This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC, AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): - U.S./U.K. 
CONSULTATIONS ON LIBYA WITH OPCW AND WESTERN GROUP 
DELEGATIONS 
 
Classified By: Amb. to the OPCW Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
This is CWC-41-04. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  AC DAS Don Mahley and Patrick Lamb, Deputy head of 
the Counterproliferation Department of the U.K.'s FCO, met 
with senior OPCW officials and delegations from the Western 
Group on March 19 to discuss Libya.  There was substantial 
interest in what procedure the U.S./U.K. supported to address 
Libya's request for conversion of the Rabta facility.  Mahley 
and Lamb confirmed the issue is still under consideration. 
On the question of extending the deadlines for Libya to 
destroy 1%, 20% and 45% of its CW stocks, there was little 
controversy.  However, Libya still needs to decide which 
destruction method it wishes to use, and may be aided in that 
process at an upcoming conference at Porton Down in the U.K. 
Mahley and Lamb noted that Libyan cooperation has been 
outstanding, and officials of the OPCW Technical Secretariat 
(TS) confirmed that they had also found the Libyans to be 
forthcoming and transparent.  End Summary. 
 
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LIBYAN COOPERATION 
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¶2.  (C)  Mahley emphasized to Acting Director General Brian 
Hawtin that Libya is a success story.  It appears Libya has 
provided full and correct chemical weapons information to the 
U.S./U.K.  The only exception had been unfilled bombs, where 
the Libyans kept increasing the number of such munitions on 
hand, but the issue was now resolved.  Lamb voiced full 
agreement with the points made by Mahley, adding that the 
initial indication is that the Libyan declaration to the OPCW 
appears to be essentially complete.  He emphasized that 
U.S./U.K. coordination with the OPCW on Libya has been 
excellent, and as the U.S./U.K. continue to work with the 
Libyans, Washington and London will remain transparent with 
the OPCW. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Hawtin expressed appreciation for the visit by 
Mahley and Lamb and concurred that Libyan cooperation has 
been excellent so far.  He said the OPCW hoped the Libyan 
decision would have an impact on universality and convince 
other non-member states to join the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.  The TS is still studying the Libyan declaration, 
noted Hawtin, but it was important to stress that Tripoli had 
said it would provide a supplemental filing on unfilled bombs 
or any other matter of concern.   Hawtin stated that there 
had been good cooperation with Libyan officials in Tripoli 
and with the Libyan Ambassador in the Hague.  He informed 
Mahley and Lamb about upcoming visits by Libyan officials, 
including one who would visit the OPCW lab to discuss 
destruction methodologies. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Acting Inspectorate division chief Renato Carvalho 
said Libya has not expressed any concern about funding for 
destruction of its CW stocks, and echoed the point of 
excellent cooperation with Libya.  They appear eager to 
resolve any disputes and answer any questions arising from 
their declaration, preferably in Tripoli, rather than in the 
Hague.  As a result of such cooperation, noted Carvalho, 
there will be no surprises for the TS when, for example, the 
Libyans submit their list of equipment to be utilized as part 
of the inspection process. 
¶5.  (C)  In the WEOG discussion, delegations raised a number 
of points on Libyan cooperation.  Spain asked about 
statements from Qadhafi's son that the U.S,/U.K. had made 
promises of compensation to Tripoli for abandoning its WMD 
programs.  Mahley noted that Libya had indeed provided a long 
"wish list," but flatly told delegations that there are "no 
blank checks" to the Libyans.  The FRG inquired about the 
fact that the Libyans had not declared any riot control 
agents in its declaration.  Lamb replied that Libya did 
indeed claim not to possess any such agents, and Mahley added 
that they assert that they have two chemicals that are used 
for training, but not in actual riot control. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Australia asked more generally about the 
completeness of the Libyan declaration, and Lamb replied that 
the U.S./U.K. are satisfied with the document.  He emphasized 
that the U.S./U.K. are not yet ready to "swear it is 
accurate," but stressed that the document does confirm what 
the U.S./U.K. have seen.  Mahley added that if there is a 
problem with the declaration due to errors or lower-level 
officials not having fully implemented instructions from 
Tripoli, the Libyans have indicated they will amend their 
declaration. 
 
