This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KWBG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS ISRAEL RELATIONS
SUBJECT: PM SHARON BANKING ON U.S. TO SAVE DISENGAGEMENT 
PLAN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Following PM Sharon's March 21 meeting with 
Likud ministers to discuss his disengagement plan, it appears 
that the Prime Minister may lack the necessary Likud 
ministerial support for the plan to pass a cabinet vote. 
Pundits and Embassy political contacts say the PM will need 
to show U.S. support for the plan, and U.S. recognition of 
Israeli control over several large settlement blocks in the 
West Bank to win sufficient Likud and cabinet support. 
FinMin Netanyahu on March 21 conditioned his support for the 
plan on an official USG rejection of the Palestinian right of 
return, USG support for inclusion of several major West Bank 
settlements inside the fence route, and U.S. acknowledgment 
of Israel's right to strike against terrorists inside Gaza 
even after a Gaza withdrawal.  Media pundits and politicians 
believe Sharon is banking on the USG's support for his plan 
as well as its blessing for Israel's de facto annexation of 
the settlement blocs of Ariel, Maaleh Adumim and Gush Etzion 
to sway Likud fence-sitters.  End summary. 
 
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Likud Ministers Want to be in the Know -- Already 
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¶2.  (SBU) PM Sharon met with Likud ministers to discuss his 
disengagement plan on March 21 amid growing concern among his 
Likud party colleagues that he would leave for Washington to 
discuss his plan before they would be briefed on it.  Sharon 
reportedly spoke about two different Gaza withdrawal 
scenarios -- one that would be an almost complete withdrawal 
from Gaza and one that that was more restricted and without 
withdrawal from the so-called Philadelphi corridor along the 
border of Gaza with Egypt.  In another possible variation, 
Israel would also dismantle four isolated northern 
settlements in the West Bank along with a Gaza withdrawal. 
Few ministers reportedly addressed the session and the Likud 
ministers will reportedly meet again next week to allow for 
further discussion.  In order to make his disengagement plan 
more palatable to the right wing of Likud, Sharon reportedly 
expressed his commitment to seek USG recognition of Israeli 
de facto annexation of three large West Bank settlement 
blocks -- Ariel, Maaleh Adumim, and Gush Etzion -- in return 
for Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and from several isolated 
settlements in the West Bank.  Some observers have also 
speculated that Sharon will request U.S. financial assistance 
to offset the cost of dismantling settlements. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to media speculation and the statements of 
various ministers, some ten ministers out of 23 have 
expressed opposition to Sharon's plan, including five Likud 
ministers: Agriculture Minister Yisrael Katz, Public Security 
Minister Tzachi Hanegbi, Health Minister Daniel Naveh, 
Minister-Without-Portfolio Uzi Landau, and Diaspora Affairs 
Minister Natan Sharansky.  Outside Likud, the four right-wing 
coalition party ministers oppose the plan: Effi Eitam 
(National Religious Party), Zevulun Orlev (National Religious 
Party), Benny Elon (National Union), and Avigdor Lieberman 
(National Union).  Eliezer Sandberg (Shinui) told Ambassador 
Kurtzer on March 10 that he also would oppose the plan. 
Several other Likud ministers have voiced opposition, but are 
considered to be wavering on the plan.  They include: Foreign 
Minister Silvan Shalom, Immigration and Absorption Minister 
Tzipi Livni, Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Education 
Minister Limor Livnat, and Minister-without-Portfolio Meir 
Sheetrit.  If these four were to join the opponents listed 
above, the plan would fail in a cabinet vote.  It is unclear 
how many of those wavering Likud ministers would be convinced 
to support the plan if the U.S. were to publicly support it. 
Livni was quoted on the IDF Radio station as saying that 
"Weissglas' meeting in Washington is more important" than the 
Likud ministerial meeting. 
 
