This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

051445Z Apr 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION WITH SENIOR MDC OFFICIALS 
IDENTIFIES AMPLE COMMON GROUND 
 
REF: A. A) HARARE 553 
 
     ¶B. B) HARARE 397 
     ¶C. C) HARARE 188 
 
Classified By: DCM REWHITEHEAD DUE TO 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (c) Comment.  On April 2, the Ambassador and DCM met with 
MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube and MDC Spokesman Paul 
Themba  Nyathi to discuss, inter alia, South African 
President Mbeki's effort to broker interparty talks between 
the MDC and ZANU-PF.  Ncube detailed March 1 meetings with 
Mbeki in South Africa, including proposed electoral calendars 
and the possible motives for Mbeki's premature public 
statement that both sides have agreed on joint 
parliamentary/presidential elections.  The MDC officials 
asserted that ZANU-PF factionalism is being driven by a well 
orchestrated attempt to undercut the position of Speaker of 
Parliament Emerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe's heir apparent.  They 
admitted that MDC morale was low after the loss of the 
Zengeza by-election, a result of the MDC's internal 
wrangling.  Ncube called for a strategic approach to bring 
African pressure to bear on Mugabe that would team Mbeki with 
Presidents Mkapa and Chissano, an outcome that we also favor. 
 End comment. 
 
¶2.  (c) The lunch time exchange commenced with a discussion 
of the shooting of an MDC activist in Zengeza, reportedly by 
Minister without Portfolio Elliot Manyika (ref a).  Ncube 
confirmed that the authorities had pressured the family to 
bury the youth immediately and without at autopsy.  Shortly 
after the shooting, Ncube said that he had spoken with Police 
Commissioner Chihuri and Security Minister Goche, both of 
whom claimed ignorance of the incident.  Elections 
Commissioner Gula-Ndebele had subsequently stepped in to 
provide an alibi for Manyika, claiming that he had spoken 
with Manyika on a land line telephone in Bindura just after 
the shooting.  Ncube said that while the MDC had not yet 
accused Manyika, eyewitness accounts all pointed to Manyika. 
Nonetheless, Ncube expected it would be difficult to bring 
him to trial even on a charge of manslaughter. 
 
¶3.  (c) Ncube spoke at length on a March 1 de facto proximity 
talks in Pretoria between President Mbeki and MDC and ZANU-PF 
delegations headed by Ncube and Justice Minister Patrick 
Chinamasa.  After initially declining a meeting with the MDC, 
in Johannesburg to launch the MDC's RESTART program, Mbeki 
had relented and agreed to meet with Ncube, Gift Chamanikire 
and Gibson Sibanda for a briefing on progress toward 
interparty talks and the mood shift in Harare since December. 
 Mbeki had initially proposed a meeting that included 
Chinamasa, to clarify why there had been little progress and 
when the rules of engagement would be ready, but when MDC 
accepted and Chinamasa declined a joint meeting, Mbeki met 
separately with ZANU-PF and MDC delegations. 
 
¶4.  (c) Ncube said that Mbeki had summoned them back to State 
House for a second meeting the same day during which he 
reported that he had met with the ZANU-PF delegation. 
Chinamasa had blamed MDC intransigence for the lack of 
progress on talks and specifically accused Ncube of allegedly 
avoiding Chinamasa throughout December.  Chinamasa claimed 
that only a few minor details remained under discussion and 
that both sides had agreed on an independent electoral 
commission, access to voter rolls, etc. 
 
¶5.  (c) Mbeki then described a ZANU-PF proposal that 
Chinamasa claimed had already been presented to and accepted 
by MDC -- a 2005 parliamentary election followed by joint 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2008.  Ncube 
responded that this was the first time the MDC had heard this 
proposal.  (Note: This conflicts somewhat with comments Ncube 
made to Embassy officers during a January meeting.)  Mbeki 
initially said he supported this solution and that the MDC 
should be able to live with Mugabe in power for three more 
years.  The MDC delegation responded that the ZANU-PF 
proposal masked growing factionalism within ZANU-PF over who 
their next presidential candidate might be, if Mugabe does 
not stand.  They added that it also reflected Chinamasa's 
lack of a mandate to agree on any electoral mechanism without 
Mugabe's explicit prior approval.  Ncube suggested that Mbeki 
should consult with Chissano and other regional leaders on 
the need for them to ask Mugabe collectively about his 
retirement plans. 
 
¶6.  (c) Ncube said that at the conclusion of the Pretoria 
meetings, Mbeki had urged both sides to agree to a joint 
statement that confirmed progress on informal talks leading 
toward the beginning of formal talks.  When Ncube 
subsequently met with Chinamasa in Harare, Chinamasa would 
only agree on a statement that informal talks were ongoing, 
thus echoing Mugabe's public declaration of last December. 
Chinamasa then proposed the same dual electoral dates he had 
described to Mbeki and said that nothing else could come 
under discussion until the MDC had agreed to the proposed 
electoral calendar. 
 
¶7.  (c) Ncube told the Ambassador that subsequent to the 
meetings in Pretoria (or about three weeks ago), Mbeki had 
sent a letter to Mugabe.  The MDC was unaware of the contents 
and was uncertain about what might come next.  He cited 
Mbeki's public statement after the Pretoria talks that both 
sides had agreed to simultaneous presidential and 
parliamentary elections and said that this could be 
interpreted in three ways.  First, Mbeki was simply referring 
to the draft of the revised constitution, which does indeed 
provide for joint elections.  Secondly, Mbeki was attempting 
to pressure Mugabe publicly.  Finally, Mbeki was dissembling 
to shore up his own position in the upcoming South African 
elections.  Ncube speculated that Mbeki might feel he has 
greater latitude to confront Mugabe once these elections are 
behind him. 
 
¶8.  (c) Themba Nyathi said that the MDC expects ZANU-PF to 
resort to the same bully tactics that carried the day in 
Zengeza (ref b).  Ncube said that his attempts to meet with 
Lupane ZANU-PF chairman Jacob Mudenda  and Matabeleland North 
Governor Obert Mpofu to discuss minimizing violence had met 
with no success -- they appeared to be ducking him.  He 
claimed that ZANU-PF had amassed a 20-billion Zimbabwe dollar 
war chest to buy votes but said that the good harvest 
underway had eroded ZANU-PF's ability to use food as an 
electoral weapon. 
 
¶9.  (c) Although neither predicted the likely outcome of the 
Lupane vote, they admitted that MDC morale was low (ref a). 
The loss of Zengeza, an urban MDC stronghold, had been 
devastating.  Ncube blamed the party's contentious candidate 
selection process for the outcome and observed that the MDC 
could not afford to take its urban constituency for granted. 
He blamed party Chairman Isaac Matonga and two other senior 
labor figures for insisting on a labor candidate without 
local roots, but exempted MDC President Tsvangirai from 
blame.  He felt that several thousand MDC supporters had 
protested the high-handed tactics of certain MDC officials by 
switching their votes, thus providing ZANU-PF's margin of 
victory. 
 
¶10.  (c) Ncube and Themba Nyathi described growing 
factionalism within ZANU-PF as an offshoot of a concerted 
effort by Solomon Mujuru, Simba Makoni, and other members of 
an internal anti-corruption committee to bring down Speaker 
of the Parliament Mnangagwa.  Police Commissioner Chihuri and 
Defense Minister Sekeremayi are also involved in the struggle 
against Mnangagwa, and possibly Security Minister Goche as 
well.  ZANU-PF whip Jerome Gumbo, a Mnangagwa ally, had 
confided to Ncube that once untouchable pro-Mnangagwa 
business elites were in detention and under torture in an 
attempt to implicate Mnangagwa in corruption.  Ncube said 
that, thus far, pro-Mnangagwa elements within the CIO had 
tipped Mnangagwa off and kept him a step ahead of his 
adversaries.  He said that the continued detention of Telecel 
Chairman James Makamba is only peripherally connected to this 
struggle -- Grace Mugabe's infidelity with Makamba was the 
root cause of Makamba's plight. 
 
¶11.  (c) Ncube concluded his comments by cautioning that the 
U.S. should not grant Mbeki exclusive control over the 
process of breaking the political impasse in Zimbabwe.  Mbeki 
had admitted that he wanted the joint MDC/ZANU-PF statement 
after the Pretoria proximity talks partly to relieve the 
pressure brought to bear on him by the U.S. and U.K.  Ncube 
thought that a broader approach that included Presidents 
Mkapa and Chissano would fare better. 
 
¶12.  (c) Comment.  For the most part, Ncube and Themba 
Nyathi's views coincide with our own.  We agree that a 
broader regional approach can intensify the pressure on 
Mugabe, and simultaneously keep Mbeki on the straight and 
narrow.  Once Mbeki's own election is safely behind him and 
the Zimbabwe issue recedes as a factor in Mbeki's political 
calculations, we believe that the time will be ripe to engage 
with Mbeki and other regional leaders again by organizing the 
one-time visit by a specially designated U.S. envoy to 
Harare, Pretoria, Maputo and Dar es Salaam. 
SULLIVAN