This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001928 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL MOPS CY IZ TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE APRIL 2004 VISIT OF GENERAL 
JUMPER, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman; Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Your visit to Turkey comes at a time when 
the US-TU relationship is generally on the mend.  It has been 
more than a year since the 1 March vote and 6 months since 
the 7 October vote and the "soft landing".  Once again, 
generally, the US-TU relationship is best approached from a 
multi-faceted perspective, not just a one-issue 
relationship-Iraq.  This is a particularly dynamic period for 
Turkey as it is dealing with several high stakes issues: 
Cyprus, EU Accession, Istanbul Summit, and just-completed 
local elections.  Further, Turkey is also dealing with a 
range of other important issues:  Iraq: PKK & the TAL, GME, 
Med Dialogue and enhanced NATO engagement in the region, the 
Global Posture Review, and Afghanistan. End Summary. 
 
 
-------------- 
Current Events 
-------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Your visit comes on the heels of Turkish DCHOD General 
Basbug's March counterpart visit to the United States. 
General Basbug's meetings were characterized by candid and 
sometimes difficult discussions.  Basbug expressed Turkish 
frustration and disappointment at a lack of US progress 
towards dealing with the PKK-Kadek and contended the US 
needed to demonstrate its resolve and take tangible action. 
On Iraq, Basbug noted Turkish concerns about the TAL, the 
transfer of authority in June, Iraqi territorial integrity, 
rights of the Turkomen, and keeping TU Special Forces in Iraq 
until the PKK/KADEK threat is removed, even if that is after 
July. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Your visit also follows the 29 March meetings between 
MG Jeff Kohler (EUCOM J-5), MG Arslan (Strategy, TGS J-5), 
and MG Kalyoncu (Deputy, TGS J-3).  They discussed a variety 
of topics, focusing primarily on the Caucasus.  The general 
atmosphere was that the Caucasus Working Group has been 
revitalized and is performing well.  Other initiatives, like 
the Caucasus Clearinghouse, bilateral training, support, and 
Caspian Guard are viewed by both the US and TU as adding to 
regional stability. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Additionally, one week prior to your arrival, Turkey 
held nation-wide municipal elections.  Prime Minister 
Erdogan's AK Party, as expected, made further gains.  This 
was the first major election since the AK Party came to power 
in 2002.  With a larger vote total, the AK Party will likely 
be held to a higher standard; they will be held responsible 
for issues across the spectrum in Turkey.  The AK Party will 
have more authority, but more responsibility as well. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
Greater Middle East Initiative (GME) 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶5. (C) Turkey wants to know what GME means in the region and 
what the US is looking for from Turkey in the way of 
support/assistance; how do we intend to work this with 
countries of the region and NATO.  GME has been the subject 
of considerable press commentary in Turkey.  It has been 
mostly negative and reflecting chronic suspicions about U.S. 
motives and paranoia that the U.S.'s real aim is to turn GME 
against Turkey and remove the Kemalist State structure. 
Recently, however the basics of the GME Initiative appear to 
be gaining somewhat greater acceptance among Turkish 
Officials as more information and details are presented.  One 
official noted he thought most people in the region would 
support it if it were presented in a clear and concise 
manner.  He also pointed out that the US needed to make more 
efforts to explain the initiative to win over world public 
opinion.  Turkish officials have been careful in underscoring 
the need to avoid characterizing Turkey as a Muslim or 
Islamic state (which it is not), 
instead of as a secular democracy with a predominantly 
moderate Muslim population that it is. 
 
 
------ 
CYPRUS 
------ 
 
 
¶6. (C)  TGS is being careful not to comment in public on the 
course of Cyprus negotiations.  TGS only cautiously agreed to 
the government's wish to move Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash 
and the Turkish Cypriots back to the bargaining table and it 
appears TGS insisted on a number of red lines.  However, TGS 
remains concerned lest a settlement (1) draw a line between 
the two communities which TGS considers militarily 
indefensible; (2) lead to a reduction of Turkish troops below 
6,000 prior to Turkey's EU entry; and (3) impose what TGS 
considers onerous reporting requirements for troop movements. 
 We continue to emphasize (1) the credit redounding to Turkey 
broadly (not just the government) from its initiative to 
re-open negotiations; (2) the crucial importance to Turkey's 
success overall (well beyond the question of a start date for 
EU accession negotiations) of a settlement in Cyprus; and (3) 
the importance of Turkey's maintaining its constructive, 
common sense, cool-handed line in the negotiations, i.e., to 
av 
oid being provoked by the Greek Cypriots into abandoning the 
negotiations. 
 
 
------------ 
EU Accession 
------------ 
 
 
¶7. (C) Turkey's current focus on EU accession has been a 
ready vehicle for the internal changes Turkey needs to be 
successful.  Although the Copenhagen Criteria are a de facto 
external discipline, there is widespread sentiment that these 
are things Turkey needs to do for its own good. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Turkey's success is not a given.  The Turks have done 
well in passing laws, but now need to implement them, as well 
as to adopt additional legislative reforms.  Everyday life 
across Turkey yields examples where the basic elements of 
individual rights and rule of law are not respected. 
Turkey's EU supporters' stress that complacency now will 
jeopardize Turkey's chances of getting a date to begin 
accession negotiations in December.  Even if Turkey does 
begin accession talks, the road will be arduous and could 
take 6-10 years.  Faced with a long haul, the current 
political focus and burst of energy for reforms could fail. 
 
 
¶9. (C) The Turkish economy has improved significantly over 
the past year, greatly reducing fears of renewed financial 
crisis and generating hope for sustained, low-inflation 
growth.  However, this improvement has generated complacency 
among government leaders, who fail to understand that the 
economy's huge debt and structural weaknesses leave it 
vulnerable.  Unless Turkey implements reforms systematically, 
it will miss the opportunity to move toward sustainable 
prosperity and away from the boom-and-bust cycles that have 
haunted it. 
 
 
--------------- 
Istanbul Summit 
--------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) The President is scheduled for a bilateral visit 
immediately prior to the NATO Summit June 27-29.  NRF has 
been recommended as a good option to augment civilian 
security forces if needed.  As Turkey would provide the 
preponderance of the ground troops, TU would be in the 
forefront.  The US is encouraging Turkey to present any 
requests for additional security assistance through NATO, but 
so far there has only been a formal request to NATO for AWACS 
support. 
 
 
¶11. (C) The image of the Summit's occurring in Istanbul 
provides an opportunity to showcase Turkey and its role in 
both the institutions of Europe and the GME initiative. 
Turkey's geographic and historic role as a bridge between 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East will provide an appropriate 
backdrop to the Summit's emphasis on GME, Med Dialogue, 
expanding PfP opportunities with the Caucasus and Central 
Asia.  Turkey's active support for these initiatives would 
further underscore the important role Turkey plays in NATO 
and its neighboring regions. 
 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
¶12. (C) PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL: Turkey is anxious for action to 
be taken against the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. Basbug and others 
have expressed continued frustration at a perceived US lack 
of action against the PKK.  In general, many in TGS have felt 
Turkey has provided the US with a range of information for 
use in combating the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL and have seen 
little in return.  Some in TGS see the need for a 
well-thought-out comprehensive plan to eliminate the 
PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL.  They also realize this is a long-term 
and laborious effort.  However, many within Turkey, and 
especially within the TGS, see a real need for immediate 
tangible action as a counter to the public/media. 
 
 
¶13. (C) Transitional Administrative Law (TAL): GOT reacted 
harshly to the terms of the TAL. It views the process of its 
development as undemocratic; the result as dividing Iraq into 
a pure ethnic federation; and the treatment of the Turkomen 
as belittling.  The result, it believes is inconsistent with 
the presentation to date by the U.S. including in the recent 
letter from the President to PM Erdogan.  Turkey believes it 
has been frozen out of US Iraq operations and treated in a 
manner unbecoming an ally.  It is not yet clear how far our 
explanations of the process so far and in perspective have 
gone to put aside those concerns, but the number of 
complaints about the TAL have diminished. 
 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
 
¶14. (C) Afghan Coordinator Taylor held wide-ranging and 
candid consultations with MFA and TGS officials in Ankara on 
March 12.  Turkish officials stressed the theme of 
"Afghanistan for Afghans" throughout the talks, arguing their 
commitment to stabilization and reconstruction efforts there 
are not motivated by a desire to support one ethnic group 
over another.  They reiterated their interest in establishing 
a PRT in northern Afghanistan and are waiting for SHAPE to 
respond formally to their proposal.  MFA officials exhibited 
varying degrees of flexibility on location and reluctantly 
accepted the importance of having SHAPE and the Afghan 
government coordinate in the overall PRT decision-making 
process.  The Turks also reiterated their interest in 
increasing their contributions to ANA and police training, 
but hinted that such steps would likely be predicated on 
establishing a PRT.  The Turks likewise intend to move ahead 
(independent of the PRT decision) with plans to deepen their 
involvement in education, medical and agriculture 
reconstruction projects in the north, while making clear that 
a PRT would greatly facilitate such efforts. 
 
 
------------ 
Incirlik AFB 
------------ 
 
 
¶15. (C) The Turks are still awaiting a second round of 
consultations on global force posture.  TGS has heard 
rumblings about different potential operational needs or 
developments.  In fact, during the TU DCHOD's recent visit, 
Gen. Pace informally mentioned the possible F-16 move and 
noted further additional discussions with Turkey would take 
place if Turkey was the preferred option.  None of these 
issues have been taken to the political leadership at this 
point and it would not be useful to get the TGS significantly 
out in front in trying to obtain continuous changes to 
approved operations.  The authority for OIF II concludes on 
April 30, and there has been no sustained engagement with the 
GOT/TGS on other operational requirements.  Of note, the 
resolution authorizing the deployment and employment of US 
tankers at Incirlik and the OIF troop rotation expires in 
June 04.  Ambassador Edelman strongly believes DoD should 
perform a comprehensive review of the potential desired uses 
for Incirlik before approaching the GOT.  The USG could 
present the total concept and carry out only one set of 
potentially protracted negotiations, vice the numerous sets 
of negotiations were we to bring our request to the Turks 
piecemeal.  Turkish interpretations of our general 
arrangements form a relatively high political bar for 
establishing different operational requirements at Incirlik. 
 
 
EDELMAN