This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 
TAGS: PGOV LO
SUBJECT: KALINAK ON GASPAROVIC: DOTH SMER PROTEST TOO MUCH? 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Weiser for reason 1.4b. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  SMER leader Robert Kalinak says SMER's 
decision to endorse Gasparovic as a "way to support Kukan 
without supporting Kukan" was a nonsensical strategy which 
then backfired.  Smer remains committed nevertheless to 
Gasparovic in the second round.  Having a grateful Gasparovic 
in the presidential palace would help Robert Fico's prime 
ministerial ambitions after the next parliamentary elections 
-- a more credible explanation for Smer's endorsement. 
Ironically, this makes Meciar the (unofficial and 
unacknowledged) government candidate.  End Summary. 
 
Presidential Elections: Smer,s Miscalculation 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU) Smer MP Robert Kalinak told polecoffs that he was 
deeply concerned about Vladimir Meciar,s victory in the 
first round and his likely success in the run-off.  He said 
that Smer made a mistake and miscalculated before the first 
round in deciding to back Ivan Gasparovic, assuming that the 
second round would nevertheless be between Meciar and Kukan. 
Smer party officials had no doubts about Kukan,s victory in 
the second round.  In evaluating the chances of the 
candidates, Smer estimated that about 25 percent of Smer 
voters would support Schuster, but that those who disliked 
him numbered around 60 percent.  About 20 percent of Smer 
voters would support Meciar, but his "negatives" were about 
40 percent.  Smer finally chose Gasparovic because he had 
about 25 percent support with low "negatives."  (SMER vice 
chairman Paska told DCM separately that Smer executive 
committee was overwhelmingly in favor of Gasparovic.) 
 
Why Meciar is Dangerous and Gasparovic is Benign 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Kalinak described the differences between Meciar and 
Gasparovic and the problems that would arise if Meciar 
becomes president.  Meciar will have 26 MPs to support his 
policies, unlike Gasparovic, who has no party backing in 
Parliament and therefore is not dangerous.  Kalinak further 
speculated that Meciar may block appointments of some 
ministers in the future and after the elections he could 
exert control not only in parliament (through his MPs), but 
also in the ministries by appointing his own people.  After 
the next parliamentary elections, Kalinak said that he could 
envision a scenario in which Meciar would be president and 
the prime minister and speaker of parliament would also come 
from HZDS.  In Kalinak,s opinion, Meciar is a stronger 
advocate of EU policies than of transatlantic ties and thus 
he will try to be acceptable to the French and Germans and 
ally Slovakia with them. 
 
Let,s Make a Deal 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Kalinak claims that PM Mikulas Dzurinda made a tacit 
agreement with Meciar, such that if SDKU and ANO voters do 
not vote in the run-off, Meciar and HZDS will not oppose GOS 
initiatives.  (Comment: Low voter turnout is expected to 
assist Meciar's chances.)  He contrasted SDKU,s behavior 
before the parliamentary elections in 2002 "when SDKU was 
vocally opposed to Meciar" and now when they appear to be 
silent about his candidacy.  In Kalinak,s opinion, Meciar 
would sell his party to the highest bidder as long as he is 
president.  Kalinak also said that Meciar approached Smer for 
its support prior to the first round. 
 
Future Coalition Possibilities 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Kalinak stressed that Smer and he personally tried 
to keep distance from HZDS and Meciar, but in the future this 
may appear more difficult, should Smer and HZDS together gain 
the majority in the next parliamentary election. If Smer 
refuses to cooperate with HZDS, Smer,s voters would not 
understand why they do not want to make a coalition with 
HZDS.  In his view, Meciar could enter a coalition with any 
available party, including SNS or communists, whose 
preferences may grow due to the hardship caused by economic 
reforms. 
 
Why Gasparovic is the Lesser Evil 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In Kalinak's view, Gasparovic was always just number 
two in HZDS, and was just following Meciar,s orders. 
Gasparovic is more pro-Western and supports transatlantic 
policies.  Gasparovic has assured Smer leadership that he 
will no longer seek support from the nationalists, but used 
the opportunity last fall/winter to establish name 
recognition.  Kalinak does not think that Gasparovic will try 
to manipulate the Parliament as Meciar might.  Kalinak said 
that he will participate in several TV discussions and will 
try to appeal to voters to go and vote, warning them that 
 
ignoring the second round will only work to Meciar,s 
benefit. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Others in Smer have told us in the last week that the 
decision to support Gasparovic was contentious within the 
party, and pushed the "acceptable limits."  Nonetheless, Smer 
made the strategic decision to endorse this candidate, and is 
sticking by him.  Ironically, Meciar is now seen as the 
government candidate.  He is considered the "lesser of two 
evils" by coalition politicians who fear a Gasparovic victory 
would do nothing but give more impetus to Smer.  Jewish 
community leaders worried in an April 14 meeting with 
Ambassador and Congressman Wexler about anti-Semitic 
tendencies of the nationalists that supported Gasparovic, and 
seemed to prefer a Meciar victory. 
 
¶8. (C) Kalinak's comments about Smer seeking to indirectly 
support Kukan ring hollow.  Several Smer leaders including 
Kalinak told us for months that they would not endorse any 
presidential candidate in the first round.  There was no need 
for them to do so, and they can have had no doubt that their 
endorsement would swing at least a few percentage pioints to 
Gasparovic.  A likelier interpretation is that Fico made a 
calculated decision that a grateful Gasparovic in the 
presidential palace would facilitate his chances to be the 
next prime minister, which would not have been the case with 
a second-round endorsement of Kukan.  Kalinak's attempt at 
rationalization is another reminder that Smer remains mindful 
of Washington's interest.  It is not the first time Smer 
leaders have attempted to "spin" their actions after the 
fact, usually only when they realize we've been paying 
attention. 
WEISER 
 
 
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