¶4. (C) PM Sharon has been criticized by his Likud colleagues 
for not keeping them in the loop on his disengagement 
proposals.  In fact, Public Security Minister Hanegbi 
complained to Ambassador Kurtzer several week ago that Sharon 
had basically "ignored" his own party when it came to the 
plan, and had even briefed Labor leader Shimon Peres on it 
before briefing Likud leaders.  Hanegbi underlined that 
Sharon had made a major mistake by not discussing the plan 
with Likud.  He noted that Sharon could have brought around 
more Likud members if he had explained the logic of the plan 
to them, but that he had not tried to do this. 
 
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Netanyahu Would Support the Plan -- With Conditions 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On March 21, FinMin Netanyahu announced that he 
would support PM Sharon's disengagement plan with three 
conditions premised on U.S. backing: 
 
-- U.S. support for Israel's right to launch 
"counterterrorism" activities in Gaza even after an Israeli 
withdrawal, and the GOI's control over land, sea, and air 
traffic into  and around Gaza. 
 
-- U.S. support for completion -- before an Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza -- of the West Bank security fence that 
establishes Israel's control over the settlement blocks of 
Ariel, Etzion and Ma'ale Adumim as well as the Modi'in road 
(443). 
 
-- Explicit and official USG rejection of the Palestinian 
right of return.  Netanyahu explained that as long as the 
Palestinians had the hope of returning to former places of 
residence within Green Line Israel, terrorism would continue. 
 
¶6.  (C) In a Jerusalem Voice of Israel Radio Network 
broadcast March 21, Netanyahu announced that "if all three 
conditions are not met, (he) would not be able to support 
(Sharon's) initiative."  He called on his Likud colleagues to 
"stand united," to support Sharon's plan, but to "insist" on 
the three conditions and "secure U.S. support" for them. 
Channel Ten reporter Raviv Drucker told poloff on March 21 
that FinMin Netanyahu skipped the March 21 cabinet meeting in 
order to prepare his statement to the Likud ministerial. 
Quoting Netanyahu, Drucker said that Netanyahu told the Likud 
ministers that withdrawing from Gaza by itself would be a 
dangerous move as it would reward terrorism.  In order to 
minimize this dangerous perception, Netanyahu aimed to 
improve upon Sharon's plan.  Drucker speculated that Sharon 
might nominate Netanyahu to head a small ministerial team 
that would implement the disengagement plan and obtain 
Washington's concurrence to his three conditions. 
 
¶7.  (C) In a separate meeting, Deputy PM Ehud Olmert told 
visiting Under Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim that it was 
unclear exactly what Netanyahu wants and that some think he 
actually is in favor of a Gaza withdrawal.  Olmert speculated 
that Netanyahu was worried that he, as finance minister, 
would be expected to muster the necessary funding to finance 
the withdrawal and settler compensation. 
 
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Yassin Hit Could Buoy Support for Plan 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Observers posit that the IDF targeted assassination 
of Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmad Yassin on March 22 could weaken 
some Likud disengagement detractors' argument that a Gaza 
withdrawal will only serve to reward terrorism and could 
embolden Hamas to commit more terrorist acts.  Mofaz 
announced on Israeli radio March 22, after he met with the 
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, that "the 
weaker the terror organizations in Gaza grow,...the easier it 
will be to carry out the disengagement plan."  Reacting to 
the Yassin assassination, Likud MKs successfully convinced 
the religious Shas Party to withdraw its no-confidence motion 
against Sharon -- on his failure to fully disclose the 
details of his disengagement plan -- which Sharon would have 
likely won in any case. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) As the Likud faction continues to discuss Sharon's 
plan on March 22, Likud ministerial support for the plan 
appears to be contingent on U.S. political support and 
possibly financial backing.  Netanyahu upped the ante, 
calling for U.S. rejection of a Palestinian right of return. 
Media analysis abounds that the wavering Likud ministers, and 
many wavering Likud MKs, are waiting to see just what in the 
way of support the U.S. will offer Sharon in exchange for a 
Gaza withdrawal and, perhaps, accompanying withdrawal of 
isolated settlements in the West Bank.  Given the ideological 
and political views of those ministers opposing the plan, as 
well as the concerns they have raised about it, it may take 
more than positive U.S. statements on the plan for Sharon to 
win them over.  It could take a change in USG policy on West 
Bank settlements. 
 
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