This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000956 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2014 
TAGS: KMPI PREL EAID XF PK YM
SUBJECT: GMEI: SUPPORT COMBINED WITH ADVICE FROM DFM NOMAN 
 
REF: A. 4/21 HULL-WAYNE E-MAIL 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 86312 
     ¶C. 4/18 FRANCESKI-HULL E-MAIL (GMEI PAPERS) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (c) Summary: On 4/21, Pol/Econ Chief delivered talking 
points (ref b) and GMEI paper package (ref c) to DFM Noman. 
While pledging to support the reforms, Noman's initial 
reaction included a reminder that the USG's credibility vis a 
vis reform is being adversely impacted by the 
Administration's public statements on the Israel-Palestine 
issue and the recent killing of Hamas leaders.  Specifically, 
he criticized the lack of a strong condemnation of Israel 
following the Rantisi assassination.  Embassy Sana'a will be 
taking broad soundings -- including the ROYG, civil society, 
NGOs and businesspeople -- on GMEI to provide further 
reporting in advance of the June Sea Island meeting.  End 
summary. 
 
GMEI REFORMS IMPORTANT, BUT U.S. HAS "ALIENATED" THE ARAB 
WORLD BY FAILING TO CONDEMN ISRAELI VIOLENCE 
 
¶2. (c) Before he even reviewed the GMEI papers, the Deputy 
Foreign Minister for Europe, the Americas and International 
Organizations Mustapha Noman launched into concerns that the 
GMEI will get mired down in a debate about the U.S. position 
on Israel-Palestine.  He said the U.S. Administration's 
statements following the Bush-Sharon meeting, and the Rantisi 
assassination less than 48-hours later (and only 72-hours 
after Egyptian President Mubarak left the U.S.) make it 
difficult for liberals, such as himself, to push forward 
reforms.  Even after Pol/Econ Chief reiterated that reform 
cannot be held hostage to the Arab-Israeli peace process, he 
maintained that any reforms labeled U.S. are unlikely to be 
supported, even if parties agree with the ideas.  Without a 
shift in U.S. public statements, he does not believe the 
opposition parties in Yemen will support adopting the ideas 
in the GMEI, even if they support the principles.  (Comment: 
This is in sharp contrast to what Post has heard from the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI)'s Deputy Country 
Director, who believes that the majority of moderate Islahis 
will support the initiative regardless of U.S. statements 
(4/21 meeting reported septel).  End comment.) 
 
¶3. (c) Noman relayed stories of his 6-year old son asking him 
about Dr. Abdul Aziz (Rantisi)'s death and a 15-year-old 
student's assertions that U.S. support for Israel is the 
equivalent to an anti-Arab policy to support his position 
that the U.S. needs to convince the Arab street that it is 
credible.  Citing the backdrop of the 9/11 hearings and the 
built-up alienation between the U.S. and the Arab World, he 
contrasted British PM Blair's "blunt condemnation" of the 
killing to the U.S. Administration "turning a blind eye." 
Claiming that he was reluctant to use the term "double 
standard," he nonetheless suggested that any statement 
condemning Israel's acts, especially the murders of Shaykh 
Yassin and Rantisi, would strengthen both our position on 
reform and our call to Palestine to control the violence. 
 
¶4. (c) Indicating his personal support for the principle and 
substance of the reforms encompassed by GMEI, Noman promised 
to circulate the papers broadly.  He also recommended that 
Post approach the major political parties and university 
figures to get reactions to the proposals.  (Comment: Despite 
his lengthy diatribe on U.S. faults on public handling of the 
Arab-Israel conflict, Noman is progressive and projected a 
strong commitment to seizing the opportunity for input to the 
evolving GMEI.  End comment). 
 
¶5. (u) Over the next 6 to 8 weeks, Post has a strategy to 
take the pulse of government officials, civil society, NGOs 
and business on GMEI proposals and will provide reporting in 
septels. 
HULL