This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 003544 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2014 
TAGS: KJUS PINR PREL PTER PINS PHUM PGOV SNAR CO ELN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS WITH HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR PEACE RESTREPO 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 3346 
 
     ¶B. RESTON 021622Z 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) On April 2, Ambassador met with High Commissioner for 
Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo to discuss the paramilitary peace 
process and, especially, to confirm that the GOC would give 
paramilitary leaders no assurances regarding their possible 
extradition to the U.S.  Restrepo explained recent changes to 
the GOC's "Alternative Sentencing" bill and assured 
Ambassador that, based on President Uribe's explicit 
instructions, no extradition assurances will be given. 
Restrepo said the country's two largest paramilitary groups, 
the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the 
Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB), have agreed to participate in 
joint negotiations with the Government.  Restrepo will 
propose that AUC and BCB leaders concentrate in a 200 sq km 
rural area of Cordoba department (map faxed to WHA/AND), 
where the GOC can monitor them.  In exchange for 
concentrating their troops and enforcing the cease-fire, 
paramilitary leaders will not be arrested while in the 
concentration zone.  The Ambassador stressed the need to 
ensure that the GOC continues to hold concentrating leaders 
responsible for the actions of any of their unconcentrated 
troops.  Restrepo expressed the belief that para leaders are 
accepting GOC conditions because of their reverses on the 
battlefield and promised that commanders who do comply will 
face the full force of the Colombian security forces. 
Restrepo also characterized the predicament of para leader 
Carlos Castano, noting that in the most recent AUC communique 
(ref b) he was a signatory, but not named as either a 
"comandante" or a negotiator.   End Summary. 
 
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Negotiations Moving Forward 
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¶2. (C) Restrepo said that President Uribe, his cabinet, and 
congressional sponsors of the "Alternative Sentencing" bill 
had achieved consensus on the draft legislation by removing 
any reference to extradition, creating a "Truth and Justice 
Commission" to recommend in individual cases who gets what 
benefits, and mandating five to ten-year prison terms for 
serious violations of human rights (ref a).  The country's 
two largest paramilitary organizations, the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the Central Bolivar 
Bloc (BCB), had formed a unified negotiating table.  AUC and 
BCB leaders continue to push for GOC commitments not to jail 
or extradite them. 
 
¶3. (C) Restrepo intends to propose that the 33 AUC and BCB 
commanders concentrate in the para-dominated region of rural 
Cordoba department where peace negotiations have been held. 
GOC security forces, establishing a presence there for the 
first time in years, would surround the 200 square kilometer 
(roughly 11 miles by 7 miles) zone with multiple rings of 
security.  The GOC would not arrest paramilitary leaders in 
this concentration zone. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador suggested that even after paramilitary 
leaders concentrate in the designated zone, thus submitting 
themselves to significant GOC control, they must still be 
held accountable for the actions of their troops and 
compliance with their cease-fire obligations.  It was crucial 
that the paramilitary leaders not be able to insulate 
themselves from responsibility for the actions of their 
troops.  For this to be possible, the GOC would have to 
accept the (unavoidable anyway) continuation of communciation 
between the leaders and their troops.  Restrepo agreed and 
proposed that commanders, on a pre-approved, monitored, and 
case-by-case basis, be allowed to temporarily leave the 
concentration zone in order to ensure compliance by their 
troops.  The Ambassador agreed. 
 
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Extradition and Legal Benefits not Negotiable 
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¶5. (C) Restrepo emphasized that he will not negotiate 
extradition or any other legal benefits with the 
paramilitaries, despite their constant pressure.  President 
Uribe has instructed him to insist that the paramilitaries 
obey the cease-fire, concentrate their troops, submit to 
verification of the process, and peacefully reinsert 
themselves into civilian society.  Only after they have 
fulfilled these conditions can their legal situation be 
reconsidered under any "Alternative Sentencing" legislation 
that might be approved in the future.  Ambassador underscored 
that the U.S. could not support a peace process that 
undermines extradition.  Restrepo said President Uribe is in 
complete agreement and had rebuffed pleas from several 
influential senators that the GOC negotiate the terms of the 
"Alternative Sentencing" law directly with paramilitary 
leaders.  According to Restrepo, paramilitary commanders have 
strongly criticized the draft law, accusing him personally of 
wanting to see them imprisoned and penniless. 
 
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Pressuring the Paras 
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¶6. (C) Asked if he believes paramilitary commanders are 
willing to concentrate their troops and negotiate in good 
faith, Restrepo admitted that some commanders, most notably 
notorious drug lord Diego Murillo, alias "Adolfo Paz" or "Don 
Berna," are trying to use the peace process to shield 
themselves from the law and expand their illicit activities. 
At the moment, Don Berna holds much sway because of his 
proven military capabilities.  BCB Chief of Operations Julian 
Bolivar and AUC regional commander Jorge Quarenta are growing 
in influence.  Ernesto Baez already has taken over for 
Castano as the chief ideologue of the paras and could replace 
Salvatore Mancuso as the primus inter pares.  Restrepo said 
that commanders with more political aspirations than military 
resources, such as Mancuso, appear to recognize they have 
little choice but to negotiate or live in constant fear of 
being captured by the authorities.  Carlos Castano, long the 
international face of Colombian paramilitarism, has lost most 
of his political and military influence, making a successful 
negotiation his best chance for survival.  In the most recent 
paramilitary communique, Castano is a signatory, but is not 
listed as either a "comandante" or a negotiator at the 
"unified table." 
 
¶7. (C) Restrepo said his objective is to bring all the 
country's paramilitary groups under increasingly tighter GOC 
control through continued military pressure.  Looking ahead, 
Restrepo and Ambassador agreed that paramilitary commanders 
who fail to negotiate in good faith must face a full military 
response. 
WOOD