This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HO CHI MINH CITY 000573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL/IRF, PRM 
BANGKOK FOR REFCORD 
GENEVA FOR REFCORD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL PGOV SOCI SCUL KIRF VM ETMIN HUMANR RELFREE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY/CONGEN TEAM VISITS DAK LAK, ASSESSES EXTENT OF 
ETHNIC UNREST 
 
REF:  A) HCMC 0401  B) HCMC 0510  C) Hanoi 1007  D) HCMC 0147 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Embassy and ConGen poloffs discovered more 
questions than answers concerning reports of recent ethnic unrest 
(refs A and B), during an April 26-27 trip through the Central 
Highlands province of Dak Lak.  While everyone from government 
officials to some of the protesters themselves acknowledged that 
the April 10 demonstrators used more violence than the Montagnard 
Foundation, Inc. (MFI) and other groups have admitted, it is still 
too early to gauge with any accuracy the overall level of violence 
on either side, the size of the demonstrations, or the numbers of 
dead, injured, and detained.  Official GVN statistics are still 
wildly at variance with the figures cited by MFI.  Also yet to be 
fully understood is the effectiveness of the GVN's response to the 
violence.  SECV pastors confirmed, however, that there have not 
been special restrictions on religious activities following the 
demonstrations.  At least some provincial leaders seemed convinced 
of a USG and UN role in the unrest, while local officials seemed 
surprised and unprepared for the level of anger they faced.  Even 
more so than usual, this trip was tightly controlled by local 
officials, making it extremely difficult for poloffs to speak 
freely with anyone.  Press coverage was heavy, with reports both 
on television and in the newspapers.  Septel will report on the 
visit to Gia Lai Province on April 27-28.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Dak Lak People's Committee Chairman Nguyen Van Lang 
condemned MFI founder Kok Ksor for "deceiving, coercing, and 
forcing" the demonstrators to participate in the demonstrations 
with promises of cash payments and resettlement in the U.S.  He 
also criticized the U.S. for "harboring" Kok Ksor, an action he 
deemed inconsistent with U.S. recognition of the GVN.  More 
troubling, however, was the way he sprinkled his commentary with 
wild conspiracy theories on the role of the U.S. and UN in 
fomenting the unrest, mentioning the previously planned visit by 
poloffs the same weekend as the demonstrations (ref C) and the 
"coincidental" presence of six UNESCO employees in the province at 
the same time.  He chided poloffs for disavowing advance knowledge 
of the protests, noting that the information was on MFI's own 
website.  (Note:  The Embassy has not heard this line from 
officials in Hanoi.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) To counter MFI's claims that the demonstrations were a 
"peaceful prayer vigil," Chairman Lang played for poloffs an 
edited videotape showing a group of more than 100 Montagnards 
armed with primitive weapons hurling stones at the police.  (He 
said he would consider providing a copy of the videotape to 
ConGen.)  He told poloffs he had gone out to address this 
particular group of protesters that morning to try to convince 
them to return to their homes, but they had hurled stones at him 
as well, actually hitting him in the hip.  He also displayed a 
crude banner allegedly carried by one group of protesters.  The 
banner, written in English, called for the establishment of an 
independent Dega state led by Kok Ksor, and demanded that the 
majority ethnic Kinh Vietnamese leave the Central Highlands. 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to Chairman Lang, forty people were injured 
during the demonstrations in Dak Lak, including 16 police, but no 
one had died.  (He claimed to have visited all of the injured in 
the hospital -- police as well as protesters.)  He said "more than 
10" people had been detained for criminal activities, but others 
had probably gone into hiding.  He claimed that the protests, 
which lasted from early in the morning until midday, were confined 
to just three of the province's 13 administrative districts -- 
Krong Ana, Cu M'Gar, and Buon Ma Thuot City. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a separate meeting, the director of the largest 
hospital in Buon Ma Thuot told Poloffs his facility had treated 40 
patients with minor injuries on Saturday, April 10.  About 20 had 
arrived in roughly one group in the morning, with the remainder 
trickling in throughout the day.  Doctors at the hospital treated 
11 police officers, one of whom was seriously injured.  Some had 
been transferred to local clinics after a few days, others had 
been released sooner.  The hospital had also treated 22 
demonstrators and seven apparently innocent passers-by.  Most of 
the patients suffered injuries consistent with stones and other 
projectiles.  The badly injured policeman had been beaten over the 
head with sticks. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The People's Committee Chairmen in the districts of Krong 
Ana, Krong Pak, and Cu M'Gar echoed many of Chairman Lang's 
accusations of U.S. complicity in the activities of the 
"terrorist" Kok Ksor, calling for his immediate extradition to 
Vietnam.  Like the provincial Chairman, they warned poloffs that 
many local people were very angry with the U.S. and might be 
hostile to the presence of American diplomats -- some because they 
thought the U.S. had stirred up the unrest, and others because the 
American planes had not come to take them away.  (Note:  Both 
official and other sources have said at least some protestors 
believed they were going to be transported for resettlement to the 
U.S.  End Note.)  The district Chairman in Krong Ana noted that 
the demonstrations in his district had been small in scale, 
involving no more than 2,000 "gullible people" who had fallen for 
promises of cash and resettlement.  The few injuries, all minor, 
had been the result of clashes among the ethnic minority 
protesters themselves.  He promised harsh punishment for the 
organizers, but clemency for everyone else.  The district Chairman 
in Krong Pak denied that any residents of his district were 
involved in the demonstrations. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The district Chairman in Cu M'Gar said armed protesters 
had started attacking people and businesses in some of the 
communes in the district as early as 7:00 a.m. on Saturday.  He 
and other district officials had personally tried to persuade the 
protesters to return to their homes, when the protesters suddenly 
attacked the police.  The demonstrations were over by noon, with 
very few injuries on either side.  The Chairman had no information 
on detentions, but said some people had gone into hiding.  Police 
impounded approximately 100 tractors.  Some local people had 
reportedly been promised that if they made it to Buon Ma Thuot, 
the U.S. Ambassador or the UN would take them to America.  Others 
had allegedly been told that they needed to leave because the Kinh 
were going to kill them in their villages.  One ethnic Ede 
resident of Cu M'Gar told poloffs he had seen a group of people 
passing through the village and decided to join them, without any 
clear idea of where they were going or what they were planning to 
do.  When police stopped his group, he fought alongside some of 
the other protesters.  After the protests, he said, he was held in 
detention for eight days. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Driving to Cu M'Gar District, poloffs made an impromptu 
stop (but still with a large entourage) at a commercial area on 
the outskirts of Buon Ma Thuot, which turned out to be the 
location featured in Chairman Lang's videotape.  The local police 
chief did not seem to be expecting poloffs, but brought them to 
meet with several shop owners in the neighborhood.  Some recounted 
how they had fled immediately when they saw the protesters coming 
down the road throwing stones and attacking businesses.  Others 
claimed that local Kinh residents had engaged in violent clashes 
with the demonstrators after police had done nothing to stop the 
rampage.  When the police chief said the demonstrations had lasted 
just two hours, an elderly woman in the shop blurted out that it 
was really four. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The police chief claimed to have had "at least one day's 
notice" of the protests, but was not at all clear on what 
precautions he had taken.  Based on accounts from three injured 
police officers at a local clinic just down the road (including 
the officer who was seriously injured), police seem to have been 
overwhelmed by the size and intensity of the protests.  One 
injured traffic policeman said there were just three of them on 
the road with rubber batons that morning, trying to stop 200 
tractors.  Another described an attack on the local police 
station, where many windows were broken and plaster was chipped 
above the door.  While some officers had helmets and shields, 
others did not.  The chief said that most of the protesters had 
eventually listened to reason and dispersed, but some had to be 
dealt with using unspecified additional measures.  One police 
officer intimated that local people had helped to fight back the 
demonstrators.  Several local residents said the same thing, 
noting that property owners had been forced to take matters into 
their own hands because the police were not doing anything to stop 
the violence.  Speaking with local residents, it was obvious that 
some of the reports carried by MFI and other organizations were 
circulating in the community.  One individual clearly believed the 
claim that government forces had beheaded children.  Most seemed 
nervous and suspicious of government accounts.  However, police 
and residents alike denied that troops stationed at an army camp 
near the clinic had played any role in crowd control. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Several members (strictly protect) of the provincial 
representative board of the government recognized Southern 
Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV) also mentioned details 
similar to those reported by MFI, although it was unclear whether 
they had any particular basis for believing or disbelieving what 
they had heard.  Meeting poloffs in a restaurant with six local 
government officials sitting at the next table, the board members 
were circumspect in their comments, citing economic frustration as 
a major cause of the demonstrations and blaming "ill intentioned 
people" for inciting the violence.  They had heard reports that 
some of the protests were peaceful until police intervened, but 
others had been violent from the start.  While police had not used 
weapons against the protesters, many Kinh business owners and 
residents had.  Inevitably, some people had been injured and some 
detained, with perhaps four to five still in custody pending 
further investigation.  Others had fled into hiding.  The board 
members thought the demonstrations were larger than those in 2001, 
with many Christians participating, although the basis for this 
view was not clear.  They confirmed that there had been no 
restrictions on religious activities in the aftermath of the 
protests, however. 
 
¶11. (SBU) More generally, the pastors noted that they had just 
submitted a list of 50 preachers (one quarter of the total number 
for the province) for training at a new bible school (ref D), 
which was still under government consideration.  These 50 had 
studied in secret after the closure of the Nha Trang Seminary in 
1976, and the short-term training course was a way to regularize 
their status and make them acceptable to both the GVN and the 
SECV.  They said the government had promised to facilitate the 
construction of real church buildings for the five registered 
churches in the province.  Three already had permission to build, 
but were held back by a lack of funds.  The pastors remained 
resigned to the slow process of recognition, one church at a time. 
 
COMMENT 
XXXXXXX 
 
¶12. (SBU) While we may never have accurate numbers for those who 
participated in the demonstrations, or were injured, killed, or 
detained, this trip provided our first opportunity to view the 
terrain where the largest protests occurred, and to try to put 
together the various pieces of the puzzle.  Unfortunately, our 
caravan of seven escort vehicles carrying government officials, 
police, and at least a half dozen members of the press made truly 
open inquiry impossible, except for occasional brief encounters. 
From our Monday flight to Buon Ma Thuot, where poloffs and our two 
FSN assistants were given an extra degree of attention, to the 
scolding we received from a local official as we crossed the 
border to Gia Lai on Tuesday, our hosts tried to keep us to the 
program they had arranged.  With the exception of the impromptu 
stop on the outskirts of Buon Ma Thuot, they largely succeeded. 
When we tried to stop at a village in Krong Pak, we were blocked 
by a group of men in civilian clothes who knew that this village 
was not on our program.  When we drove down a side road en route 
to Gia Lai and were stopped by a police car that seemed to come 
out of nowhere, we were again told it was not on our program. 
When we stopped to talk to a local villager, a dozen young men 
materialized from the brush yelling at us in what appeared to be 
an ethnic minority language.  The GVN was also clearly looking at 
this as an important press opportunity, going so far as to print a 
full page article in one of the nation's highest circulation 
newspapers reporting on the meeting with Chairman Lang, even after 
poloff's had made it clear that journalists were not allowed in 
the meeting.  (Note:  Trips to the Central Highlands, when allowed 
at all, are often restricted in a similar manner, especially 
during periods of heightened tensions, although the number of 
"escorts" this time was higher than usual and the press coverage 
was significantly more.) 
 
¶13. (SBU) The only "facts" that seem to be established at this 
point are that at least some of the protests were violent, but 
they do not appear to have been extremely large or widespread. 
Other details will be harder to establish.  How high would the 
level of ethnic animosity and/or desire for any of the benefits 
reportedly promised need to be to drive ethnic minority villagers 
to this kind of violence?  Local officials really did seem 
surprised by the anger of the crowds, and their unwillingness to 
listen to reason.  The financial lure of social security and green 
cards appears to have played a role.  And how important a factor 
was religion?  Most reports from official and other sources focus 
on land and other economic issues as the main source of 
discontent, and religious practice seems to have been unaffected 
the very next day, but religion may well have been part of the 
mix, at least for some.  Answers to these questions will be slow 
in coming, along with a better understanding of how the protests 
were coordinated and organized.  It will also take time to sort 
out the details of the government's response.  If the casualty 
figures are as low as the GVN would have us believe, then 
restraint seems to have been the order of the day.  But if a 
stronger response was required to quell the disturbance, then 
higher figures could be closer to the real number.  And we do not 
know how many protestors are still in detention. 
 
¶14. (SBU) We did hear a number of recurring themes throughout the 
trip, such as claims of Montagnards clashing with other 
Montagnards, Montagnards clashing with Kinh, and police dressing 
in civilian clothes to make the clashes look like Montagnards 
against Kinh.  Other stories seemed more bizarre, like the 
accounts we heard from several officials in different districts 
that elderly, paralyzed people had been loaded on tractors and 
forced to join the protesters, later requiring treatment in the 
hospital.  In a country where the government is generally 
suspicious of the people and the people are often equally 
suspicious of their government, it is not surprising that both 
sides might be willing to believe the worst.  And in a region with 
poor communications and transportation infrastructure, rumors can 
easily become the coin of the realm.  Even with all of the 
restrictions, this was a useful trip.  Sadly, the suspicions 
voiced by the Dak Lak PC Chairman about USG and UN involvement are 
likely to be taken seriously among a large number of local and 
even some national GVN officials.  Mission will remind national 
leaders that they have a responsibility to dispel ridiculous 
conspiracy theories. 
WHITE