This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO IO/CD AND NP AND EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL KNNP EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: MARCH 19 U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON 
NON-PROLIFERATION (CONOP) 
 
REF: A. A. BRUSSELS 1119 
     ¶B. B. BRUSSELS 1081 
     ¶C. C. USEU TODAY 03/03/04 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶D. D. BRUSSELS 36 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff David Armitage for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 19, Special Representative of the 
President for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Geneva 
CD Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders and NP/PPC Director 
Christopher Murray led discussions on arms control and 
disarmament with the EU's Nonproliferation Troika (CONOP). 
Issues discussed were: 
 
-- Irish European Union (EU) Presidency priorities:  The 
Irish want to implement the EU's weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) nonproliferation strategy.  This includes seeking to 
universalize nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control 
regimes.  It also includes an EU peer review of national 
export controls, with a general assessment planned for 
completion by June. 
 
-- Nuclear Issues: The EU is concerned about planning for the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Third Preparatory Committee 
and reiterated its call for support for extending Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) membership to the EU accession states 
that are not yet members of the NSG. 
 
-- Missiles:  The EU was raising pre-launch notifications at 
every occasion and has discussed it so far with 113 countries. 
 
-- G8 Global Partnership:  EU member states seemed willing to 
expand the Global Partnership's geographical scope, but 
resources would be tight through 2006. 
 
-- Regional Issues:  Iran, Libya, and North Korea were 
discussed, and everyone noted the need for continued US-EU 
cooperation. 
 
-- Australia Group:  EU restated its hope for USG assistance 
on extending AG membership to all EU accession states. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
EU Delegation 
------------- 
¶2. (U) The Irish EU Presidency was represented by Disarmament 
and Nonproliferation Director Adrian McDaid and Deputy 
Director Sarah McGrath.  The upcoming Dutch Presidency was 
represented by Nuclear Affairs and Nonproliferation Director 
Paul Wilke and Policy Officer Elke Merks-Schaapveld. 
Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative for WMD 
Nonproliferation and Nonproliferation Desk Officer Didier 
Cosse represented the Council Secretariat.  Nonproliferation 
specialist Marc Deffrennes and USA Desk Officer Andrew 
Denison attended for the Commission. 
 
Priorities of the Irish EU Presidency 
------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) McDaid said that a priority for the Irish Presidency 
would be to implement the EU's WMD nonproliferation strategy 
(ref. D).  A key tool in the EU strategy is to seek 
universalization of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms 
control regimes.  This will be in the form of a series of 
demarches to countries that have not yet acceded to the 
regimes.  The first round, currently underway, urges 
universal membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC).  The results will be compiled in a matrix and 
delivered to the organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW).  The EU is working on the terms of reference 
for a Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) demarche.  The EU 
also plans to hold a seminar on challenge inspections, as 
part of its effort to strengthen multilateral 
nonproliferation regimes.  McDaid discussed plans to exchange 
information among EU member states on bilateral assistance to 
prevent overlap. 
 
¶4. (C) Giannella described the EU nonproliferation strategy. 
In early February, a team of EU member state experts began a 
peer review of national export controls and hoped to have a 
general assessment completed by June.  The EU is also 
implementing a Council Directive on controlling radioactive 
sources that is stronger than a Code of Conduct, and recently 
conducted a demarche campaign urging countries to enhance the 
physical protection of fissile materials.  Moreover, the 
Political-Security Committee (PSC) plans to discuss 
transshipment/transit and seizure issues, which Giannella 
described as "conceptually linked" to the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), but which she said "needs to 
happen anyway." (ref. C) 
 
¶5. (U) McDaid and Murray exchanged views on US and EU efforts 
to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
activities.  McDaid noted that the EU had just pledged 3.3 
million euros through the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) budget to fund three new EU-selected, IAEA-implemented 
programs in Southeast Europe and the Caucasus/Central Asia. 
Murray responded that the US provides about USD 50 million 
annually in voluntary contributions to the IAEA.  Murray also 
provided an update on the status of ratification of the IAEA 
Additional Protocol in the Senate.  McDaid emphasized that 
the EU was looking to work with the US to strengthen the 
IAEA.  With reference to the President's February 11 
nonproliferation speech, he asked rhetorically how we might 
define "under suspicion" when deciding whether to bar a 
country from the IAEA Board of Governors. 
 
