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Viewing cable 04TELAVIV1911, UN AGENCIES FED UP WITH GAZA RESTRICTIONS; BUT NO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TELAVIV1911 2004-03-29 16:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001911 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR SATTERFIELD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2005 
TAGS: PREF EAID ECON PHUM KWBG GZ IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: UN AGENCIES FED UP WITH GAZA RESTRICTIONS; BUT NO 
IMMINENT FOOD CRISIS 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 1546 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Ted Mann per 1.4 b and d 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Following a series of terrorist attacks at 
or near the Erez crossing between Gaza and Israel, the GOI 
began requiring UN personnel to walk through the crossing 
point. The GOI also restricted movement of all containers at 
Karni crossing following information suggesting that the 
terrorists implicated in the March 14 Ashdod bombing may have 
escaped Gaza in an empty container. UN agencies accepted the 
restrictions begrudgingly and on the condition that the 
measures would be temporary.  On March 26, UN agency heads 
issued a press release stating that the limitations were no 
longer acceptable and might result in the UN having to reduce 
or terminate some critical humanitarian services.  The GOI 
has offered to restore some vehicle access but far short of 
what is needed, according to the UN agencies.  As for food 
access, the GOI is allowing UNRWA food containers in, but no 
empty containers out.  The UN is refusing to import more food 
and risk incurring thousands of dollars in demurrage fees for 
the empty containers.  GOI efforts to resolve these issues 
have been clumsy and ad hoc.  For its part, the UN may have 
overstated the possibility of a food "crisis".  Solving these 
problems expeditiously is necessary to ensure uninterrupted 
humanitarian services to the Palestinian population.  End 
Summary and Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Restrictions at Erez: UN says "Not going to take it anymore" 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
2. (C)  On March 26, UN heads of agencies held an emergency 
meeting in Jerusalem where they agreed that they could not 
continue "business as usual".  Specifically, they agreed that 
no staff would enter/exit Gaza by foot and that no new 
containers of food would be imported until the GOI had 
demonstrated that empty containers would be allowed to exit 
Gaza.  They further agreed to issue a press release entitled 
"UN forced to consider humanitarian cut-back in Gaza" in 
order to put public pressure on the GOI to revert to status 
quo ante in regards to its treatment of UN personnel.  (See 
para. 11 for full text). 
 
3. (C)  UN frustration has been building since the GOI began 
requiring personnel to walk through Erez following the failed 
March 6 terrorist attack at the crossing that caused some 
minor damage to the infrastructure.  This rule has taken on 
various permutations, with personnel sometimes being required 
to use the far more restrictive chute for Palestinian day 
laborers, and other times being allowed to walk through the 
VIP area.  The UN and diplomatic community argued that not 
only did the rule significantly delay personnel, it also put 
staff at serious additional risk by precluding the use of 
armored vehicles and exposing personnel to possible militant 
fire in the "no-man's" land between Israel and Gaza. On March 
23 (the day after the Yassin killing), the IDF abandoned a UN 
official along with two international journalists and five 
Italian NGO workers in the laborer's chute when the crossing 
began to receive mortar shells.  The eight individuals were 
left stuck between two electronic gates for 20 minutes, while 
IDF personnel retreated to their defensive positions.  This 
incident was the "final straw" according to UN sources. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
GOI conflicted on how to facilitate humanitarian 
work and guarantee security 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4. (C) There have been a series of meetings, letters and 
phone calls between the diplomatic/relief community and the 
GOI over the past few weeks to discuss Erez restrictions. 
Initially, COGAT intimated that the restrictions were 
temporary and the status quo ante would be restored as soon 
as a security review was complete and the infrastructure 
(gate and road), which had been moderately damaged in the 
March 6 attack, repaired.  As time passed, the GOI restored 
vehicle access to diplomats and a limited number of blue UN 
laissez-passer (UNLP) holders.  As of, March 29, the GOI has 
offered unlimited access for diplomats and red UNLP holders 
and vehicle access for 21 blue UNLP holders who are resident 
in Gaza. 
 
5. (C) The relief community has tentatively rejected this 
offer, though it will not take an official position until 
after the Heads of Agencies meeting scheduled for April 1.  A 
UN official asked "how can we tell half of the international 
staff that they can drive through Erez, while the other half 
has to walk and be exposed to greater security risk?" 
Numerous UN colleagues have told embassy staff that they will 
not/not accept a less than comprehensive solution. (Note: 
There are approximately 50 international blue UNLP holders 
resident in Gaza.  A much larger number of international 
staff for the UN and other NGOs are resident in Jerusalem and 
require regular travel to Gaza.  Thus far the GOI has offered 
no dispensation for staff resident in Jerusalem.  End Note.) 
 
6. (C) Daniel Beaudoin, a mid-ranking official in COGAT, 
confided to econoff on March 28 that the GOI was "struggling" 
with what to do.  He said that the intelligence services did 
not want any/any cars at Erez and although they knew that the 
chances were slim that a diplomatic or UN car would be 
boobytrapped, they were acting out of "fear."   At a March 23 
meeting, Coordinator for Government Activities General 
Mishlev told the TFPI that he would raise the issue of 
vehicular access with General Harel, IDF Head of Southern 
Command, and report back to the group early the following 
week.  We do not yet have a read-out of that discussion. 
 
