This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001510 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014 
TAGS: PARM PHUM PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT 
STEPS FOR U.S. 
 
REF: A. USEU TODAY 04/06/04 
     ¶B. BRUSSELS 1464 
     ¶C. STATE 68263 
     ¶D. PRAGUE 390 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S/NF) The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
discussed the EU arms embargo on China during a heated 90 
minute exchange on April 2.  PSC Ambassadors generally agreed 
that the issue -- of whether, when and how to lift the 
embargo -- should be sent back down to working groups for 
further study before being presented to political groups for 
a decision.  France objected, however, and succeeded in 
getting agreement to discuss the issue at the April 26 FMs 
meeting (GAERC) -- but failed in its campaign to secure an 
early decision.  The debate will likely continue well into 
the Dutch EU Presidency.  This cable draws on a detailed 
readout and a sensitive internal report provided to Poloff by 
UK and Hungarian contacts (please protect accordingly), as 
well as background provided in recent days by other 
interlocutors.  It also offers a strategy for continuing US 
engagement. 
 
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PSC Reacts Badly to Latest US Demarche 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) PSC Ambassadors reportedly arrived at the April 2 
meeting to find copies of ref C demarche sitting on their 
otherwise empty desks.  The demarche was received badly 
because it gave the impression that "big brother was 
watching," and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and 
hubristic attempt to influence the PSC, according to our UK 
contact.  Some reps, led by Greek Ambassador 
Paraskevoupoulos, objected to the Council Secretariat's 
distribution of the demarche under Council Secretariat cover 
and with a Secretariat identifying number.  He argued that 
the document had no business being circulated by the 
Secretariat, and insisted that it be stricken from EU 
 
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records.  Ambassadors also reacted against what they 
perceived as the threatening tone of our demarche. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) The Financial Times' front page article on April 2 
about the US demarche campaign also enflamed the Ambassadors 
because it appeared directly aimed at Friday's PSC 
discussion.  Irish Ambassador Kelleher reportedly opened the 
meeting by waving the article in the air and imploring his 
colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU 
deliberations.  Poloff pointed out that the timing of the 
latest US demarche was a coincidence, as we were previously 
unaware that the PSC was scheduled to discuss the issue on 
that day.  (COMMENT: Our demarche was received badly not so 
much because of its substance, but because of the way it was 
presented.  Our UK contact faulted the Irish and the Council 
Secretariat for the way the demarche was handled in the PSC, 
 
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and also the awkward timing that made it seem, along with the 
FT article, tailor-made to influence the April 2 discussion. 
END COMMENT). 
 
----------------------------------------- 
National Positions: France versus Denmark 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact, France staked out a 
"zero flexibility" position on lifting the embargo, and is 
opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by 
insisting on further human rights progress by China and/or 
strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lifting the 
embargo).  The Danes are reportedly still leading the 
opposition, and have circulated to EU partners a list of ten 
human rights conditions that they believe China should meet 
before the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy 
of this list).  Other EU Member States are lining up 
somewhere in between, although "all agree in principle" that 
the embargo should be lifted if certain conditions are met. 
The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions and 
timing. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Following is a summary of national interventions 
made at the April 2 PSC: 
 
-- France: The embargo is anachronistic and must go; willing 
to discuss timing but not conditionality because China would 
not accept human rights conditionality; likewise would be 
contradictory to enhance the Code of Conduct specifically for 
China while also lifting the embargo; opposed also to making 
Code of Conduct legally binding; wants issue to remain 
political; opposed to sending it down to working groups. 
 
-- Denmark: Any decision to lift the embargo must be linked 
to specific Chinese steps on human rights; EU also needs to 
review Code of Conduct to ensure that lifting the embargo 
does not result in increased arms sales to China. 
 
-- Germany: EU must consider regional impact of lifting the 
embargo; now is not a good time to lift embargo (COMMENT: The 
Germans appear to have moved closer to the Danes in recent 
weeks, and are now the largest EU member state with serious 
reservations about lifting the embargo.  One report of the 
discussion suggests that "the tough German position, coupled 
with the strength of US views, might be tempering French 
enthusiasm."  END COMMENT). 
 
-- UK: Should be further study by working groups to identify 
implications for human rights and regional stability, and to 
examine options for strengthening Code of Conduct (COMMENT: 
Our Hungarian contact reports that the UK is fundamentally 
closer to the French end of the spectrum than the Danish. 
The UK, like France, does not favor making the Code of 
Conduct legally binding.  END COMMENT). 
 
-- Greece: Should explore gestures China could make on human 
rights without explicitly linking them to lifting the 
embargo; should not link regional stability to lifting 
embargo; "provocatively" proposed that the Code of Conduct be 
made legally binding.  (COMMENT: Our contacts report that the 
Greek position on lifting the embargo is closer to France 
than any other Member State.  END COMMENT). 
 
-- Ireland: Supports sending the issue back to working groups 
(in part to keep the EU from making any decision during its 
Presidency). 
 
-- Netherlands: Central consideration should be possible 
release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown. 
 
-- Czech Republic: Supports French position that issue should 
remain political; silent on other points (COMMENT: Our UK 
contact said that the Czech position is generally understood 
to be informed by that country's interest in selling radar 
equipment to China, as described ref D.  END COMMENT). 
 
-- Sweden: Working groups should further study issues of 
human rights, regional stability, and enhancing the Code of 
Conduct. 
 
-- Austria: Should explore gestures on human rights that 
China could make but avoid linkage to lifting the embargo; 
should conduct a general (i.e. non China-specific) review of 
Code of Conduct. 
 
-- Italy: Intervened with same points as Austria. 
 
-- Belgium: More discussion needed of implications, including 
on human rights, of any decision to lift embargo. 
 
-- Commission: Took no position on lifting embargo but said 
EU should remain focused on human rights. 
 
Other member states did not intervene in the PSC discussion. 
 
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Timeline: Back to the Working Groups? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF) The PSC will meet again on this issue on April 7, 
when it is expected to approve an "issues paper" which will 
then be sent through COREPER to FMs for discussion at the 
April 26 GAERC.  According to our UK and Hungarian contacts, 
the paper is intended as a tour d'horizon for the GAERC 
discussion.  It will not contain recommendations, and FMs are 
not expected to take a decision.  Instead, they will likely 
send the paper back down to the PSC for re-examination.  Most 
PSC Ambassadors, having satisfied the French desire for a 
ministerial discussion in April, will then press France to 
accept the majority preference for sending the issue back to 
the working groups.  The working groups would need two to 
three months, minimum, to complete their assessments and 
submit their papers to the PSC (EU working groups are 
comprised of capital-based experts who rarely meet more than 
once per month).  The relevant working groups are COHUM 
(human rights), COASI (Asia Directors), and COARM 
(conventional arms exports). 
 
¶7. (S/NF) What all this means is that the debate will likely 
continue well into the Dutch Presidency.  Already, Member 
States are beginning to look toward the December EU-China 
Summit as a possible timeframe for any decision to lift the 
embargo.  We have heard they are also looking at the US 
electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be 
worth holding off their decision until November or December 
in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar.  They have not 
and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each 
other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet 
conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the 
wings. 
 
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Next Steps for the US 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) Our efforts have managed to slow down the momentum 
in favor of removing the arms embargo, but have not killed 
this idea outright.  In addition to the ongoing diplomatic 
dialogue on this issue, we recommend the following steps to 
help us keep the pressure on European governments: 
 
-- We should coordinate closely with Japan, and perhaps also 
the ROK.  According to numerous EU interlocutors, the 
Japanese have become increasingly active on this issue, but 
their efforts appear so far uncoordinated with our own. 
While this may have served our interests in the sense that it 
gave the Europeans the impression that Japan's concerns were 
genuine and not dictated by Washington, it is now time to 
begin coordinating our efforts, so that Europeans recognize 
that other key players in the region share our regional 
stability concerns. 
 
-- We should engage the European Parliament, and particularly 
members of its Human Rights Committee.  The EP is already on 
record opposing an end to the embargo.  By calling attention 
to EU deliberations and ongoing Chinese human rights abuses, 
the EP could increase the political heat on member state 
governments against any decision to lift the embargo. 
 
-- We should consider increasing our public statements and 
press briefings for European audiences, on the assumption 
that more scrutiny by European publics would help our views 
on this issue, especially as regards human rights. 
 
-- We should increase our engagement with institutional and 
member state representatives to the COHUM, COASI and COARM 
working groups.  In this way we could ensure that our views 
on human rights, regional stability and the Code of Conduct 
are fully understood by those experts who will be supplying 
recommendations to the political groups for discussion. 
 
-- Additionally, as suggested ref B, we recommend the USG 
begin considering options for how the EU might strengthen 
controls on arms exports to China in a post-embargo scenario. 
 The worst case for us would be for the EU to lift its 
embargo without having in place some sort of new mechanism 
for controlling the transfer of arms and sensitive 
technologies to China. 
 
Schnabel