court would rule 
that a state agency should pay compensation for a regulatory 
action. 
 
 
What do the Former Owners Really Want? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
5. (Sbu) Given this situation, it is not entirely clear what 
the former owners really hope to accomplish.  As a practical 
matter, the BRSA lawyers and Turkan said that in neither case 
can the former owners get their banks back: the SDIF has long 
since sold Demir Bank to HSBC, and Kent Bank was merged into 
the SDIF's main holding bank, Bayindir Bank.  According to 
the press, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullatif Sener made the 
same point on May 3. One of the reasons that the IMF was so 
concerned was that HSBC's purchase of Demir Bank was one of 
the largest foreign investments in Turkey in recent years, a 
rare bright spot in an otherwise bleak FDI picture. 
Cingillioglu had filed a separate--reportedly even more 
frivolous--suit against HSBC, which had HSBC management quite 
concerned.  Last week, Cinguoglu withdrew that case.  Given 
the situation, the BRSA officials speculated that the former 
owners' main goal is to clear their names. 
 
 
The Issue of Failed Bank Owners Continues to Reverberate: 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
 
6. (Sbu) The Demir and Kent cases are only one manifestation 
of the continued festering of issues relating to the former 
owners of failed banks.  As required under the IMF's Seventh 
Review, in April the GOT finally named the head of a 
commission to investigate the Imar Bank fiasco.  The GOT has 
chosen a French former Central Banker, Jean-Louis Fort, to 
lead the Commission, as well as a British former central 
banker and IMF official, Peter Hayward. Though the Turkish 
members of the commission have not yet been named, the local 
press is reporting that Fort is beginning work. Turkan told 
us the commission has until August to submit its findings. 
 
 
7. (Sbu) The saga of the Cukurova Group's dealings with bank 
regulators, over its ownership of Yapi Kredi Bank (and its 
former ownership of SDIF-intervened Pamuk Bank) continues. 
Though BRSA Chairman Bilgin (at the time also SDIF Chairman) 
had rejected in January Cukurova's proposal for a 
restructuring of the group's debts to the SDIF to cover 
Cukurova group loans to the banks, now Turkan confirmed press 
reports that Cukurova continues to talk to BRSA. Turkan 
himself is not involved so he was not sure exactly what 
exactly his fellow BRSA V.P.--and Bilgin protege--Dawaz was 
talking to Cukurova about.  Turkan agreed with Econoff that 
the "fit and proper" criteria of the bank law, which 
prohibits owners of banks that have failed to hold banking 
licenses, would seem to disqualify Cukurova owner Mehmet 
Karamehmet from reasserting control of Yapi Kredi.  In other 
words, Karamehmet's prior ownership of the failed Pamuk Bank 
would appear to disqualify him from owning any other bank, 
including Yapi Kredi.  Turkan surmised that Cukurova's talks 
with regulators may have to do with restructuring his debt, 
rather than resuming ownership.  Comment: In this case, it 
would be more appropriate for Cukurova to be talking to SDIF, 
to whom the debt is owed, than to BRSA, which is responsible 
for licensing. End Comment. 
 
 
8. (Sbu) As required under the IMF's Seventh Review, the GOT 
is working on amendments to the Banking Law in consultation 
with the Bankers Association.  Among the amendments are 
provisions to tighten ownership requirements, expand on-site 
inspection to experts other than the sworn auditors, and to 
delineate the relative duties and responsibilities of the 
now-separate BRSA and SDIF.  Turkan said that the proposed 
tightening of ownership requirements is proving to be a 
contentious issue with the Bankers Association, since it 
would ban foundations or owners of media groups from owning 
banks.  The latter provision would require the Dogan Group, 
with its extensive media properties, to divest itself of 
Disbank.  Turkan wondered whether it would not make sense to 
grandfather existing bank ownership, or to allow a transition 
period for compliance.  He said that the law had been drafted 
by the previous management of BRSA and that the current 
management and the government had not yet taken a clear 
position. 
 
 
State Bank Privatization: 
------------------------ 
 
 
9. (Sbu) Though the BRSA is not directly involved with the 
GOT's negotiations with the IFI's on a State Bank 
privatization strategy, Turkan updated us on earlier reports 
that state-owned Ziraat had aggressively undercut 
privately-owned banks by lending to consumers at a 1.9 
percent monthly rate when the market was at 2.00 percent.  In 
a meeting in March with econoffs, Ziraat CEO Can Akin Caglar 
insisted Ziraat had the right to take actions such as this 
that would increase its loan portfolio, thereby directly 
contradicting what World Bank economist Rodrigo Chavez had 
told us about the strategy.  Now, in May, Turkan told us 
Ziraat's consumer loan rate has now been matched and 
surpassed by two private banks: Akbank and HSBC.  Turkan 
agreed, however, that Ziraat's action in triggering the lower 
interest rate was troubling.  Bankers Association Secretary 
General Ekrem Keskin told econoff that he believes the State 
Banks' aggressive lending is no accident: the government 
wants the State Banks to extend credit.  Separately, On April 
19, Ziraat announced a whopping profit of 1.072 quadrillion 
TL (USD 765 million), up from only TL 178 trillion in 2002, 
on the strength of huge profits in Ziraat's outsized 
government securities portfolio. 
 
 
Consumer Loans, Overheating and the Resource Utilization Tax: 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
10. (Sbu) According to press reports, Government officials 
continue to be concerned about potential overheating to the 
economy from exploding consumer and credit card loans.  On 
May 4, the press reported that an interagency meeting of 
officials had decided to recommend that the Resource 
Utilization Tax on consumer loans, currently 10 percent, be 
increased to 20 percent. The press also reported, however, 
that Deputy Prime Minister Sener denied the GOT was 
considering increasing the Resource Utilization Tax.  Deputy 
Undersecretary Birol Aydemir had told econoff a month ago 
that he was quite concerned about overheating and had pressed 
the IMF to allow for an increase in the Resource Utilization 
Tax on consumer loans.  As Odd Per Brekk later confirmed to 
us, the IMF had refused because increasing the tax went 
against the thrust of IFI efforts to reduce bank 
intermediation costs.  In the meeting with the BRSA's Turkan, 
who played a role in highlighting the problem of the high 
costs of bank intermediation, he thought the overheating 
issue was legitimate and that it might be reasonable to 
temporarily raise the Resource Utilization tax if it was 
limited to consumer loans. 
EDELMAN