This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

051708Z Apr 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR PM/RSAT AND PM/PMAT; JCS FOR J-5 INMA COALITION 
AFFAIRS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019 
TAGS: IT IZ MARR MOPS PREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ANTI-COALITION VIOLENCE IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 74537 
 
     ¶B. (B) FBIS EUP20040405000110 
 
Classified By: DCM EMIL M. SKODON, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: (C) Italian officials agree on the need to 
respond firmly to al-Sadr's challenge to the Coalition's 
authority.  MFA noted the importance of not allowing Jaysh 
al-Mahdi to establish a "territorial presence."  The Italians 
also believe that Iran should share our interest in 
containing al-Sadr; FM Frattini was seeking as of Monday 
night to contact Iranian FM Kharazzi with that message.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C) Early April 5, Embassy delivered reftel points to high 
officials in the Italian Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister's 
office, and Defense Ministry.  We accompanied this with an 
expression of sympathy for the three Italian Carabinieri who 
had been injured in responding to the demonstrations.  MFA 
Political Director Massolo told DCM that Italy understood the 
need for coalition unity.  He pointed to the statement of FM 
Frattini in an Italian newspaper that morning (Ref B) 
reiterating "no change" in the Italian military mandate. 
Massolo said that Italy is also worried, especially about the 
prospect that al-Sadr could come to control the situation on 
the ground, or establish certain territory under his 
exclusive control, without a coalition presence.  (Massolo 
also took the opportunity to express concern about Senator 
Lugar's comment that the June 30 date for transfer of 
sovereignty might slip.  DCM replied that we have no 
indication that Sen. Lugar's comment reflects any change in 
our firm plans for June 30). 
 
¶3. (C) Paolo Dionisi, Deputy Diplomatic Adviser to PM 
Berlusconi, told PolMC that al-Sadr's actions increase the 
importance to the coalition of working with other Shi'a 
leaders, particularly al-Sistani.  Al-Sadr's followers, 
though devoted to their leader, did not enjoy a good 
reputation among most Iraqi Shi'a.  It would be important to 
convince the Shi'a that al-Sadr's strategic choice was the 
wrong one for them.  In this, al-Sistani would be important, 
but the Coalition should also reach out to al-Hakim and 
SCIRI. 
 
¶4. (C) Dionisi also noted that Tehran should share our 
interest in preventing a violent showdown between a Shi'a 
faction and the coalition.  He repeated the offer that 
Berlusconi's chief dip adviser, Gianni Castellaneta, made 
during his March 19 meetings at the White House: to convey 
directly to Iran messages of particular concern to the US. 
PolMC agreed that Iran should share our interest in Iraqi 
stability, and noted that the USG has the capability of 
conveying such messages reliably to the Iranian government. 
Dionisi thought that Lebanese Shi'a groups could also play a 
positive role in calming the situation in southern Iraq, 
listing Fadlallah and the younger Shams al-Din as two who 
would have some influence with al-Hakim and other Iraqi Shi'a 
leaders.  (COMMENT: Dionisi is something of an expert on 
Shia' politics, having served last in Beirut.  In November, 
he undertook a mission to Baghdad and Basra on Berlusconi's 
behalf to consult with Shi'a leaders and prepare a report on 
the situation.  End comment). 
 
¶5. (C) Late in the day, MFA Director-General (A/S equivalent 
for the Middle East) Ricardo Sessa confirmed to PolMC that FM 
Frattini was seeking to place a call to Iranian FM Kharazzi 
to urge Iran to contribute to calming the situation.  Sessa 
also asked whether Ref A points contained any specific action 
request for the Italian military, given the late afternoon 
announcement of an arrest order being issued for al-Sadr. 
PolMC replied that any request that concerned actions on the 
ground by the Italian contingent would be passed through 
Coalition military authorities in Iraq.  The non-paper was 
instead a general statement of what we had done, and a 
request for Coalition solidarity on the ground and in public 
statements. 
 
¶6. (C) Defense Minister Martino has been in Brussels for an 
EU meeting, and has not seen the full text of Ref A demarche. 
 However, his Dip Adviser, Francesco Trupiano, was informed 
by MoD of our points and contacted PolMilCouns.  Trupiano 
said only that Martino is deeply concerned about the safety 
of the Italian contingent in Nasiriya, and especially 
interested in any information the Coalition may have that 
could affect the contingent's assignment. 
 
¶7. Minimize considered. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2004ROME01343 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL