This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000799 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, VC/VO, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): VIS ENHANCEMENT 
PROJECT, IMPLEMENTATION OF ISO 17799, SECURITY AUDITS, AND 
OTHER IT ISSUES AT THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT 
 
This is CWC-43-04. 
 
------------- 
Status of VIS 
------------- 
 
¶1.  (U)  Del reps met with OPCW Chief of Administration Herb 
Schulz, Chief of the Information Support Branch (ISB) Greg 
Linden, and Chief of the Office of Confidentiality and 
Security (OCS) Rob Simpson to discuss issues related to 
Technical Secretariat (TS) work on the Verification 
Information System (VIS) Enhancement project on a number of 
occasions between March 2-26.  Del reps stressed Washington's 
dissatisfaction with the speed of the TS implementation of 
the VIS effort.  Linden and Simpson reported that the Deputy 
Director General heads the VIS project review board, and 
assesses VIS project status every two weeks. 
 
¶2.  (U)  In summary, efforts to ensure the security of the 
Secure Critical Network (SCN) in parallel with development of 
the VIS project will cause a two-month delay in VIS 
deployment.  But TS officials noted that if delegations need 
assurance that the SCN will appropriately protect their 
classified industrial data before submitting electronic data 
declarations, it is well worth the two-month investment. 
 
----------------------- 
VIS Enhancement Project 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U)  Personnel from ISB, OCS, and the Verification 
Division are working closely on the VIS project.  The 
prototype will be developed on an unclassified platform after 
documentation of the technical details, security assurances, 
and information flows are completed circa March 31.  This 
definition and design phase is the critical underpinning of 
the effort and requires about 25 documents essential to 
understanding the project from the ISO and programming 
perspectives.  The key VIS elements will be programmed over 
April/May, the remainder over the summer.  Industrial data 
declarations are due April 1; the Verification Division and 
the Secure Critical Network (SCN) will be devoted to first 
entering and then assessing declared information received 
from around 50 States Party (SP) until late May. 
 
¶4.  (U)  With the assistance of the Verification Division 
staff, ISB will assemble declaration data to test the VIS 
prototype capability in the June/July timeframe.  Linden 
expects to be able to demonstrate the VIS prototype to users, 
both TS and SPs, by the end of the summer, even allowing for 
the annual and home leave plans of ISB staff and contractors. 
 (Note: On January 1, 2004, ISB was approved a P2 position 
and has hired a programmer for the VIS project who will begin 
work in June.  To supplement its VIS effort, ISB used a 
temporary hire to fill in.)  In case of problems, Linden has 
programmed a two-month slip time (August to October).  The 
enhanced VIS is expected to be fully up and running on March 
31, 2005, for both the TS (80 percent of the users) and SPs 
(20 percent of users). 
 
¶5.  (U)  Linden reported that a small number of SPs have 
approached him and asked to be allowed to submit their 
(redacted) industry declarations electronically in October 
¶2004.  Linden reported that the TS is considering how best to 
support this.  One possibility under consideration (and will 
probably be approved) is mounting the Common File 
Transmission System (CFTS) interface and the chemical 
identifier database on the OPCW website.  SPs who choose to 
do so can use the CFTS interface to format their data for 
submission to the TS. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Implementation of the ISO Standard 17799 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U)  Simpson, who oversees the work of the Security Audit 
Teams (SAT), reported that the charter and mandate of SAT-IV 
directs the auditors to assess security functionality. 
SAT-III recommended that the TS implement ISO standard 17799, 
which addresses the security management of system operations, 
which OCS is now working to implement.  OCS has decided in 
principle to implement ISO 17799, but has yet to determine 
the cost of doing so.  This will be reported to delegations 
in an upcoming DG note, which will include a recommendation 
to the EC that this standard be adopted. 
¶7.  (U)  Simpson reported that at this point, the costs of 
implementing ISO 17799 will be minimal, mostly the result of 
training new staff members.  Simpson also reported that this 
effort has been reported to the EC on a number of occasions. 
He also was surprised to find that a decision document 
regarding the ISO 17799 implementation had never gone to 
EC-29 as planned.  This will be rectified, hopefully by EC-37 
as one of the first elements emerging from the upcoming 
consultations on Confidentiality chaired by Del Rep. 
 
¶8.  (U)  According to Linden, OCS decided on July 7, 2003 to 
accept the ISO 15408 standard or the "common criterion" which 
addresses security operations in a classified environment. 
There are five levels (EAL 1 to 5), and OCS wants to achieve 
EAL 3 from its starting point of zero (Note: EAL 3 is the 
standard set for secure U.S. Government systems).  Linden 
noted that earlier SATs were not asked their opinion of the 
common criterion, nor has senior TS management been brought 
into the decision.  (Note: This is a policy issue which needs 
senior level attention because of its cost and requirements 
to realign certain business procession, in particular the 
need to implement stringent documentation requirements.) 
 
¶9.  (U)  Linden reported that the TS is not attempting to be 
accredited for either ISO standard.  For the common 
criterion, there is no one authority that can certify EAL 3 
implementation.  Furthermore, it is very costly and would 
result in major delays in implementation of projects (Note: 
Certification for the common criteria would result in a delay 
of the RDBMS development effort for up to two years and cost 
at least USD 500,000). 
 
¶10.  (U)  The documentation effort required by the two ISO 
standards has slowed things down, but no initiatives are dead 
in the water.  In part, the effort is a result of the TS move 
from an organization that was not process-oriented to one 
that has appropriate managerial oversight and process 
procedures in place.  Both OCS and ISB agree that in general 
more and better documentation is needed, and both share the 
ISO documentation burden.  On the plus side, the TS has not 
had a systematic approach to documenting its IT efforts 
before.  On the minus side, there is still no guidance from 
OCS regarding how much documentation is enough.  Could the 
documentation effort be less onerous? Yes, the decision to go 
for EAL 3 for security assurance could be reversed.  However, 
without documentation, the TS could not reassure the security 
auditors and SPs that things are as they should be.  (Note: 
the RDBMS contractor analysis of its ability to meet the new 
(and last minute) security standard cost the project one 
month.) 
 
--------------------- 
Status of SCN Upgrade 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U)  The upgrade of the SCN has been delayed until after 
EC-36.  Taken together, a number of elements created 
challenges to this effort but will not seriously delay the 
SCN migration. Linden reported that the SCN upgrade will be 
completed and fully documented by July 1, 2004. 
 
-- First, the seven new servers due in early December 2003 
did not arrive until mid-February 2004. 
-- Second, data migration from the 24 Microsoft Access 
databases is not technically difficult, and will require two 
days.  This is complicated by a technicality: someone 
knowledgeable needs to map the new capabilities to the old 
ones, making the upgrades effort more difficult.  The 
databases contain all the digitized declaration information 
that eventually will be sent to the RDBMS, so extra caution 
is needed to ensure that it is done right the first time. 
-- Third, the inspector laptops are older models, and the 
upgrade to a powerful new operating system could tax their 
computing capability (tests show this will not be a problem). 
 The laptops will be updated as they come in, circa ten or 12 
a week.  More difficult will be updates of the laptops at the 
CWDFs as they only return every six to eight months and carry 
unique software elements, so these laptops cannot simply be 
erased and reloaded. 
-- Fourth, OCS requires more documentation to meet the ISO 
requirements, and ISB is preparing 30 documents.  Because OCS 
needs time to review them, this led to a decision to delay 
until April/May. 
-- Finally, Verification Division receives declarations in 
early April and produces the Verification Information Report 
in June, so it requested an additional delay until July. 
Upon reconsideration, Verification Division allowed that the 
upgrade probably could take place in early May, or perhaps 
even in late April. 
 
------------------------- 
RDBMS and Security Audits 
------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U)  Linden reported that the RDBMS specifics will also 
be fully documented by late June.  Although ISB does not set 
the agenda for or time of audits, Linden suggested that the 
relevant RDBMS documentation could be put on a CD-ROM and 
distributed to SAT-IV for a remote July audit exercise.  If 
SAT-IV sees itself as critical to the eventual acceptance of 
the Enhanced VIS project, the TS needs to know what SAT-IV 
perceives as its role and how it would exercise that role. 
 
¶13.  (U)  In Linden's opinion, waiting to audit the RDBMS in 
December 2004 would be a mistake because the coding would 
have been completed by that time.  Linden preferred to have 
SAT-IV assess the RDBMS documentation in July and to comment 
on any security concerns.  (Note:  Simpson/OCS also supports 
the idea of a remote Security Audit of the RDBMS design in 
the July timeframe.)  Linden reported that the TS requested 
SAT-IV to provide by March 31 a list of tools (i.e., 
evaluation requirements and processes) they would like to use 
to assess the security functionality of the RDBMS development 
plans. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL