This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000920 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE, EAP/BCLTV, IO/UNP, and EAP/RSP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR MARR EAID PREL VM CNARC
SUBJECT:  U.S.-VIETNAM DRUG COOPERATION COULD STRENGTHEN 
WITH JIATF WEST INVOLVEMENT 
 
REF: A. Hanoi 405     B. Hanoi 816 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  GVN Defense and Public Security Ministries, 
as well as the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), are 
"eager" to work on implementation of the new bilateral 
counternarcotics letter of agreement.  Training and 
infrastructural assistance are high GVN priorities; all are 
interested in exploring future cooperation with JIATF-WEST. 
One possible quick project would be for JIATF-WEST to work 
with DEA to supply DEA trainers for an ongoing USG-funded 
UNODC project, thus increasing the number of GVN law 
enforcement officials exposed to U.S. training, personnel, 
and methods.  Embassy Law Enforcement Working Group will 
meet soon to refine some project proposals.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) RADM David Kunkel, Director of the Joint Interagency 
Task Force-West (JIATF-W), visited Hanoi March 29 for 
meetings with officials of the Ministries of Defense (MOD) 
and Public Security (MPS).  (The visit was a follow-up to 
the visit of Admiral Fargo in February -- ref A.)   Admiral 
Kunkel, accompanied by his planning staff, operations chief, 
and DEA liaison, introduced the GVN officials to the JIATF-W 
organization and solicited input regarding potential 
counternarcotics assistance projects in Vietnam. 
 
MPS 
--- 
 
¶3. (U) Major General Phan Van Duc, Deputy Director General 
of the General Division of Police in charge of 
counternarcotics at MPS, called Admiral Kunkel's visit 
"important" in light of the "ratification" of the new 
Counternarcotics Letter of Agreement (LOA) February 3, 2004. 
(Note: Ref b reported Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien's 
assertion to Ambassador that the agreement was now in 
effect, but we have not been formally notified in writing by 
either the Office of Government or MFA, despite repeated 
requests for formal clarification of the status of the 
agreement.  We have been told that MPS will soon appoint a 
point of contact at the Standing Office for Drug Control, 
however. End note.)  General Duc noted that the main element 
of the LOA was a project to increase the capabilities of 
Vietnamese law enforcement, and that MPS looked forward to 
using this and other projects to "strengthen and extend" 
U.S.-Vietnam cooperation.  He conceded that MPS "faced some 
large problems due to legal system difficulties and a 
different legal framework from the U.S." that prevented MPS 
from providing DEA with the level of cooperation it desired. 
General Duc expressed a determination to set up a mechanism 
for implementing the LOA and determining the best way to 
exchange information and deliver training, and then use that 
mechanism as a step towards joint operations. 
 
¶4. (U) Admiral Kunkel described JIATF-W's closely 
cooperation with DEA, and highlighted that the LOA offered 
the opportunity to discuss issues of mutual concern on 
counternarcotics.  He described other JIATF-W projects in 
the region, such as the development of a joint intelligence 
fusion center in Thailand, and asked General Duc about MPS' 
priorities.  Duc noted that checkpoint equipment might be 
important for Customs, while a joint intelligence fusion 
center would consistent with the GVN's priorities in the 
counterdrug fight and the effort to build interagency 
cooperation.  He admitted that the GVN needed a place to 
receive, disseminate, and analyze intelligence and 
information. 
 
¶5. (U) SODC representative Colonel Bui Xuan Hieu noted that 
Vietnam had a five-year plan (2001-2005) to combat narcotics 
and that there were 14 international projects already 
included.  He said that SODC was "eager" to begin 
implementation of the LOA, but stressed that it would be 
necessary to synchronize any proposed projects with those 
that were already a part of the national plan. 
 
MOD 
--- 
 
¶6. (U) Senior Colonel Nguyen Sinh Xo explained to Admiral 
Kunkel that the MOD's Border Defense Command was one of four 
forces (along with the Coast Guard, MPS, and Customs) 
responsible for implementing counterdrug policy in Vietnam. 
Previously, Colonel Xo noted, the Border Army was 
responsible only for defense but, in light of the GVN's 
increasing attention to the drug problem, had now become an 
integral part of the national counterdrug task force.  New 
efforts included information-sharing among agencies, with 
Interpol, and with neighboring countries, he added. 
 