Nuclear Issues/NPT 
------------------ 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Sanders stressed that the U.S. was 
committed to a renewed emphasis on compliance with NPT 
nonproliferation obligations.  Recent disclosures in Libya 
and elsewhere have made clear that the NPT needs 
strengthening, a goal the US would pursue at the 2004 NPT 
Prepcom and 2005 Review Conference (RevCon).  McDaid 
discussed issues related to the run-up to the Third PrepCom. 
He noted that the PrepCom should provide two sets of 
recommendations:  one procedural and the other substantive. 
McDaid agreed that it would be best if PrepCom III could 
resolve the RevCon agenda issues, and cautioned that we 
should avoid publicly discussing any possibility of a 4th 
PrepCom to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
¶7. (C) On the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Dutch Nuclear 
Affairs and Nonproliferation division head Wilke described 
work in several areas: a French paper on sensitive 
technologies; a French/British/Swedish paper on information 
exchange; a British/Austrian paper on the Additional Protocol 
as a condition of supply; and a French outreach paper. 
Sweden had raised the issue of NSG intelligence sharing, and 
was hoping to get into greater depth at information sharing 
meetings by limiting participation to a select group.  The EU 
reiterated its call for support on ensuring NSG membership 
for all ten EU accession states.  Murray later reported that 
the U.S.supports NSG membership for Malta, Estonia, and 
Latvia, the three accession states that are not already 
members of the NSG.  Finally, the EU expressed concern over 
China's bid for NSG membership, particularly with regard to 
1993 grandfathering and IAEA safeguards.  Murray reviewed the 
President,s speech of February 11 as it described proposals 
for limiting the export of enrichment and reprocessing 
equipment and technology.  These proposals, he continued, 
could be effected through strengthening NSG guidelines, which 
would be discussed at the upcoming NSG working level meeting 
in Vienna.    Wilke replied that most EU member states would 
support our amendments, but that one (note: one EU 
participant confirmed on the margins that it was France. end 
note) was likely to block full EU consensus. 
 
¶8. (C) European Commission nonproliferation specialist 
Defrennes raised a question about how to deal with spent 
fuel.  He said some were concerned about the possible impact 
of the US NSG proposals on the EU's internal market and 
Euratom.  He added that the Commission legal services were 
responding to a member state request for further analysis. 
 
Missiles 
-------- 
¶9. (C) Wilke asked where the US stood with Russia on 
finalizing the pre-launch notification system, and urged us 
to move quickly to finish the process.  He said that the EU 
was raising pre-launch notifications at every occasion.  The 
EU has discussed it with 113 countries so far.  On the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wilke noted that 
Kazakhstan's and Croatia's MTCR membership credentials were 
weak, but stressed the EU desire that no one break silence on 
EU accession state applications.  Murray agreed that Croatia 
and Kazakhstan were not potential significant suppliers of 
missile technology, and Kazakhstan was not part of the ICOC 
or BWC.  Wilke expressed interest in whether interception 
would be on the agenda of the Re-enforced Point of Contact 
meeting in Paris 13-14 April, and if so, whether it would be 
related to PSI. 
 
G-8 Global Partnership 
---------------------- 
¶10. (C) Deffrennes provided a readout of ongoing Commission 
efforts in the G-8 Global Partnership (GP), and said the EU's 
Joint Action to renew the program with Russia would be 
finalized June 24.  Deffrennes noted also that the EU was 
unhappy with Russia's efforts to link GP assistance delays to 
Russia's failure to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles in 
accordance with its CWC commitments.    He said there 
appeared to be the will among EU member states to expand the 
geographical scope of the GP and to devise a second Joint 
Action program.  He warned, however, that the EC would be 
under budget constraints through 2006, so new money would not 
be available until the 2007-2013 budget cycle.  Murray 
replied that the US is focusing on the threat, not just 
geography, and is also considering countries such as Libya, 
Iraq, etc. 
 
Regional Issues 
--------------- 
¶11. (C) On Iran, the EU was supportive of the efforts by the 
EU-3 and recognizes the need to maintain pressure.  McDaid 
assessed Iranian cooperation so far as mixed -- should have 
been better but could have been worse -- and said the EU was 
pleased that the IAEA Board of Governors was able to agree on 
a resolution by consensus.  On Libya, McDaid said the EU was 
pleased with the BOG resolution and with the US-UK 
disarmament efforts. 
 
¶12. (C) Wilke was interested in US views on the situation in 
the DPRK, particularly as it impacts KEDO.  Currently, there 
is no EU position on the costs of suspending KEDO, but he 
emphasized that there was a connection between KEDO 
suspension and Six Party talks.  Wilke reiterated what he 
called the "standing offer" made by EU Asia Directors and DG 
Cooper (refs. A and B) to assist in any way possible with the 
Six Party process.  Giannella said the EU did not want the 
DPRK to have even a civilian nuclear facility, though it was 
unclear how North Korea would meet its energy needs without 
one. 
 
Australia Group 
--------------- 
¶13. (C) Wilke was open to US ideas on preparation for the AG 
plenary June 7-10 in Paris.  He reiterated the need to 
discuss membership in the AG for the ten EU accession states. 
 Murray said the US was discussing the issue with EU 
counterparts through AG channels, and would do so more once 
the current MTCR silence process was finished.  He said the 
US would appreciate EU assistance in persuading Switzerland 
and France to stop blocking the addition of new nerve gas 
precursors to the control lists.  The EU took note of the 
request but did not respond. 
 
Schnabel