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CONVERSION OF RABTA FACILITY 
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¶7.  (C)  With TS officials and the WEOG, Mahley noted that 
there are two key issues, one of which is the Libyan desire 
to convert the Rabta facility for peaceful pharmaceutical 
production.  Mahley informed Hawtin and the TS officials that 
the U.S./U.K. are comfortable with the Rabta engineering data 
concerning projected production uses.  Lamb said that Italy 
has played an important role concerning Rabta, and feels a 
degree of "possession" on this issue, although it has 
admitted that it has little experience on facility 
conversion.  Hawtin noted that DG Pfirter has worked hard to 
keep the Italians informed on Libyan developments.  However, 
Verification Division chief Horst Reeps flatly told Mahley 
and Lamb that the Italians have not been forthcoming with the 
TS on their discussions with the Libyans. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶8.  (C)  During the WEOG discussion, as anticipated, Italy 
made a strong pitch on the need to find a pragmatic and 
flexible solution regarding Rabta conversion.  Lamb told the 
delegations that the U.S./U.K. recognize the importance of 
the issue, and the precedent that it would set.  And while 
one of the points made by Libya is that the converted 
facility would be producing beneficial medicines, Lamb noted 
that the CWC does not provide "humanitarian" exemptions or 
caveats.  Mahley added that there is no question Libya is 
being transparent on the issue and has good intentions. 
However, it is important to avoid setting a bad precedent. 
The option of a "technical amendment" to allow Rabta 
conversion might be best, but, emphasized Mahley, the U.S. 
has not decided yet on the course it wishes to take. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Switzerland asked about the impact the justification 
authorizing conversion would have on other late signatories 
to the Convention.  Mahley replied that the U.S./U.K. were 
aware of such concerns, and commented that an additional 
protocol (suggested by one WEOG member as a possible action 
path), for example, would raise a lot of other legal and 
procedural complications.  In the U.S., it would require 
Senate approval.  And it was possible that the deliberation 
process on an additional protocol would not be limited to 
Rabta, but other unexpected issues could be thrown in as 
well.  Lamb added that an additional protocol would be a 
lengthy process. 
 
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DESTRUCTION DEADLINES AND METHODOLOGY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Mahley told the TS officials and the WEOG that the 
second issue that needs to be addressed is extension of the 
deadlines for Libya to destroy 1%, 20% and 45% of its CW 
stocks, as required under the Convention.  He noted that it 
is not clear yet there will be a problem with Libya meeting 
the 100% destruction deadline by 2007.  Mahley told Hawtin 
and the TS officials that the upcoming conference at Porton 
Down would give the Libyans information on destruction 
options, and the U.S./U.K. hope Libya makes a decision soon 
on destruction technology.  Mahley stressed that Libya can 
pay for the destruction of its CW stocks itself, and the U.S. 
does not plan to compete with or impinge on OPCW 
responsibilities regarding inspection and monitoring. 
 
¶11.  (C)  On destruction technology, Reeps commented that he 
did not have a clear recommendation for the Libyans.  There 
was no/no consideration of the offer from a Polish company to 
destroy the Libyan stocks in Poland, or any other option to 
ship CW out of Libya.  One possibility was using on-site 
holding containers to ship the mustard to a cement kiln in 
Libya for destruction.  This appeared at the moment to be the 
fastest way to dispose of stocks, commented Reeps.  Building 
an incinerator may not be cost-effective, and will certainly 
take time.  Reeps added that elimination of precursors is 
another question that needs to be addressed.  The salts to be 
eliminated could simply be made into cubes. 
 
¶12.  (C)  But the bottom-line, emphasized Reeps, is that the 
TS wants U.S./U.K. views on destruction so the Libyans get 
 
SIPDIS 
one message.  Mahley and Lamb voiced strong support for that 
goal, and Lamb invited the OPCW to send participants to the 
Porton Down conference.  Mahley emphasized that Libya "does 
not have a deep bench" and there are only a few Libyan 
experts on the CW program.  That small group needs to get a 
clear message from the U.S./U.K. and the TS.  He then added 
that the key for the U.S. is verification of the destruction 
of the material.  Carvalho added that Libyan officials had 
said that if possible, they would like to initiate 
destruction of stocks in December 2004-January 2005. 
 
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LIBYAN STOCKS 
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¶13.  (C)  Mahley noted to the TS that he had phoned DG 
Pfirter and informed him that TS personnel had to be sure to 
protect themselves from the possibility of leakage from 
stored Libyan CW.  Protective gear would be critical, and the 
prospect of out-gassing in the summer was particularly great. 
 Chief of Staff Rafael Grossi noted that the OPCW had acted 
expeditiously to destroy the Libyan unfilled bombs, with the 
DG taking action and then notifying the Executive Council of 
the destruction.  Such a step could theoretically be 
questioned by member states as an unauthorized action by the 
DG. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Lamb expressed the view that the most difficult 
part of the process may have been completed with the removal 
of as much WMD material from Libya as possible.  While the 
U.S./U.K. were aware of IAEA and OPCW concerns about process, 
the goal was to get the sensitive material out of Libya. 
Lamb said the U.K. would be talking with the Indian and other 
delegations to ensure they do not feel snubbed by being 
informed after-the-fact about actions that were taken.  The 
U.K. message will be that Libya is an excellent example which 
non-member states should be encouraged to emulate. 
 
¶15.  (C)  In the WEOG discussion, the Australian delegation 
asked about possible Libyan stocks of biological weapons. 
Mahley replied that Libya informed the U.S./U.K. it had 
"thought briefly" about a BW program, but claims to have not 
proceeded down that path.  Mahley stressed that Libya has 
been "less forthcoming" on the BW side, but there have been 
no pathogens found yet in Libya.  And there is no sign yet of 
any BW-related infrastructure or current capability.  In 
addition, commented Mahley, it appears Libyan claims to send 
medical diagnostic requests to Tunisia have been borne out. 
And it seems Libya does import all its vaccines and has no 
indigenous production.  So for the moment, there is no 
indication of a BW program. 
 
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PUBLICITY SHY 
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¶16.  (C)  Lamb told Hawtin and the TS that the Libyans have 
emphasized that there would be 1) no publicity, and 2) no 
message that Libyan WMD materials went to the U.S./U.K.  He 
said that as Libya is coming under pressure from the Arab 
world, there is appreciation for the Libyan requests.  Hawtin 
said he understood the reasons that Libya is publicity-shy, 
adding that the TS experience is that it cannot rush the 
Libyans, even though the presence of the Libyan Ambassador at 
the March 23-26 Executive Council session would be a good 
opportunity for the OPCW to highlight the Libyan decision. 
Grossi added that the Libyans have said they will not object 
to what the OPCW may want to do on publicity, but have made 
clear they simply will not be a part of it. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Mahley recommended that DG Pfirter should have a 
dialogue with senior Libyan officials.  Libya has been far 
more open to IAEA publicity than U.S./U.K. publicity, which 
is understandable due to the views expressed by Arab states. 
But the OPCW, like the IAEA, may have more latitude for 
publicizing what Libya has done.  Grossi replied that Libyan 
officials had told Pfirter that Libya wants the OPCW to have 
"a front seat," particularly on public relations.  Reeps 
provided the caveat that the OPCW requirement is for approval 
from the host country with regard to any film footage of 
destruction activity or any other type of publicity on 
OPCW-related activities. 
 
¶18.  (U)  AC DAS Mahley has cleared this message. 
 
¶19.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL