This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003545 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER PINR PINS PROP SNAR CO AUC ELN FARC
SUBJECT: DECIPHERING THE SIZE OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD), 
at least 20,000 Colombian terrorists, both paramilitaries and 
guerrillas, have deserted or been captured or killed in 
combat with government forces since President Alvaro Uribe 
took office in August 2002.  Still, the estimated numerical 
strengths of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and paramilitary 
groups such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC) have not seen corresponding declines.  This apparent 
contradiction can largely be explained by: (1) continued 
terrorist recruiting, (2) truncated criminal cases against 
terrorist suspects, (3) GOC actions that target urban 
militias and civilian terrorist support networks not included 
in MOD estimates of terrorist strength, and (4) estimates 
influenced by the institutional responsibilities of 
particular government entities.  Although the exact size of 
Colombian terrorist groups will never be known with 
certainty, it is clear that the GOC is hitting terrorist 
groups -- both paramilitaries and guerrillas -- and their 
civilian supporters harder than ever before.  End Summary. 
 
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The Numbers in a Nutshell 
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¶2. (SBU) The Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD) reports that 
between January 2003 and March 2004, nearly 800 
paramilitaries and 2,000 members of the National Liberation 
Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
deserted.  Since President Uribe's inauguration in August 
2002, the MOD reports that nearly 500 paramilitaries and 
2,800 members of the FARC and ELN were killed in combat and 
over 4,200 paramilitaries and 9,350 members of the FARC and 
ELN were captured by GOC security forces.  In addition, over 
1,000 paramilitaries voluntarily demobilized near the end of 
¶2003.  Thus, according to official figures, approximately 
6,500 paramilitaries and 14,200 guerrillas have been taken 
off the battlefield in the last 19 months.  However, 
estimates of the numerical strengths of the FARC, ELN, and 
paramilitary groups have not fallen consistent with these 
figures. 
 
¶3. (C) According to the Department's 2002 and 2003 human 
rights reports on Colombia, which used figures similar to 
official GOC estimates, the FARC lost only 3,000 combatants 
in 2003 and the ELN only 1,000, while paramilitary strength 
remained unchanged (the 2003 report estimates there are 
13,500 FARC members, 3,500 ELN, and 12,000 paramilitaries). 
These relatively small declines in official estimates of 
terrorist strength raise questions about the accuracy of GOC 
figures on desertions and casualties suffered by terrorist 
organizations.  However, most of the apparent discrepancies 
can be accounted for by continued terrorist recruitment, 
truncated criminal cases against terrorist suspects, GOC 
actions that target urban militias and civilian terrorist 
support networks not included in MOD estimates of terrorist 
strength, and estimates influenced by the institutional 
responsibilities of particular government entities. 
 
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Recruitment Continues 
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¶4. (C) Aggressive recruiting efforts by illegal armed groups 
compensate for many desertions and casualties.  The GOC does 
not keep statistics on terrorist recruiting, primarily 
because most takes place in areas beyond GOC control. 
However, it is clear that illegal armed groups continue to 
add thousands of new members to their ranks, sometimes by 
force.  In some regions, new recruits fully offset losses 
from desertions, detentions, and deaths.  Recruiting occurs 
primarily in poor rural areas where illegal armed groups 
exercise de facto control.  The FARC, for instance, obtains 
most of its recruits from the eastern departments of Meta and 
Caqueta.  In many of these economically backward regions, 
joining an illegal armed group is a seemingly attractive 
option.  For similar reasons, illegal armed groups have found 
rich recruiting grounds in urban slums, especially on the 
outskirts of Medellin and in southern Bogota. 
¶5. (C) FARC deserters often report joining guerrilla ranks 
because of FARC promises to care for their impoverished 
families.  A significant percentage of other FARC deserters 
claim they were forcibly recruited, although the 
self-selecting nature of this group makes it difficult to 
extrapolate a reliable percentage of FARC recruiting that is 
forcible.  The ELN, weakened by conflict with paramilitaries 
and increased GOC military pressure, has difficulty 
recruiting new members outside of regions where it still 
enjoys well-established grassroots support, such as the 
departments of Arauca and Norte de Santander.  Paramilitary 
recruits most often join for the promise of a regular, 
relatively generous salary. 
 
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Many Detainees are Released without Trial 
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¶6. (C) Another factor offsetting GOC military and law 
enforcement actions against illegal armed groups is the fact 
many detainees are released soon after they are captured. 
The military often detains large groups of persons suspected 
of affiliation with terrorist groups.  Representatives of the 
Prosecutor General's Office ("Fiscalia"), who generally 
accompany military operations, take charge of these 
individuals and check their identities against the names of 
known fugitives.  If there are no outstanding arrest warrants 
against an individual and no additional incriminating 
evidence is immediately available, the suspect must be 
released.  Because Colombian terrorist groups do not have 
internationally recognized "belligerent" status, the GOC must 
treat each individual case as a law enforcement matter, 
significantly limiting its ability to incapacitate suspected 
terrorists. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Even when fresh evidence or outstanding arrest 
warrants legally justify a more lengthy detention, Colombian 
law generally requires that detainees be released if the 
Government fails to file charges against them within 180 days 
of their arrest.  For example, in November 2002, 85 persons 
were detained in Arauca department on suspicion of ties to 
the ELN.  However, only 43 were held beyond the initial 
screening stage, and 37 were released months later because 
the 180 day period -- legally extended in this case under a 
terrorism exception -- expired before criminal charges were 
filed.  Hence, although MOD statistics reflect that 85 
terrorist supporters were arrested, only six actually remain 
in custody.  The GOC does not keep records on how many 
detainees are released.  The National Penitentiary Institute 
(INPEC) reports that approximately 19,000 persons were 
imprisoned for all types of crimes in the past 19 months.  If 
over 13,500 members of illegal armed groups were captured 
during this same time frame, it is probable that large 
numbers of suspected terrorists were released without trial 
or ruled "not guilty." 
 
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Urban Militias and Support Networks Confuse the Numbers 
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¶8. (C) Urban militias and civilian logistical and 
intelligence support networks contribute significantly to the 
operations of illegal armed groups.  However, their numbers 
are notoriously difficult to estimate, and are not included 
in overall estimates of terrorist strength.  Most law 
enforcement operations against terrorist groups, especially 
in urban areas, target support networks rather than 
combatants.  For example, on March 28, Colombian authorities 
arrested 65 supporters of the FARC's Teofilo Forero Mobile 
Column (TFMC); it is unlikely that more than a handful of 
these individuals were included in official GOC estimates of 
FARC numbers.  However, these arrests -- and arrests and 
deaths of other members of urban militias and terrorist 
support networks -- are included in GOC statistics on actions 
against illegal armed groups. 
 
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Institutional Environments Influence Opinions 
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¶9. (C) Particular institutional environments also affect how 
organizations in Colombia, whether government or private, 
formulate statistics on illegal armed groups.  For example, 
MOD estimates of the number of paramilitary fighters have 
remained at or near 12,000 for several years.  However, the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, which is hoping to 
receive international support for its efforts to negotiate 
the demobilization of the AUC, has claimed that as many as 
22,000 paramilitaries could demobilize as a result of its 
efforts.  We suspect that the responsibilities of the High 
Commissioner's Office color its interpretation of available 
data and its public estimates of paramilitary strength. 
Undoubtedly, the opinions of other entities are also 
affected, albeit perhaps subconsciously, by their own 
institutional interests. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10. (C) Even within the MOD, there are discrepancies and 
disagreements about terrorist strength.  What is clear, 
however, is that the GOC is hitting terrorist groups -- both 
paramilitaries and guerrillas -- and their civilian support 
networks harder than it ever has before. 
WOOD