This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014 
TAGS: OVIP PREL BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI LEADERS ON IRAQ:  FOCUS FIRST ON 
SECURITY, LATER ON DEMOCRACY 
 
Classified By: Robert S. Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The King, Crown Prince and Foreign 
Minister told visiting American officials on April 13 that 
the U.S. needs to focus more of its effort on restoring 
stability in Iraq immediately, and to worry less about 
building democracy there in any short time frame.  The King 
and Foreign Minister suggested Arab states should help with 
security issues in consultation with the U.S.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Bahrain's King, Crown Prince and Foreign Minister 
told visiting U.S. officials that the U.S. needs to 
concentrate its attention now on restoring stability in Iraq, 
and worry less about building democracy there.  King Hamed 
told CJCS General Myers on April 13 that the U.S. can't leave 
Iraq until stability and order are securely reestablished. 
He dismissed the Iraqi Governing Council as unable to make 
tough decisions.  Iraq needs to be a republic, but Arab 
republics historically are weak, he said.  Therefore, the 
U.S. Government needs to find a strong leader able to steer 
the republic and guide the security services.  It is vital, 
the King asserted, that a strong leader rebuild the Iraqi 
Government's authority and credibility among the Iraqi 
public.  The King stated that it didn't matter if that strong 
man was a Sunni, a Shia or a Kurd; even Salahadin was a Kurd, 
he exclaimed. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Crown Prince Salman was characteristically blunt to 
CJCS Myers at the April 13 lunch also attended by the King. 
Salman asked when the U.S. would shift its focus from 
building democracy in Iraq - a nearly impossible task in the 
short term - and instead concentrate on building security. 
He wondered if it was possible for the U.S. political 
establishment to understand that the democracy goal in Iraq 
was not achievable this year. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Speaking to Congressman Issa on April 13, Foreign 
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak wondered where the U.S. 
could find an Iraqi "Adenauer" who could to address Iraq's 
many problems.  Sheikh Mohammed added that restoring law and 
order has to take precedence over issues like a constitution 
or democracy.  The U.S. also had to keep aggressive neighbors 
like Iran out of Iraqi affairs, the Foreign Minister added. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The King and Foreign Minister both said on April 13 
that regional states should take a greater role in Iraq.  The 
King said it is unfortunate U.S. troops are patrolling 
cities.  This is a job better left to Iraqi security or even 
Arab forces while American units secure the borders.  The 
Arab League should be brought into play.  Speaking 
separately, the Foreign Minister said that the U.S. should 
secure an agreement in principle from the Arab League so that 
"select" Arab states could send forces to help the Coalition. 
 (Sheikh Mohammed specifically cited the UAE, Jordan and 
Bahrain.)  The Foreign Minister said that last year the U.S. 
rejected such an idea.  He suggested the time has come to 
revisit that decision. 
 
¶6.  (C)  King Hamed also urged that the U.S. try harder with 
Sunni tribes in western Iraq.  He recalled that historically 
tribal leaders could be paid to guarantee security across 
large expanses of territory.  He recommended the U.S. focus 
more intently on building ties to tribal leaders; the 
Jordanians could help a great deal in this, he added.  Hamed 
also cautioned against letting religious figures, especially 
among the Shia clerical establishment, get too involved in 
Iraqi political affairs. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Hamed expressed confidence the U.S. ultimately would 
prevail; he was not especially alarmed by the recent spike in 
fighting.  He was more interested on April 13 in giving 
advice about how to make the Iraq campaign easier. 
Nonetheless, all three officials underlined the primacy of 
restoring stability in Iraq, while dismissing the chances of 
democracy, more clearly than we have ever heard them do 
before. 
 
¶8. (U)  Baghdad minimize considered. 
FORD