This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2014 
TAGS: MOPS PREL AF IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SEEKS DEPUTY COMMANDER 
SLOT IN POST JUNE 30 IRAQ, AGREES WITH NEED FOR 
STEADFASTNESS 
 
REF: STATE 86313 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5(B)(D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Italy expects to be a top candidate for a deputy 
commander position in the post-June 30 Iraq mission, Italian 
Defense Minister Antonio Martino told Ambassador Sembler on 
April 19. During the meeting, which Martino requested, 
Martino reaffirmed Italy's commitment to the mission in Iraq 
and said Italy agrees completely with reftel talking points 
on Spanish troop withdrawal; leaving would mean abandoning 
Iraq to terrorists.  He noted that another UNSC resolution 
will be politically useful, given Italy's constitutional 
limitations, but vowed that the government will continue to 
work creatively within existing constraints.  On Afghanistan, 
Martino said that Italy is discussing the logistics of a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a Forward Support 
Base (FSB) with SHAPE and other military planners.  Italy 
would prefer to contribute a PRT under ISAF, Martino said, 
but he did not rule out other possibilities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ITALIAN DEPUTY COMMANDER? 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Sembler, accompanied by DCM and Pol-Mil 
Counselor, met with DefMin Martino on April 19 at Martino's 
request.  Martino led off by telling Ambassador Sembler that 
it would be appropriate for an Italian to serve as a deputy 
commander in the post-June 30 Iraq mission.  Martino had 
heard that the operation was to be led by a US commander, 
with three deputy commanders - US, UK and a third to be 
determined.  Given Italy's sizable contribution to Iraq's 
reconstruction, both militarily and financially, assigning an 
Italian to the third position seemed reasonable and 
appropriate, Martino said.  Rumors that the job might go to a 
Canadian were hard to believe, particularly since Italian 
forces have been responding capably and professionally - 
often under fire - for almost a year. 
 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador used the opportunity of the meeting to 
deliver reftel demarche on Iraq.  Italy agrees completely 
with reftel talking points on the need for steadfast 
determination in the wake of the Spanish decision to withdraw 
troops from Iraq, Martino said.  As he recently told a 
journalist, it is no longer a question of how or why the war 
happened.  Either Iraq achieves success and stability or we 
leave and abandon the country to become a haven for 
terrorists, he recounted. 
 
¶4. (C) Martino reaffirmed Italy's commitment to hold firm in 
Iraq, but emphasized that parliament authorized sending 
troops as part of a "humanitarian" mission.  While the 
Italian government has interpreted that language broadly, 
Martino said, the limits are real.  Therefore, he wanted the 
Ambassador to know that Italy may need to take a creative 
approach to achieve the goals set out in CJCS General Myers' 
April 15 letter to CHOD Admiral Di Paola.  (NOTE: a copy of 
the letter, which asked for an ROE review to allow for use of 
deadly force against forces declared to be hostile, has been 
faxed to EUR/WE. END NOTE.)  Martino said he plans to approve 
a proposal Di Paola suggested (NFI) that "would achieve the 
same result" sought in Gen. Myers' request, but in a manner 
consistent with the Italian legal and constitutional 
requirements. 
 
UNSCR 
----- 
 
¶5. (C) Martino noted that parliament will need to approve the 
extension of Italy's Iraq mission beyond June 30.  Such 
authorization will be much easier politically if an 
additional UNSC resolution is in force and a new Iraqi 
government asks Italy to stay, he said.  DCM commented that 
consideration of an additional UNSCR is still in the early 
stages, and asked about the outcome of the April 14 Supreme 
Defense Council meeting chaired by President Ciampi (who is 
known to strongly favor a UN role).  Martino confirmed that 
the Supreme Defense Council had focused in large part on 
 
Iraq.  Ciampi used the occasion to emphasize that, for legal 
and constitutional reasons, Italian participation in Iraq is 
directly tied to UN authorization, specifically UNSCR 1511. 
Martino reassured the Ambassador that PM Berlusconi's 
administration is fully prepared to work creatively within 
existing constitutional constraints but indicated that a 
broader UNSCR would be politically useful. 
 
¶5. (C) After the meeting, Martino's diplomatic advisor, 
Trupiano, specified that parliamentary approval would ideally 
come after such a UNSC resolution but must in any event be 
before the June 30 transition.  Accordingly, early UNSC 
action would be better, so the government could prepare the 
parliamentary ground.  For the same reasons, continued 
Trupiano, a "broader" UNSCR would be welcome. Comment:  We 
understand this to refer to the actual UN role in post-June 
30 Iraq.  End comment. 
 
AFGHANISTAN PRT/FSB 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  The Ambassador said he was encouraged to hear that 
the CHOD and SACEUR have been discussing an Italian PRT and, 
possibly, an FSB for Afghanistan.  He urged Italy to take on 
the FSB in western Afghanistan and noted that SACEUR has 
assured that Italy will not have to go it alone.  Martino 
said decisions have not yet been made but added that he 
agrees with the direction of the discussions underway in 
military channels.  If Italy agrees to stand up an FSB, it 
will be essential that other Allies pitch in, he said.  When 
probed about contributing a PRT under OEF or ISAF command, 
Martino said Italy would prefer to do an ISAF PRT, although 
he did not rule out other options. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Martino has kept a wary eye on post-June 30 command 
structure in Iraq and is now laying down a marker that Italy 
has earned a top slot, through actions as well as words.  His 
meeting with the Ambassador was as much to underscore that 
message as to reassure the US that the government's 
commitment is not wavering.  Berlusconi's administration is 
determined to structure Italian participation to avoid a 
constitutional standoff with Ciampi - a legal battle they 
might not win.  For Ciampi, UN authorization is the key to 
Italian participation and UNSCR 1511 could use some 
bolstering.  The Supreme Defense Council meeting was a subtle 
caution to Berlusconi to avoid provoking a constitutional 
confrontation by interpreting Italy's "humanitarian" mission 
in Iraq too liberally.  Martino has made it clear that 
Ciampi's boundaries still leave sufficient room to maneuver 
but will require careful handling.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶8. (U) Minimize considered for CPA Baghdad and Embassy Kabul. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2004ROME01526 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL