This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 000340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2024 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PINR LO
SUBJECT: MECIAR OR GASPAROVIC: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Weiser for reason 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  The April 17 run-off election for president 
does not present much of a choice: neither Meciar nor 
Gasparovic would be an ideal Slovak president in the view of 
the U.S. or Slovakia's new EU and NATO partners.  Although 
the president does not directly influence foreign policy, 
this election strengthens the position of nationalist and 
populist parties that are not particularly friendly to the 
U.S.  We should adopt a public line that stresses our respect 
for democratic choice, participation in the electoral 
process, and the attendant responsibility.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Vladimir Meciar against Ivan Gasparovic in the April 
17 second round of the presidential election was not what we 
(or anyone else) expected or hoped for.  Meciar has a history 
of abusing power, sanctioning corruption, and condoning 
illegal acts.  Gasparovic was for many years Meciar's 
lieutenant, and has supporters with both populist and 
nationalist tendencies.  Neither is especially friendly 
toward the U.S.  However, given the relative lack of power 
vested in the office of the president, we do not expect 
immediate effects on U.S. interests. 
 
Chance for Rehabilitation? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Meciar seeks legitimacy and U.S. and EU approval.  He 
is now on the record as supporting Slovakia's membership in 
both NATO and the EU, and it is unlikely he would backtrack 
now.  His presidency would be a chance to rehabilitate his 
international image, and many analysts believe this would be 
his strongest motivation.  Foreign governments may be 
unwilling to invite him for official visits based on his 
behavior in the past, but even Slovaks who despise him 
believe he would not actively undermine Slovakia's 
reputation.  On the other hand, Meciar is unpredictable.  He 
will likely continue to play power games with his own party 
and with other politicians, and will control HZDS either 
directly or through a puppet (the tradition is for the 
president to resign from his party, although it is not a 
constitutional requirement). 
 
¶4. (C) Gasparovic is untested on the international scene, 
which means his name is not as tainted as Meciar's.  In the 
opinion of many, he is the lesser of two evils as a 
pragmatic, opportunist politician.  They believe that once he 
is in office, he will not worry about his small party (less 
than four percent support) and will leave the politicking to 
Smer.  Others, however, believe Gasparovic is more dangerous 
than Meciar, for both Slovakia's and U.S. interests. 
President Schuster pointed out to the Ambassador after the 
election that Gasparovic was Meciar's right-hand man who only 
broke with him over personal ambition (Meciar did not include 
him on the HZDS Parliament list for the last election), has 
never recanted or even acknowledged his actions under the 
Meciar regime, and, unlike Meciar, is allied with extremist 
nationalist elements.  PM Dzurinda's foreign policy advisor 
cautioned DCM that "the worst candidate may not be the one 
you think."  Another Dzurinda advisor told P/E chief that 
Meciar would be "easier to work with" in completing the 
government's reform agenda.  (Comment: This may be a reaction 
to Fico's support of Gasparovic.) 
 
Damage on the Domestic Front 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Whether the next president is Meciar or Gasparovic, he 
will likely seek to undermine the governing coalition and its 
reform program.  He will veto legislation, influence 
appointments (such as ambassadorial and senior military 
posts), and use the bully pulpit to advance his interests and 
criticize the coalition.  To some extent, the governing 
coalition is accustomed to dealing with an "opposition" 
president, as Rudolf Schuster also vetoed many laws, held up 
ambassadorial appointments, and voiced his dissatisfaction 
with economic reforms.  More worrisome is how Meciar or 
Gasparovic might use the authority to grant presidential 
pardons and release corrupt cronies from jail, including 
former Slovak Information Service director Ivan Lexa and 
businessman Jozef Majsky (although under current law they 
must be convicted before they can be pardoned, unlike the 
pardons Meciar issued in the Kovac affair). 
 
Fallout 
------- 
 
¶6. (C) Opposition parties have new wind in their sails. 
There is already rampant (and overblown) speculation about 
what the next governing coalition might look like.  There is 
no doubt that this was a huge boost to Meciar and his HZDS, 
Smer's Robert Fico (who can take credit for boosting 
Gasparovic to the second-round), and Gasparovic himself. 
Coalition politicians can barely speak from surprise and 
 
disappointment. 
 
¶7. (C) The silver lining may be the wake-up call this 
election sends to the governing coalition, particularly the 
SDKU.  Before the vote, the attitude within the SDKU was one 
of complacency: Kukan was leading in the polls and there was 
smug confidence that all was well.  When recriminations about 
who "lost" the election are over (septel), the coalition will 
have no choice but to band together against a stronger common 
enemy or face possible extinction.  There will be less room 
for internal bickering and divisions.  At this time we do not 
believe new elections are in the cards, although that could 
change based on future coalition cooperation. 
 
¶8. (U) The EU and NATO have not made official comments, but 
European Parliament rapporteur for Slovakia Jan Marinus 
Wiersma expressed disappointment to press that voters in the 
second round will be choosing from two candidates 
representing the old HZDS. 
 
Long Term Significance for U.S. Interests 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The presidential election will not have much effect 
on U.S. interests.  Either a Meciar or Gasparovic presidency 
will be considerably less forthcoming than Schuster's, but 
will have little direct influence on day-to-day engagement 
with us.  There is a possibility of more rhetoric directed 
toward the U.S. from the Presidential Palace, and even more 
so directed at the government.  However, the Slovakia of 2004 
is not the Slovakia of the mid-1990's.  Most of the powers 
that Meciar enjoyed as "pseudo-President" in 1998-99 have 
been removed or otherwise constrained.  Public expectations 
-- political, economic, and otherwise -- have been shifted in 
ways not easily undone, and bureaucratic structures have been 
reformed.  EU and NATO membership are not only seals of 
approval but constraints on behavior. 
 
¶11. (C) The political effects are more important. 
Dzurinda's government and President Schuster have been 
courageous in standing behind U.S. actions in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, both with words and troops.  The 
rest of Slovakia is not convinced.  If the coalition does not 
react responsibly to this defeat, their reform program could 
be threatened, and our expectation of continued support for 
U.S. initiatives could be hurt as well.  The party that most 
staunchly supports the U.S. is the SDKU.  Within the 
coalition, the more isolationist Christian Democrats (KDH) 
were anti-Iraq War (for religious reasons).  The Hungarian 
Coalition Party (SMK) is more stable, but would have trouble 
carrying the water for us given its ethnic minority status. 
ANO may not survive beyond the next election.  Among the 
opposition, both Meciar's HZDS and Fico's SMER are more 
interested in following the popular mood than defined 
national interests. 
 
Where Should The U.S. Be? 
------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Given the active and visible U.S. campaign against 
Meciar prior to the September 2002 parliamentary elections, 
the question has arisen as to the U.S. position on this 
election.  We believe the answer should be cautious and 
reflect the significant changes that have occured in this 
country.  It would be a useful lesson for the Slovak 
electorate to see that its vote is respected but that at the 
same time its decisions have consequences.  Our public line 
should be that we respect a democratic vote, encourage 
participation in the electoral process, and are confident 
that the Slovak people will consider Slovakia's future when 
they vote. 
WEISER 
 
 
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