This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  04-27-14 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS CVIS CE LTTE ECONOMICS
SUBJECT:  Ambassador meets with President Kumaratunga 
and reviews peace process and highlights USG programs 
 
Refs:  Colombo 694, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador met Sri Lankan 
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on April 
¶26.  A visibly tired CBK said she wanted to restart 
peace negotiations with the LTTE as soon as possible, 
and was willing to discuss the LTTE Interim Authority 
proposal.  She intends to reorganize the Peace 
Secretariat and bring relief and rehabilitation measures 
 
SIPDIS 
under it.  She is still deciding on her negotiating 
team.  She values US-Sri Lanka military cooperation. 
She promised an answer by the end of the week on whether 
Sri Lanka would proceed with the acquisition of an ex-US 
Coast Guard cutter.  She expressed interest in the 
TIP/PISCES program, which she had not heard about 
previously.  She is also interested in a Free Trade 
Agreement if it would have benefits for Sri Lanka.  CBK 
said she wanted to know about ongoing and proposed US 
programs so decisions could be made.  Though clearly 
fatigued, the President was much more focused and 
forward-looking than in previous meetings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador called on Sri Lankan President 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga April 26 for a one- 
on-one meeting which lasted well over an hour.  The 
Ambassador began by stating that the US supported Sri 
Lanka, not a particular party or person, and wanted to 
work with the new government, as Secretary Powell had 
told CBK in his recent phone call.  CBK said how much 
she appreciated the Secretary's call and the neutral 
stance which the US had taken during the election. 
 
Peace Process 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador said that, as the Secretary had 
stated in his call, we believed the first priority was 
to restart the peace negotiations.  CBK said she agreed 
completely and was eager to proceed.  She then 
complained that she had told this to Norwegian 
Ambassador Brattskar on April 5, but he had not 
contacted the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to 
pass on the message, pending a written request from the 
GSL that Norway continue as facilitator.  With Brattskar 
out of the country, CBK called the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister and obtained his agreement to a continued 
Norwegian role. 
 
¶4.  (C) CBK continued that she had received informal 
messages from the LTTE that they wanted the talks to 
start up soon, and on the basis of their proposal for an 
Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA).  CBK said that 
she had agreed, although she would rather discuss a 
final solution.  The Ambassador noted that the end step 
in this negotiation would result in the demise, or 
perhaps the transformation of the LTTE into a completely 
different kind of organization.  It was unrealistic to 
think that the LTTE would agree in advance to such a 
thing.  The strategy for the negotiations had to be to 
build a new situation step by step, so that in the end 
there could be no backing out. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador asked CBK if she had chosen her 
Peace Team yet or her lead negotiator.  She said the 
issue was under discussion.  When the Ambassador asked 
if she had any ideas about her negotiator, she said 
again that it was under discussion and suddenly asked 
the Ambassador "Do you have any suggestions?" (The 
Ambassador declined to enter into that discussion.)  CBK 
did say that she would keep the Peace Secretariat but 
restructure it.  She would bring the current "Triple R" 
activities (relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction) 
into one section, and have two additional sections:  one 
for strategic planning and one for staff work for the 
negotiations.  Ambassador noted that we had tried to 
provide some technical assistance to the Peace 
Secretariat earlier, but that there had not been much 
 
SIPDIS 
interest, and we had therefore moved our peace support 
activities to Track II areas.  CBK said she might be 
interested in some assistance to the Secretariat.  The 
Ambassador said that the negotiations would need a 
carefully structured approach; utilizing the Secretariat 
would be important. 
 
Military Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador said that, as CBK knew, we had an 
extensive military cooperation program with Sri Lanka. 
This program was designed in part to make it clear to 
the LTTE that if they returned to war, they would face a 
stronger Sri Lankan military, which would be supported 
by the international community.  CBK said that she 
understood and supported this.  The Ambassador then 
raised the issue of former US Coast Guard cutter 
"Courageous," scheduled for transfer to the Sri Lankan 
Navy as an excess defense article (EDA).  He noted that 
Sri Lankan had to decide quickly if it wanted the 
cutter.  Other countries would snap it up if Sri Lanka 
did not.  He noted that the cutter would greatly 
increase the Sri Lankan Navy's maritime surveillance and 
interdiction capabilities, and would also be a visible 
symbol of US support for Sri Lanka. 
 
¶7.  (C) CBK replied that she had the file on this issue 
on her desk at that moment.  She said that the problem 
was that the cutter was 36 years old and would cost the 
GSL $11 million ($7 million for refurbishment and $4 
million for new guns.)  The Chinese had offered a brand 
new ship for $33 million and the Indians a similar ship 
for $25 million.  Would the GSL not be criticized for 
spending so much money on a "36 year-old ship?"  The 
Ambassador emphasized that the cutter had been 
maintained and revamped throughout its career, and that 
with the planned refurbishment, Sri Lanka would 
essentially receive a new ship.  He said further that he 
had to tell CBK frankly that a tremendous effort had 
been expended in obtaining this ship for Sri Lanka under 
the EDA program.  If Sri Lanka turned down the ship now, 
it would be difficult to make further EDA requests -- 
such as the Sri Lankan Air Force desire for an EDA C- 
¶130.  After further similar discussion, CBK promised the 
Ambassador that the GSL would give its answer by the end 
of the week. 
 
Anti-terrorism Cooperation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador said that he wanted to mention 
one particular program, the TIP/PISCES immigration 
control system, which we had briefed before the election 
to the Defense and Interior Ministries.  The Ambassador 
described the system and the advantages it would bring 
to Sri Lanka.  CBK said she was very interested and 
would ask for the file from the Public Security 
(formerly the "Interior") Ministry.  She said that the 
Embassy should use the new Public Security Secretary as 
the GSL's point of contact on PISCES.  There is one 
thing for sure, she said: "I hate terrorists." 
 
Economic Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) The Ambassador said he wished to briefly raise 
two economic issues.  We had discussed a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the previous government, although 
no decision had yet been made on whether to go ahead 
with negotiations.  We needed to know if the GSL was 
still interested.  CBK said that her earlier government 
had negotiated Sri Lanka's first FTA, with India.  In 
general she favored free trade agreements, but, of 
course, there needed to be some benefit for Sri Lanka. 
She told the Ambassador to work with the Finance 
Minister on the issue, and the Ambassador said he had 
already raised it with Finance Minister Amunugama.  The 
Ambassador then briefly described the Millennium 
Challenge Account, noting that possible participants 
would be chosen shortly. 
 
¶10.  (U) The Ambassador said that there were many 
ongoing or proposed programs which the USG had with the 
GSL, and which we were discussing with the new 
government.  He had raised only a few during this 
discussion.  CBK asked that the Ambassador send her a 
note describing these programs so that she could ensure 
they were dealt with properly. 
 
Frustrations 
------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) CBK said that she was tired and frustrated, 
annoyed that three weeks after the election, her 
government was still unformed due to the dispute with 
the JVP over ministerial portfolios.  "I have been up 
till 2:00 a.m. every night trying to sort this out." 
She noted, somewhat ruefully, that the "mainstream 
parties" (the UNP and the SLFP) had seventy-five percent 
of the seats in Parliament, while the "extremists" (the 
JVP and the TNA), which had twenty-five percent, were 
able to hold the others hostage. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Despite her visible fatigue, CBK was much more 
focused and forward looking than in previous meetings. 
She was also much less strident, foregoing her usual 
vitriolic asides about former Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe.  Her last attempt at direct negotiations 
with the LTTE, in 1995, ended in renewed fighting, at 
least partly because her negotiating team was 
inexperienced and operated without any staff or backup. 
From her comments, she may be prepared to try a new 
approach this time.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD