This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

141029Z Apr 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
STATE FOR AC/CB ROBERT MIKULAK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL PARM IT CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: COORDINATING WITH ITALY ON RABTA CONVERSION 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 77352 
 
     ¶B. ROME 0735 
     ¶C. ROME 0777 
 
Classified By: A/POLMINCOUNS GARY ROBBINS FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Italy is concerned that using a technical 
change to the CWC to help Libya with its conversion request 
(as described ref A) could result in an overly lengthy 
process.  Italian officials, after consulting with the OPCW 
Technical Secretariat, are recommending that an attempt be 
made to partition Rabta into three areas: a "clean" section 
that was never used for CW production, a "dirty" contaminated 
section, and a "grey" section that was only indirectly 
involved in CW activity.  Italy believes such a division 
could allow Libya to move ahead with pharmaceutical 
production in the clean area while the grey section would be 
subject to a conversion request (the dirty section would be 
destroyed under the Italian plan).  To assist Libya in moving 
forward with conversion of what Italy hopes would be a 
relatively small section of the Rabta facility, Italian 
officials suggest that a technical fix be applied to the CWC 
so that the imposed six-year time limit on submitting a 
conversion request would start from the date a country 
accedes to the Convention (instead of April 29, 1997, when 
the CWC entered into force).  End summary. 
 
Concerns about Timing 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On April 8, Polmiloff and UK Embassy DCM Scott 
Wightman conveyed ref A points and non-paper to Giovanni 
Iannuzzi, head of Italy's CWC National Authority.  General 
Tracci, an MoD CW expert assigned to Iannuzzi's office, 
participated in the tripartite meeting.  Iannuzzi appreciated 
US/UK interest in consulting with Italy on Libya's conversion 
request for Rabta and efforts to develop a solution to the 
potential stumbling block described in ref A.  He generally 
agreed with the arguments set down in the non-paper as to why 
options 1 and 3 were problematic.  After exchanging views 
with OPCW Secretary General Pfirter on the margins of the 
March Executive Council meeting Iannuzzi had nevertheless 
concluded that option 2 alone did not necessarily represent 
the best way forward. 
 
¶3. (C) Italy, Iannuzzi said, was particularly concerned that 
a pure technical change to the CWC could result in a 
lengthy--perhaps years long--process before conversion could 
take place.  Italy is worried that if Libya gets frustrated 
with delays in having a conversion request approved, it could 
abandon the prospect of transforming Rabta and decide to 
build another industrial pharmaceutical plant elsewhere that 
would not be subject to any international controls.  Tracci, 
taking issue with the statement in our non-paper that the CWC 
"establishes an abbreviated procedure for making changes to 
the Annexes", cited the one precedent where a technical 
change to the Convention was applied--Canada's interest in 
producing Saxitoxin for the world market--as indicative of 
why Italy was concerned about timing. He argued that it took 
three years for CWC States Parties to approve Canada's 
request, despite the fact that there was, according to 
Tracci, no political opposition to what was fundamentally a 
"technical issue". 
 
¶4. (C) Iannuzzi acknowledged that the fix sought for Rabta 
could prove to be non-controversial, but Tracci said he would 
be surprised if at least one state didn't raise objections. 
Polmiloff suggested that this was the reason why the U.S. was 
committed to developing an effective diplomatic strategy to 
overcome any dissent to a technical change.  Wightman weighed 
in to emphasize that working together at three 
(U.S.-UK-Italy) in consultation with Libya would be key to 
convincing CWC States Parties of the merits of whatever 
solution was finally agreed upon. 
 
Another Way Forward? 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Iannuzzi described what he considered a potential way 
forward.  He proposed working through the OPCW Technical 
Secretariat to partition as precisely as possible the "three 
 
SIPDIS 
sections of the Rabta facility".  These he defined as the 
"clean part" which had never been used in the production of 
 
chemical weapons or their precursors, the "dirty section" 
which had been used for those purposes, and the "grey area" 
which had been peripheral to actual production but not 
necessarily "clean".  His hope was that a thorough analysis 
of Rabta could result in a partitioning of the clean area 
where pharmaceutical production could begin even before 
Libya's conversion request was approved.  The request would 
apply to the grey area while the dirty section could simply 
be destroyed. 
 
¶6. (C) Iannuzzi thought that after an effort to segregate the 
three sections was complete, a technical adjustment to the 
Convention would be appropriate.  He suggested that the words 
"for it" (Note: referring to the acceding state) could be 
added to the end of Verification Annex, Part V, Article 72 so 
that the imposed six-year time limit on submitting a 
conversion request would start from the date a country 
accedes to the Convention.  This would be an additional 
incentive for countries potentially interested in joining, 
such as Syria, to make the leap, Iannuzzi said.  Polmiloff 
assured Iannuzzi that his views would be conveyed to 
Washington, but noted that the readout by U.S. officials of 
the situation at Rabta provided to Italy in February (ref B) 
raised questions as to how feasible a "partition plan" would 
be. 
 
¶7. (C) Iannuzzi concluded by suggesting that the U.S., the 
UK, and Italy consult further on the way forward.  He said 
Italy could agree on approaching other countries in general 
terms about the need for a positive attitude toward 
conversion, without at this point going into details about 
proposed workarounds to the Article 72 language.  Italy will 
broach the matter again with its EU partners at the next 
Disarmament Working Group meeting (CODUN) slated for May 11. 
Iannuzzi indicated that he would be looking to the OPCW 
Technical Secretariat to provide an update on its analysis of 
Rabta, but clarified that he did not expect it to render an 
opinion on the merits of any particular approach to the 
conversion issue.  Rather, he suggested that its views be 
taken into account because the Secretariat had the "pulse of 
the situation" at Rabta. 
 
Training Offer 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Iannuzzi confirmed that Italy had invited Libya to 
send a delegation to the Italian chemical weapons destruction 
facility in Civitavecchia.  Italy was hoping that a one day 
introduction to the facility and Italian private sector CW 
destruction capabilities could be held by the end of April, 
but was still waiting on a Libyan response. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2004ROME01459 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL