This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NASSAU 000733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHSA HA BF CARICOM
SUBJECT: BAHAMIAN PERSPECTIVE ON CARICOM AND HAITI 
 
REF: SECSTATE 71329 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert M. Witajewski for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
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¶1.    (C) Charge hosted a lunch for the Bahamian Foreign 
Minister Fred Mitchell, and Foreign Ministry Permanent 
Secretary, Ms. Patricia Rodgers on March 29.  A/DCM and 
Consular Section Head also participated.  The discussion 
covered a number of topics: The dynamics of 
recently-completed Caricom heads of government 
inter-sessional meeting, Caricom-U.S. relations, status of 
Bahamian ratification of the bilateral Comprehensive Maritime 
Agreement (CMA), the status of ex-Haitian President Jean 
Bertrand Aristide, and Caricom,s request of UN investigation 
of the events related to Aristide,s resignation and 
departure from Haiti. 
End of Summary 
 
 
CARICOM INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING IN ST. KITTS 
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¶2.     (C) The Charge began the discussion by asking Foreign 
Minister Mitchell "How did the meeting go in St. Kitts?" 
Mitchell responded that Caricom,s statement reflected the 
aggregate view of Caricom members, however he continued, the 
Bahamas maintains its own views on these matters.  Mitchell 
revealed a bit of internal Caricom dynamics in his response. 
According to FM Mitchell, there was a definite "north-south" 
division within Caricom on Haiti.  In contrast to the more 
categorical positions taken by Grenada, Guyana, Surinam, and 
Trinidad and Tobago, he claimed, the "northern Caribbean 
countries"  who have more concrete interests  took  more 
"considered" positions regarding Haiti because of their 
geographic proximity.  The northern Caribbean countries, he 
continued, are obliged to deal with the realities and are 
also cognizant of the importance of their relations with the 
United States and thus are more careful in balancing their 
interests with Caricom and the U.S.  The southern Caribbean 
members are more detached from the practical issues and are 
guided by political agendas, according to the Bahamian 
Foreign Minister. 
 
¶3.    (C) Continuing on the Haiti theme, Foreign Minister 
Mitchell expressed the view that the United States 
overreacted to Jamaica,s offer to let ex-President Aristide 
reside in the country and to Caricom,s declarations.  He 
appeared to be arguing that Caricom was entitled to express 
its views and not necessarily be held accountable for them. 
Mitchell also claimed that despite Caricom,s verbal shots at 
the United States over recent events in Haiti, there would be 
little net impact on overall U.S.-Caricom relations...as long 
as the United States didn't "overreact." 
 
¶4.    (C) Expressing irritation at Caricom,s cumbersome 
decision-making style, Mitchell complained that too much time 
was wasted by the ceremonial opening and closing of the 
sessions as each successive host felt compelled to spend time 
and money on needless pomp and circumstance.  He also 
expressed annoyance at the prolixity of his colleagues, 
noting that had not each government head not insisted on 
"getting their own paragraph" into the final declaration, 
they might have both accomplished more and not have been 
forced to hold their closing press conference at 2 a.m. in 
the morning. 
 
 
CARICOM,S SPECIAL ENVOY AND CALLS FOR AN INVESTIGATION 
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¶5.         (C) Regarding the naming of Caricom,s "special 
envoy" to address the Haiti issue, Mitchell indicated that 
Caricom had been unable to reach consensus on who this person 
should be by the end of the inter-sessional and that this 
would be subject to continued intra-Caricom negotiations.  He 
said that personally hoped that it would be an individual who 
both had prior diplomatic experience and someone closer to 
The Bahamas, position on Haiti than that of some eastern 
Caribbean states.  He discounted the prospect of anyone from 
The Bahamas being selected for this role. 
 
¶6.    (C) Asked to clarify Caircom,s call for an 
investigation into the circumstances of Aristide,s 
resignation, Mitchell sought to downplay its significance. 
He said that he personally envisioned the "investigation" as 
equivalent to resolution of a "routine credentials challenge" 
to a government such as occurs at the UNGA or another 
committee.  If the LaTortue government is seen to be 
exercising effective control in the country then, thought 
Mitchell, it ought to be seated in Haiti,s chair at the UN 
without controversy, Mitchell claimed.  He  explicitly sought 
to minimize the scope, the impact, and the significance of 
the Caricom-requested investigation -- but without indicating 
whether his views reflected a broader Caricom view, those of 
the Bahamian Cabinet, or his own personal view of an exit 
strategy out of Caricom's dilemma. 
 
¶7.    (C) Questioned about recognition of the LaTortue 
government, FM Mitchell reiterated his previous statements 
that most Caricom members, as does The Bahamas, follow the 
"Estrada Doctrine" when it comes to recognition and rather 
than making value or moral judgments about a government, will 
recognize whomever exercises effective control in Haiti as 
that country's legitimate government.  He assured the Charge 
that The Bahamas would not break with its long-held policy of 
dealing with any government in control in Haiti, pointing out 
that bilateral relations between The Bahamas and Haiti had 
never been suspended during the transition from Aristide to 
LaTortue  Foreign Minister Mitchell complained that the press 
has exaggerated the recognition controversy and that matters 
were not as bad as they appeared to be.  He noted that 
Haitian Prime Minister LaTortue had called him personally and 
assured him that press reports on Haiti refusing to permit 
the return of the Bahamian Ambassador to Haiti were totally 
untrue.  Mitchell also cited repeated phone conversations 
between LaTortue and Jamaica's Prime Minister P.J. Patterson, 
who apparently had a close working relationship in the past, 
as evidence that Caricom and the new Haitian government could 
work together.  He said that he expected the Haitian 
Ambassador to return to The Bahamas in the near future as 
well. 
 
 
Ex-President Jean Aristide in Jamaica 
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¶8.    (C) The Foreign Minister insisted that the United 
States should not be concerned with, or opposed to, 
Aristide,s presence in the Caribbean.  He argued that a 
perceived "Banishing Policy" has racial and historical 
overtones in the Caribbean that reminds inhabitants of the 
region of slavery and past abuse.  The Charge inquired on 
what would happen if Aristide were to meddle with Haitian 
internal affairs and give his supporters the impression that 
he is still a player in the future of Haiti.  Foreign 
Minister Mitchell was emphatic that Jamaica will not allow 
Aristide to play such an intrusive role and would "deal" with 
Aristide if such a situation were to arise. 
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AGREEMENT 
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¶9.    (C) Queried about the status of ratification of the 
comprehensive maritime agreement (CMA) that has now been 
negotiated over the last 18 months, FM Mitchell reported that 
due to the document,s significance and complexity it had 
been decided to prepare a formal briefing to the entire 
Cabinet.  Optimistically, Mitchell thought that this could 
completed in two cabinet sessions over a two-week period. 
Questioned about the need for such a time-consuming review of 
what is essentially a codification and rationalization of 
existing agreements, Mitchell again wistfully muse about how 
the Bahamian cabinet decision-making process might be 
improved.  He related that he had learned as a result of his 
Caricom attendance that in other Commonwealth countries, 
debate and intervention on issues in the cabinet is 
restricted to their ministers whose portfolios are directly 
impacted by the issue, or ministers that assert fundamental 
issues of principle.  In contrast, Mitchell intimated, in the 
Christie Cabinet of the Bahamas operates much less 
efficiently since any minister can intervene and express a 
view on any issue before the government. 
 
 
JOINT TASK FORCE MEETING 
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¶10.   (C) Queried about his preferences for a date for the 
next session of the Joint Task Force on Illegal Drug 
Interdiction (JTF), Mitchell expressed agreement for an early 
summer meeting in late May/early June.  He agreed with 
Charge,s suggestion that the JTF would best be held 
following ratification of the CMA and successful 
implementation of a major anti-drug round-up that is being 
planned for the near future so that participants could review 
both past successes since the last JTF meeting and consider 
specific goals to be accomplished for the coming year. 
 
 
COMMENT 
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¶11.   (C) Foreign Minister Mitchell was his usual 
business-like self during lunch as he pursued his agenda of 
downplaying the consequences of a division between Caricom 
and the United States on Haiti.  Underlying many of 
Mitchell's arguments was the premise that Caricom/The Bahamas 
as small countries take (and are entitled to take) principled 
stands while the United States necessarily engages in real 
politik. 

¶12.  (C)  Despite a life-long career as a politician in a 
country were politics is personalized to the extreme, neither 
kissing babies nor making small talk comes naturally to Fred 
Mitchell.  He prefers to deal with agendas expeditiously and 
then engage in philosophical discussions or reviews of 
international relations drawing on his seminars at Harvard,s 
Kennedy School.  Holding two time-consuming portfolio,s 
(managing the civil service and foreign policy) is also 
taking its toll on Mitchell,s private time.  Mitchell told 
Charge a year ago that he hoped to write a twelve-chapter 
(one chapter for each month of the year) book combining 
policy, history, and personal ideology to be published on his 
fifty-first birthday.  Ruefully, he admitted that he hasn,t 
progress beyond chapter four. 
WITAJEWSKI