This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001934 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2014 
TAGS: KWBG PREL PGOV MARR IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI OFFICIALS DISCUSS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, 
YASSIN KILLING WITH USD ZAKHEIM 
 
REF: A. TEL AVIV 1742 
     ¶B. TEL AVIV 1741 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings that took place in the hours 
following the Sheikh Yassin assassination, USD Dov Zakheim 
discussed the targeted killing and Gaza disengagement with 
Ministers Olmert and Mofaz and MKs Steinetz and Sneh. 
(Selected GOI comments from these meetings reported reftels.) 
 Mofaz defended Yassin's killing, and said the GOI would 
continue such operations.  Sneh blasted the operation, which 
he characterized as typical GOI undermining of Palestinian 
moderates.  Mofaz and Olmert both focused on the issue of 
U.S. support for the disengagement plan, with Olmert 
predicting that President Bush would privately hint to Sharon 
that support would come after the U.S. election.  Sneh urged 
the U.S. to withhold its support until Sharon took a number 
of steps, including on settlements and outposts in the West 
Bank.  Steinetz said Sharon would have to refrain from any 
West Bank withdrawals if he hopes to win the support of 
Steinetz and other key Likud members.  Olmert suggested that 
Netanyahu and Shalom would back the PM.  Mofaz thought 
withdrawal would begin around the end of the year and 
continue until summer, 2005.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Visiting Under Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim 
discussed Gaza disengagement and the Yassin assassination in 
a series of meetings March 22 with Alternate Prime Minister 
Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Knesset Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Committee Chairman Yuval Steinetz and 
Labor MK Ephraim Sneh.  The Ambassador and/or emboffs 
accompanied Zakheim to the meetings.  (Selected GOI comments 
from these meetings reported reftels.) 
 
-------------------- 
Yassin Assassination 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The meetings all took place the morning of Israel's 
targeted killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin.  Mofaz 
strongly defended the GOI decision to kill Yassin, and said 
Israel would continue carrying out such operations.  He 
accused Yassin of sending hundreds of suicide bombers to kill 
Israelis and called him "the Palestinians' Bin Laden."  The 
Ambassador asked Mofaz about the impact the killing might 
have on PM Sharon's attempts to get Egypt to play a 
significant role in Gaza withdrawal.  "We're going to fight 
Hamas, in any case," Mofaz replied, adding that Egypt even 
before the assassination had been interested only in 
low-level involvement, with no "responsibility" for 
Palestinian actions. 
 
¶4. (C) Sneh, while asserting that Yassin undoubtedly deserved 
his fate, criticized the GOI action, predicting that it would 
accelerate what he said was the movement of PA security force 
members towards the Hamas orbit.  Does the GOI, he asked 
rhetorically, want Hamas to rule Palestine?  An Islamic 
government, he said, would be intolerable, but the GOI is 
doing nothing to encourage moderate Palestinians to take 
over.  Olmert, who, as a member of the inner Cabinet, would 
have helped make the decision to kill Yassin, also commented 
that the assassination could have a problematic impact on the 
future of Gaza, citing the greater difficulty the GOI would 
have in coordinating with the PA over security issues related 
to the Israeli withdrawal. 
 
----------------------------------- 
U.S. Support for Gaza Disengagement 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Mofaz said that he gained the impression from a visit 
to Washington the week before that the USG favors Sharon's 
Gaza disengagement plan and appreciates why Israel must take 
unilateral action.  From his own point of view, he saw the 
removal of settlements from Gaza improving Israel's overall 
security situation and giving the IDF greater flexibility. 
The plan, he said, preserves chances for the roadmap.  He 
said he hoped that U.S. support would help convince GOI 
members currently opposed to the plan to support it. 
 
¶6. (C) Olmert focused as well on the importance of U.S. 
support, but averred that he did not expect the U.S. to 
provide financial assistance for Gaza withdrawal.  The extent 
of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank under consideration 
was probably not enough to motivate strong U.S. support.  He 
did predict, however, that President Bush, in a one-on-one 
meeting with Sharon, would ask Sharon to trust him on the 
question of support on the withdrawal plan and Israel's 
rejection of a Palestinian "right of return" until after the 
U.S. election. 
 
¶7. (C) Sneh blasted what he called Sharon's "strategy behind 
the pullout," charging that Sharon's ultimate goal is to get 
assurances that Israel will be left alone on West Bank 
matters.  The result of Sharon's approach, he asserted, would 
be a "Hamastan" in the South to go along with the 
"Hizballahstan" that Israel already allowed to be created in 
the North. 
 
¶8. (C) Asked by Zakheim about the U.S. role, Sneh said the 
GOI could not "cynically" ask the U.S. for financial 
assistance.  To do so would be neither "respectful" nor 
"dignified."  For its part, Sneh continued, the U.S. should 
ensure that: 
 
-- There is no Hamas state in either Gaza or the West Bank; 
 
-- Israel dismantles outposts in the West Bank before 
proceeding with Gaza settlements; 
 
-- The separation barrier sticks "strictly" to the Green Line; 
 
-- The GOI "negotiates" with Dahlan and Gaza security figures 
in advance of Israeli departure from Gaza; 
 
-- The GOI does not pay "exaggerated compensation" to the 
7,000 or so Gaza settlers, as this would create an impossible 
precedent for removing the 100,000 or so West Bank settlers 
whom the GOI would have to move in any agreement on the West 
Bank; 
 
-- The status of West Bank settlements be negotiated 
(Comment: Sneh did not say with whom) before any settlers are 
removed from Gaza. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Internal GOI Politicking on Disengagement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Looking ahead to prospects for approval of Sharon's 
plan in the Cabinet, Olmert commented that Finance Minister 
Netanyahu's wishes were unclear, although many insiders 
believe that he's in favor of withdrawal from Gaza. 
Netanyahu does, however, appear to be worried about the U.S. 
position and his own prospects, as finance minister, for 
ending up stuck with the bill.  Olmert predicted that Foreign 
Minister Shalom, who has not taken a position yet, would 
ultimately come around to Sharon's plan.  He claimed that 
Shalom had come to realize after a recent meeting with some 
of his base supporters in the Yemenite Orthodox community 
that he could afford politically to back the PM. 
 
¶10. (C) Steinetz told Zakheim that he might ultimately be 
able to support the withdrawal, but only if it involves Gaza 
only, not the West Bank.  Israel, he said, could afford to 
take more security risks in Gaza than in the West Bank, which 
sits close to the most strategic places in Israel, e.g., 
Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion airport, and the economic centers 
around Tel Aviv.  If the withdrawal were limited to Gaza 
only, he predicted, no Likud members, or virtually none, 
would leave the party. 
 
-------------------- 
Withdrawal Logistics 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Mofaz said he hoped to begin the withdrawal from Gaza 
at the end of the year.  This would permit completion of the 
plan by the summer of 2005.  Zakheim asked why the process 
will take so long.  Mofaz replied that removal of the 
settlers, including "talking with them" and finding them new 
housing, would prove time-consuming.  Pressed by Zakheim for 
a budget estimate for withdrawal, Mofaz demurred, but finally 
said, "Maybe a few billion shekels.  I can't say if it's five 
or eight billion."  Sneh said he had the impression that Gaza 
settlers would move in roughly equal proportion to the Negev, 
to other parts of Israel, and to West Bank settlements. 
 
¶12. (C) Olmert said the GOI had no definite timetable for the 
withdrawal, although he thought it might begin after the U.S. 
election.  Should President Bush lose the election, the start 
could be delayed. 
 
¶13. (U) U/S Zakheim cleared this message. 
 
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