This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EB/ESC/TFS (GGLASS), S/CT (TNAVRATIL), 
EUR/SE, IO/PHO (APEREZ), INL (ANNE CUMMINGS); 
TREASURY FOR RNEWCOMB AND JZARATE; 
NSC FOR GPETERS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2014 
TAGS: EFIN PREL PTER SNAR TU
SUBJECT: GERMAN POLICE LIAISON'S TAKE ON TERROR FINANCE AND 
NARCOTICS IN TURKEY 
 
(U)  CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ROBERT S. DEUTSCH 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
 
¶1.    (C) Summary. According to Heinrich Reiser, the German 
Police Liaison to Turkey, Turkey's Financial Intelligence 
Unit, MASAK, is not effective. Reiser considers the Turkish 
National Police (TNP) a much more effective partner in 
fighting terrorism financing and narcotics. End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.    (U) On 22 April Econoff met with Reiser, who has acted 
as Liaison for the past three years. His duties encompass 
operations, reporting, and technical training and assistance. 
Reiser noted that, with Turks comprising 5% of the population 
of Germany, Germany police have long maintained close 
relations with their Turkish counterparts. He is interested 
mainly in narcotics, TIP, organized crime, and terrorism. In 
a wide-ranging conversation, Reiser provided insights drawn 
from his years of experience working with TNP. 
 
 
¶3.    (C) According to Reiser, Turkey exports to Europe 
(mostly Germany) 4-7 tons (comment: presumably, metric tons) 
of heroin per month, of a value to the exporters of $5,000 
per kilo. Reiser asserted that up to 5% of this amount goes 
to finance terrorism. 
 
 
¶4.    (C) While Turkey's narcotics personnel are 
operationally effective, Reiser does not consider them to be 
good at gathering and utilizing intelligence, and does not 
believe that they can put together a complicated case. Cases 
are based mostly on informers, and little effort is put into 
reaching higher-ups, in part because of limitations of 
Turkish law. German training is directed at developing this 
intelligence capability. 
 
 
¶5.    (C) Reiser does not believe the PKK to be the primary 
terrorist threat any more. Of the 50 terrorist organizations 
that Reiser said are operating in Turkey, he considers DHKP/C 
to be the most dangerous. (He surmises that DHKP/C is 
responsible for the April 21 bombing in Istanbul.) 
 
 
¶6.    (C) Reiser does not believe that much money is 
laundered through the banking system. Rather, he thinks it is 
brought into the country in cash (border control is, he says, 
non-existent) or as goods -- primarily, automobiles and 
machinery. 
 
 
¶7.    (C) Reiser called MASAK, the Turkish financial crimes 
investigation agency, a "paper tiger" and "hopeless." Reiser 
says it was established only at the insistence of the E.U. 
and that GOT has no intention of taking effective action to 
prevent money laundering. Note: Reiser's views, while 
strongly worded, are not much different from those expressed 
more diplomatically by a number of post contacts. End note. 
 
 
¶8.    (U) Reiser works extensively with four TNP departments 
reporting to a Deputy Director General. The departments are 
International Relations; Interpol; Intelligence; and KOM. 
Intelligence handles terrorism (including terrorist 
financing) and organized crime intelligence gathering. 
Intelligence hands off to other TNP departments for arrests, 
and works with State Security Court prosecutors in developing 
cases. KOM, the Headquarters for Combating Drugs and 
Organized Crime, has operational responsibility for organized 
crime, narcotics, cyber crime, and includes a financial 
police unit (Mali Sube). Reiser considers Istihbarat and Mali 
Sube to be very good units. 
 
 
¶9.    (U) The EC has 12 twinning projects with TNP, of which 
Germany is responsible for 4: (i) Organized crime, which 
started last week; (ii) money laundering (with Istihbarat and 
KOM), to start by year end; (iii) migration/TIP, to start by 
year end; and (iv) forensics (including terrorism and cyber 
crime), to start by year end. 
 
 
¶10.   (C) Echoing comments made by UK's resident customs 
inspector, Reiser says that mid-level TNP people do not 
require additional training; rather, efforts should be 
directed towards supervisors, so that they can appreciate the 
issues and the work that their subordinates are doing. He 
also emphasized that providing training (particularly, 
overseas training) to supervisors is very valuable in 
developing relationships and that without personal 
relationships little substantive assistance can be expected 
from Turkish officials. 
EDELMAN