This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR OECD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2014 
TAGS: PREL KWBG TSPL PINR IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: SHINUI SCIENCE MINISTER MAKES CASE AGAINST 
UNILATERAL GAZA WITHDRAWAL 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) In a March 10 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister 
of Science and Technology (and Shinui MK) Eliezer Sandberg 
outlined his opposition to unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, 
adding his view that the Israeli public is moving in that 
direction as well.  Sandberg cited three reasons for his 
opposition:  history shows that the withdrawal from Lebanon 
encouraged greater violence and the present intifada; Israeli 
military presence within Gaza is needed for the time being; 
and aversion toward appearing to reward Arafat.  Sandberg 
could support withdrawal from Gaza if it were coupled with 
measures designed to send the message to the Palestinians 
that it did not come without a price (e.g. shifting of 
settler presence to the West Bank), and provide the incentive 
for negotiations.  He would support a unilateral move only if 
the IDF were to signal that continued presence in Gaza is not 
militarily tenable.  Sandberg indicated that he and other 
Shinui members would vote their conscience and not be bound 
by party loyalty if this issue were brought to a Cabinet 
vote.  Turning to science issues, Sandberg expressed 
frustration at the limited budget and clout of his ministry. 
He would like to have closer relations with the USG -- 
particularly on space issues -- and stated that he has 
pressed PM Sharon to embrace nanotechnology in the same 
manner that Israel created the National Water Carrier and 
Dimona nuclear facilities.  Sandberg has been in the Knesset 
since 1992, is Chair of the Shinui Knesset faction and while 
one of the party's more right-wing members, is not regarded 
as an influential figure.  End Summary. 
 
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Israeli Public Moving Toward Settler Position 
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¶2.  (C)  Sandberg, one of 5 Shinui members in the Cabinet, 
opened the meeting by asserting that public sympathy in 
Israel is shifting toward the settler position on Gaza 
withdrawal.  If the Palestinians would only attack soldiers 
protecting the settlements, then public opinion might well 
build for unilateral measures.  But as long as attacks 
continue within Israel, the public sees the value of 
continued Israeli military presence in Gaza.  Sandberg 
outlined three key reasons why he opposes unilateral 
withdrawal.  First, the Lebanon experience demonstrates that 
unilateral withdrawal inspires the Palestinians toward more 
violence.  It gives them hope that through terror they can 
force Israel to run.  Second, Sandberg believes that Israeli 
military presence is still required in Gaza for the time 
being.  The ability to rapidly segregate the Strip into three 
isolated boxes and to control crossroads offers valuable 
security.  Finally, this move will be viewed as rewarding 
Arafat -- "the partner who betrayed us" -- and continuing the 
failed Oslo process. 
 
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Palestinians Have to Pay a Price 
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¶3.  (C)  The Palestinians must be convinced that there is no 
alternative to negotiation, Sandberg continued, and a price 
must be paid for Gaza withdrawal.  To do otherwise would feed 
the view that time is on the Palestinian side and that the 
Israeli presence in the region is reversible.  He suggests 
that withdrawal from Gaza be coupled with a settler move to 
at least one West Bank area to create facts on the ground 
that will change only through further negotiation.  This 
would accelerate, not retard, efforts to return to 
negotiations.  Sandberg would apply the same approach to the 
separation barrier, pushing deeper into the West Bank with 
the understanding that it could be moved back through 
negotiation.  Planting the barrier close to the 1967 border 
would be the worst case scenario since it would remove any 
incentive for the Palestinians to come to the table.  In the 
end, Sandberg opined, we will evacuate many areas in the 
territories, but "we must be tough now in order to be soft 
later."  How would Sandberg react, the Ambassador queried, if 
the USG were to offer the GOI "something attractive" in terms 
of coupling the withdrawal with additional measures in the 
West Bank.  Such a move would be persuasive, the Minister 
replied, since it would provide the Palestinians with an 
incentive to negotiate. 
 
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Shinui Unity in the Cabinet 
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¶4.  (C)  With respect to whether Shinui will vote as a bloc 
should the withdrawal issue come to a Cabinet vote, Sandberg 
noted that "it depends on who you ask."  He made clear that 
he would not feel bound to follow the party line -- 
suggesting that he is contemplating leaving public office 
anyway at the end of his term -- and indicated that up to 
four Shinui Cabinet members may be prepared to buck the party 
position on unilateral withdrawal.  He will vote his 
conscience, Sandberg continued, and the only set of 
circumstances that could cause him to change his view on a 
unilateral withdrawal would be if the IDF were to declare 
that continuing to stay in Gaza and providing security for 
the settlements was not militarily tenable. 
 
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Science Ministry Struggling 
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¶5.  (SBU)  Turning to his role as Minister of Science and 
Technology, Sandberg bemoaned the small budget and clout of 
his ministry.  The three principal foci of his ministry are 
management of 10 R&D centers, support for the Israeli space 
program, and efforts to coordinate GOI positions in key areas 
of applied research.  Sandberg expressed interest in closer 
relations with NASA -- particularly in the fields of science 
education and efforts to send a second Israeli astronaut on 
the shuttle.  He also recounted efforts to expand Israeli 
scientific presence in the global scene, including the recent 
S&T agreement signed with India and discussions with 
Ethiopian officials concerning exchanges in the areas of 
research, education and equipment.  He indicated that he 
intends to participate in the next Earth Observation Summit 
ministerial in Japan.  The Ambassador noted that Israeli 
observers have not been regularly attending meetings of the 
OECD Committee on Science and Technology Policy, a logical 
place for Israeli input on issues of regional and global 
concern.  Sandberg stated that he had only recently become 
aware of this problem, and had asked the Director General of 
the Ministry to resolve the matter.  He reassured the 
Ambassador that Israel was interested in remaining engaged on 
the committee. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In Sandberg's view, the GOI should engage in a 
major policy and research initiative in the area of 
nanotechnology.  He suggested to the Prime Minister that an 
effort along the lines of construction of the National Water 
Carrier or the Dimona nuclear facility be dedicated toward 
this field.  Although the GOI could never match the resources 
that the USG and European countries have dedicated, he 
believed that Israeli scientists could establish their niche 
and gain access to international funding.  The Ambassador 
suggested that the U.S.-Israel binational science 
organizations (Binational Industrial Research and Development 
(BIRD), Binational Agricultural Research and Development 
(BARD), Binational Science Foundation (BSF)) might provide a 
convenient mechanism for Israeli scientists to engage U.S. 
counterparts in state-of-the-art research in the field, 
potentially leading to access to additional USG or 
international funding. 
 
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Bio Note 
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¶7.  (C)  Sandberg, a Knesset member since 1992 and Minister 
of Science and Technology since 2003, is one of the Shinui 
party's right-wing members.  He is not regarded as one of the 
more vocal or influential members of the party.  Sandberg 
began his political career in the hard-line Tsomet party, 
where he served as legal advisor and secretary general. 
While in Tsomet, he was one of the architects of the 
electoral reform proposals adopted in 1992.  He left the 
party in the late 1990's during a round of "party musical 
chairs," when 14 ministers who were not returned to the 
Knesset on their own party lists joined other parties, where 
they were promised a high enough slot on the list to be 
elected.  Sandberg ultimately joined Shinui, and now serves 
as chair of the Shinui Knesset faction. He has served on the 
economics, constitution, law and justice, and science and 
technology committees.  From February 1998-June 1999 he was 
Deputy Minister of Education, Culture and Sport. Sandberg has 
long fought draft deferrals for yeshiva students and the 
stringent Shabbat regulations, and pushed for Israeli 
membership in the European Union.  Sandberg graduated with a 
degree in law from Tel Aviv University.  He delayed his entry 
into the military by participating in the academic reserve, 
eventually serving as a lieutenant in the Army Prosecutor's 
Office.  He is married, has three children and speaks Hebrew 
and English. 
 
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