¶7. (U) Admiral Kunkel explained that JIATF-W was concerned 
primarily with collection and monitoring of information more 
so than actual interdiction of drugs.  He emphasized that 
drug trafficking was linked to a variety of other 
transnational problems, including trafficking in persons, 
money laundering, and terrorism, and that JIATF-W was 
looking for ways to cooperate with countries in the region 
to combat these problems. 
 
¶8. (U) According to Colonel Xo, the Border Army was now 
working with UNODC on a project to provide training for its 
forces, adding that more training was always needed and 
"welcome."  Other projects, involving provision of equipment 
that could be used to detect narcotics at border crossings, 
would be welcome as well, he predicted.  He expressed a hope 
that the USG would share intelligence and technology with 
the Border Army, either through JIATF-W or through DEA, and 
pledged to consult further within the Border Army as well as 
to remain in contact with JIATF-W through DAO. 
 
UNODC 
------ 
 
¶9. (U) UNODC Program Officer Troels Vester highlighted to 
Admiral Kunkel that information-sharing between agencies in 
Vietnam was a high priority need; currently, the 
institutional technical capacity as well as the political 
will to share information was lacking.  He explained that 
while the GVN in theory accepted the necessity of sharing 
information to combat drug trafficking, in practice GVN 
agencies found such cooperation "extremely difficult." 
Vester concurred that something like the intelligence fusion 
center in Thailand could fill a need in Vietnam as well, but 
noted that it would take a great deal of time to obtain GVN 
approval of such a project.  In the short term, he 
suggested, JIATF-W might consider funding a U.S. expert - 
possibly a DEA agent - to provide training under the 
existing UNODC counter-drug capacity building project. 
 
¶10. (U) In a separate meeting with Poloff, Vester clarified 
further that using DEA personnel would be an excellent 
option for the project because: U.S. trainers are "the 
best;" if the U.S. arranged the training, UNODC's small 
staff here would be relieved of the burden of logistical 
arrangements; project funds could then be spent broadening 
and deepening the reach of the project; and DEA involvement 
would accelerate implementation of the project.  An ideal 
contribution, Vester opined, would be to supply two trainers 
for nine weeks, with trainings conducted in six different 
provinces, plus one each in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in 
early 2005.  In addition, Vester said that the project would 
benefit from an official USG consultant to create training 
materials on information-sharing and interdiction units for 
use with the trainees, and that temporary position would 
need to complete its duties by late 2004.  He estimated the 
cost for the trainers would be in the range of USD 100,000, 
but noted that the cost savings to UNODC would be 
approximately USD 130,000; without the contribution of 
trainers, UNODC would have to hire private consultants for 
considerably more money. 
 
¶11. (U) Vester added that he would raise the issue with the 
Project Steering Committee, which is made up of 
representatives from various GVN agencies, to obtain 
approval before making a formal request.  The next 
opportunity to raise it would be April 8, he said.  As the 
project manager, however, he claimed to be "excited" about 
the prospect, which, if successful, would allow the project 
to do increased follow-up work, expand training to more than 
the interdiction teams, support the GVN in providing 
necessary follow-on training, and improve the capacity of 
the surveillance department of the Border Army, thus 
enhancing border control effectiveness. 
 
¶12. (U) Comment: RADM Kunkel's visit clearly delivered the 
message that the U.S. military is committed to assisting 
Vietnam in battling its drug problem.  The Border Army 
seemed very interested in the opportunity to work with the 
U.S. military, as did MPS, and both highlighted the LOA as 
the mechanism for arranging and implementing assistance 
projects.  Embassy will continue efforts quickly to clarify 
the exact status of the LOA and to begin further 
coordination and consultations.  With training and equipment 
as top counternarcotics assistance needs for the GVN, 
Embassy's Law Enforcement Working Group will meet to discuss 
possible concrete proposals for FY05 and beyond, in line 
with MPP strategic goals, to forward to JIATF-W for 
consideration. 
PORTER