This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL KWBG PGOV PTER IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: SHARON TELLS CODEL LEVIN NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PA 
UNTIL AFTER GAZA WITHDRAWAL 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: While reaffirming his preference for the 
roadmap, PM Sharon told Codel Levin on March 14 that he would 
not "negotiate" with the PA prior to Gaza withdrawal, which 
he termed a security, not political, solution.  Asked what 
sort of U.S. support he is seeking, the PM said only that he 
wanted assurances that the GOI would be under no pressure as 
long as the PA failed to perform on dismantling terrorist 
infrastructure.  Asked whether he would allow Arafat to 
travel to Gaza after disengagement to help bolster the PA 
security forces, Sharon said, "Arafat will stay where he is." 
 (In response to the same question, NSA Eiland said, 
"Maybe.")  Sharon pointed to the political obstacles he faces 
in implementing disengagement, both from the Gaza settlers 
and from within Likud, where "I've lost the majority in the 
party I formed."  Reinforcing Sharon's point about lack of 
unity within Likud, FM Shalom told the Codel that he was 
personally reserving judgment on Gaza withdrawal until 
details are clearer.  Shalom said Sharon would not bring the 
plan to the Cabinet until "the U.S. contribution is clear." 
He said the GOI was not necessarily seeking U.S. financial 
support, but that "statements" would not be sufficient. 
Sharon, Shalom, Eiland and DMI Chief Farkash all assessed 
that Hamas will not seek to take over Gaza following Israeli 
withdrawal, although Farkash warned that motivation for 
terrorist attacks in the West Bank will increase following 
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) In a March 14 meeting interrupted by news of the 
double suicide bombing in Ashdod, Codel Levin asked PM Sharon 
about his plan for disengagement from Gaza.  The Codel 
discussed the same topic earlier in the day in separate 
meetings with FM Shalom, National Security Adviser Eiland and 
IDF Intelligence Chief MG Farkash.  (Codel members were 
Senators Carl Levin, Jay Rockefeller, Jeff Bingaman, Jack 
Reed and Frank Lautenberg.  The Ambassador and emboffs joined 
all the meetings.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Sharon: Negotiations With PA Only After Gaza Withdrawal 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3. (C) Sharon told the Codel that the roadmap remains his 
preferred route for dealing with the Palestinians. 
Unilateral disengagment, he asserted, does not preclude a 
roadmap approach because it is a security, not political, 
"solution."  Political negotiations with the PA, however, 
would only be possible after Israel withdraws from Gaza, not 
before. 
 
¶4. (C) Members of the Codel, who had heard FM Shalom say 
earlier in the day that Sharon would take his withdrawal plan 
to the Cabinet only after U.S. support for the plan was 
clear, asked Sharon about the sort of commitments he was 
seeking from the U.S.  Sharon said only that he was looking 
for assurances that no further pressure would be placed on 
the GOI as long as the PA is not fulfilling its roadmap 
obligation to dismantle terrorist infrastructure. 
 
¶5. (C) Sharon noted the political difficulties he faces in 
carrying out the disengagment plan.  The GOI, he said, has 
never moved settlements without gaining peace at the same 
time.  Some families have lived for three generations in 
Gaza, where they have modern farms, as well as painful 
memories of terrorist attacks.  These settlers are reminding 
the PM that statements he made as a candidate about "painful 
compromises" all spoke about making the compromises in 
exchange for a genuine, durable peace. 
 
¶6. (C) The PM pointed as well to his lack of support for the 
plan within his own Likud party.  Recounting his role in 
establishing the party during the three months in 1973 
between his retirement from the IDF and his return to uniform 
for the Yom Kippur war, he commented with a smile, "I've lost 
the majority in the party I formed."  Support for the plan on 
the Left does not offset this loss because the Left is so 
weak. 
 
¶7. (C) Responding to questions about Gaza after Israel 
withdraws, Sharon said he did not expect Hamas to take over. 
He expressed concern, though, about the Tanzim, which, he 
said, is responsible for most of the recent terrorism and 
which, he said, receives its orders and support from Iran and 
Hizballah.  Asked whether he thought Hamas wanted Israel to 
leave Gaza, Sharon said he did, but assessed that Hamas is 
worried that Israel will hit it harder after Israeli 
withdrawal because the GOI will no longer have to take into 
account the security of Gaza settlers. 
 
¶8. (C) Senator Levin asked Sharon whether he would allow 
Arafat to travel to Gaza after disengagement.  Sharon 
responded firmly that "Arafat will stay where he is," to 
which Dov Weissglas, the PM's COS, added, "for his own 
safety." 
¶9. (C) Weissglas commented that he did not foresee Gaza 
withdrawal having any impact on threats to Israeli security 
from Gaza.  The Gaza fence "works," he said, and the IDF will 
remain deployed "around" Gaza.  The withdrawal will have no 
impact on terrorist motivation because motivation is "already 
at the highest level."  Elements in Gaza will continue to 
play the role of the "brains" in terrorist attacks, the 
"commands" for which emanate in Syria and the execution of 
which is carried out by residents of the West Bank. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Shalom: Reserving Judgment on Disengagement 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Like Sharon, FM Shalom opened his discussion of 
Palestinian issues with the Codel by affirming his support 
for the roadmap.  Asked for his personal view of Sharon's 
Gaza disengagement initiative, Shalom said he would reserve 
judgment until its details are clearer.  He noted that Sharon 
has said that the GOI would go ahead with Gaza disengagement 
only with U.S. support.  He also asserted that Sharon would 
not bring the plan to the full Cabinet until "the U.S. 
contribution is clear."  Pressed by the Codel on the kind of 
"contribution" sought, Shalom said he did not necessarily 
mean financial support (although he did not exclude it).  He 
added, however, that U.S. "statements" would probably not be 
enough. 
 
¶12. (C) Sen. Rockefeller commented that Congressional 
interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is waning, given 
the imperatives of dealing with al-Qaeda and Iraq.  He 
offered his own view of the "inherent intractability" of the 
Israeli-Palestinian problem, noting that some people believe 
that no solution is possible as long as Arafat and Sharon are 
calling the shots.  Shalom rejected the implicit comparison 
between Arafat and Sharon, asserting that Arafat, unlike 
Sharon, is a terrorist.  Unilateral disengagement, he 
continued, represents a totally new approach that is designed 
to circumvent the problem of Israel's lack of a Palestinian 
partner. 
 
¶13. (C) Sen. Reed noted that Israeli security needs following 
Gaza withdrawal would seem to require a strong PA, an outcome 
about which the GOI "seems to be of two minds."  Shalom said 
he agreed with Reed on the need for a strong PA, but thought 
the PA was not ready or willing to take charge of Gaza 
security.  Egypt, he said, would first have to provide about 
six months of training to the Gaza security forces.  Shalom 
suggested that the IDF should remain in the Philadelphia 
Strip along the Gaza-Egypt border after disengagement, in 
order to avoid both having to reopen the peace treaty with 
Egypt and facilitating smuggling into Gaza. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Eiland: PA Security Forces Lacking Only Political Will 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶14. (C) Eiland differed with Shalom on the capabilities of 
the PA security forces.  While they could certainly benefit 
from training, he commented, they are already strong enough 
to exercise security control in Gaza.  All that is needed is 
political will, mainly from Arafat.  Asked whether the GOI 
would allow Arafat to travel to Gaza after Israeli 
disengagement, Eiland said, "Maybe."  He noted as well that 
all GOI assessments concur that Hamas is not interested in 
taking over Gaza in the short term.  The political goal of 
Hamas is to be strong enough to derail any initiatives that 
do not suit its purposes. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Farkash: Gaza Withdrawal Means More West Bank Terror 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶15. (C) Hamas leaders in Gaza and Syria are "negotiating," 
Gen. Farkash told the Codel, about how Hamas should react to 
the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.  In order to retain its 
legitimacy on the Gaza street after Israel withdraws, Hamas, 
he predicted, will look to increase its attacks in the West 
Bank.  Hamas will believe that terrorism can force Israel out 
of the West Bank, just as terrorism will be seen to have 
succeeded in Gaza.  Terrorist efforts will therefore focus on 
the West Bank.  Summarizing the IDF assessment, Farkash said 
Gaza disengagement will lead to greater terrorist motivation 
in the West Bank. 
 
¶16. (U) The Codel did not have an opportunity to review this 
cable before departing Israel. 
 
 
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