------------------------------------ 
UNRWA says won't bring in more food 
until container restrictions eased 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) The international community is also concerned over 
problems with food shipments to Gaza.  Karni crossing has 
worked intermittently, at best, over the month of March.  The 
press reported widely that the terrorists who attacked Ashdod 
left Gaza by stowing away in an empty container that passed 
through Karni.  The GOI has not yet officially confirmed 
those reports, but has restricted movements of containers out 
of Gaza in the wake of the attack.  UNRWA reported that it 
currently has 40 empty containers in Gaza that it needs to 
return to Ashdod.  It is charged USD 20/day/container for the 
first ten days as demurrage; thus currently the agency is 
incurring costs of USD 800/day.  After the first ten days, 
the charges increase significantly. 
 
8. (C) Kris Nordahl, UNRWA deputy field representative, told 
econoff that the agency had decided not to import any more 
food until it had concrete proof that empty containers will 
be allowed out.  Nordahl said that for the past three days he 
had been in a "Kafkaesque" world where the office of the 
Coordinator for Government Activities (COGAT) tells him he 
has permission to export empty containers, only to be told at 
the crossing that no such permission exists. UNRWA currently 
has 267 containers of food that have been cleared at Ashdod 
and are ready for shipment to/to Gaza.  As of March 26, 
Nordahl said that the GOI is allowing 50 humanitarian 
containers in per day, which Nordahl characterized as 
"sufficient."  However, Nordahl said that UNRWA had "learned 
the lesson" of the past of "trusting" the GOI and going 
forward with operations, only to be "stuck" with costs later 
on.  UNRWA would therefore not/not bring in any new 
containers until it had been "proven" that the GOI would let 
empty containers out, he said.  According to Nordahl, there 
is enough food in the warehouse to make distributions through 
this week only.  WFP reported that it was not experiencing 
any problems at Karni because coincidentally it had no 
scheduled shipments.  Genevieve Wills, WFP Gaza director, 
told econoff that the agency has enough food on-hand to make 
distributions through mid-April. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (C) The primary issue at this point is restoring vehicle 
access for international personnel.  We concur that it is too 
dangerous to walk through Erez crossing and the procedure 
significantly hinders the work of the relief community.  The 
statements about food availability are somewhat misleading 
since technically the UN can/can import containers;  It just 
lacks a guarantee that it will be able to export the empty 
containers.  Last year the UN was stuck with tens of 
thousands of dollars in demurrage fees when unable to export 
empty containers for a sustained period.  Ideally, this issue 
should be resolved and we will not have to see whether the UN 
"blinks" and brings in food containers without the desired 
proof that it will be able to get them out.  Meetings 
continue between the GOI and various UN and donor 
interlocutors.  However, thus far, GOI efforts to handle the 
situation have been clumsy and ad hoc.  For example, on March 
28, COGAT officials called UN heads at 08:30 and informed 
them that all international staff could travel freely with 
their vehicles until 12:00 noon that day.  March 29, there 
was no such "window".  European Union officials and others 
have said they simply cannot work under such parameters. 
Solving these problems expeditiously is necessary to ensure 
uninterrupted humanitarian services to the Palestinian 
population.  End Comment. 
 
 
--------------- 
Press Statement 
--------------- 
 
11. (U) (Begin text)  (Title)  UN Forced to Consider 
Humanitarian Cut-Bank in Gaza (Title) 
 
New York and Gaza City, March 26 - The heads of the United 
Nations agencies may have to reduce or terminate some 
critical humanitarian relief operations in Gaza due to new 
movement restrictions imposed on UN personnel and 
humanitarian assistance by the Government of Israel. 
 
For the last three weeks, nearly all UN and other 
humanitarian agency vehicles have been prohibited from 
crossing through the Erez checkpoint.  In addition, the 
movement of food containers through Karni - the only 
commercial crossing point in Gaza - is currently obstructed. 
 
These unacceptable limitations on access for humanitarian 
staff and goods are undermining UN operational capability to 
deliver essential services and food relief to Gaza's civilian 
population.  These operations provide more than half of 
Gaza's essential social services, as well as food assistance 
to several hundred thousand people.  Any cutbacks will lead 
to a further deterioration of the already fragile 
humanitarian situation in Gaza. 
 
The UN recognizes Israel's legitimate security concerns and 
senior officials have repeatedly sought to engage the 
Government of Israel to resolve these concerns, but without 
success.  Because the restrictions persist, the UN is 
compelled to call publicly on the Government of Israel to 
restore full access to Gaza for UN and humanitarian workers 
and goods. 
 
The UN agencies include: 
UNRWA 
WFP 
UNICEF 
UNDP 
WHO 
OCHA 
UNSCO 
 
(End Text). 
 
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Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
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KURTZER