This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS BK EUN NATO USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERIAL APRIL 5-6 
 
 
Classified By: USEU External Affairs Officer Andrew Erickson 
for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The EU Informal Defense Ministerial in Brussels on 
April 5/6 endorsed and appeared to expand the concept of the 
EU rapid reaction force, with Hirep Solana identifying as its 
elements rapid EU institutional decision-making, a planning 
cell, and battle groups.  Solana explained that the purpose 
of the battle groups was to provide the EU with "the means to 
apply the European Security Strategy".  On Bosnia, Defmins 
discussed the way forward with NATO, and appeared to reach 
informal consensus that the current way forward and division 
of tasks (with PIFWCs continuing under current arrangements) 
is acceptable to the EU.  Following the informal, Solana on 
April 7 approved the draft General Concept on Bosnia, which 
can now be formally approved on April 15 by the PSC, and then 
moved up the EU chain to COREPER and the Council, with final 
approval likely April 23rd.  END SUMMARY 
 
-------------------- 
Capabilities the Key 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Following April 5th discussions, Hirep Solana told 
the press and invited diplomats that the first day's 
discussions had focused on capabilities, and the EU's need to 
"be ready to act quickly" in the event of a crisis.  There 
were different strands to this.  One was the importance of 
the new 2010 Headline Goal, intended to enhance EU 
interoperability, deployability, and sustainability.  "The 
idea" guiding the EU, said Solana, "is to have the means to 
apply the European Security Strategy".  Solana said that the 
focus needed to be giving the EU the means to respond to 
several crises simultaneously.  A skeptical press corps 
pushed the Hirep hard on specifics, but Solana was reserved. 
 
--------------------- 
Ministers Endorse the 
Battle Group Concept 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Irish Defmin Smith noted that the Franco-UK-German 
Battle Groups concept had been favorably received by all EU 
member countries at the ministerial, and could be seen as 
having the informal endorsement of the group.  According to a 
Council Secretariat contact speaking on April 8, the Battle 
Groups idea can now be seen to have the informal endorsement 
of the member states, increasing the likelihood that it will 
be formally folded into the 2010 Headline goal at the 
appropriate political juncture. 
 
¶4.  (U) On April 5, Solana stated that the EU intends to have 
its incipient planning cell functioning by the end of the 
Irish Presidency in June, and the first battle group on line 
by 2007.  Solana remarked at the press conference that the 
EU's ability to respond rapidly rests on three elements: 
flexible decision-making, speedy planning, and a rapid 
response capability such as Battle Groups.  He was notably 
imprecise about where the speedy planning would take place. 
It should be noted that in his intervention Solana repeatedly 
underscored the need to work in harmony with NATO. 
 
----------------- 
Bosnia Transition 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) We debriefed Council Secretariat working-level 
officials on April 7 and 8 on the Bosnia transition.  These 
informed interlocutors, who attended the defense ministers 
informal and who actually drafted the draft General Concept 
for Bosnia, told us the following: 
-- exchanges at the defense ministerial on Bosnia were 
primarily focused on force generation, with Solana expressing 
concerns that there would be shortfalls; 
-- according to one official present, the meeting was 
characterized by "lots of small countries offering up minor 
contributions; Solana was clearly concerned that this was 
inadequate;" and, 
-- there was general consensus that the current state of 
NATO-EU agreement on task delineation constitutes "a workable 
starting point" but that there was a need for operational 
commanders on the ground to eventually work out clearer 
understandings. 
 
¶6.  (C) Following the defense ministerial, Hirep Solana on 
April 7 approved the Council Secretariat's draft General 
Concept.  This document sets down the strategic parameters of 
the security and stabilization tasks for the EU in Bosnia. 
Solana's approval seems to reflect his comfort level with the 
outcome of the discussion at the informal ministerial, and 
clears the way for the draft to be presented to the Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) on April 15, where if approved, 
it would go on to COREPER on April 21 for clearance prior to 
final approval by the Council on April 23.  There are no 
surprises in the concept, which accepts command and control 
arrangements running from DSACEUR through AFSOUTH to the EU 
OpCommander in Bosnia. 
 
------------------------------- 
Other issues: Defense Armaments 
Agency, Military role for GWOT? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) According to our Council contacts, another notable 
issues were discussed at the informal ministerial.  Following 
a presentation by its British Head of the Agency 
Establishment Team, Nick Whitney, there was an inconclusive 
debate about what sort of entity the Defense Armaments and 
Capabilities Agency would be.  Would it be a proper agency 
with a budget and a staff like the Commission, or would it 
remain a secretariat with very limited resources like the 
Council Secretariat?  Clearly the debate was just beginning 
on this issue, although it was a debate of some urgency, 
given Solana's imperative to get the project operational by 
the end of 2004.  Finally, at the CHODs meeting on 7 April, 
there was some discussion of the potential for an EU military 
role (a "second pillar role") in the war on terrorism.  This 
conversation was spurred by the appointment of the new EU 
anti-terrorism coordinator.  It was extremely preliminary, 
limited to traditional military tasks and consequence 
management, we were told. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The ever-cautious Solana's decision to push the draft 
Bosnia General Concept forward to the PSC indicates that 
Solana believes he is on solid ground with defense ministers 
on the parameters of the EU's proposed Bosnia operation, 
following the April 6 discussion with ministers.  We 
understand that there are no surprises in this document, as 
it endorses a DSACEUR/AFSOUTH/EUFOR chain of command, and 
accepts NATO and U.S. redlines. 
 
¶9.  (C) The informal endorsement of defense ministers of the 
UK-French-German Battle Groups concept was expected.  We 
expect that the concept will be folded into the EU 2010 
Headline Goal at the appropriate political opportunity, and 
will become the basic "cost" to member states wishing to join 
"structured cooperation" in the future -- if this element of 
the Constitution is ever adopted. 
 
Foster