This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001568 
 
SIPDIS 
 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014 
TAGS: PTER TSPL PARM IS COUNTERTERRORISM ISRAEL RELATIONS
SUBJECT: COMBATING RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM; USG-GOI DISCUSS 
JOINT ACTIVITIES 
 
REF: 03 TEL AVIV 7234 
 
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) U.S. and Israeli delegations discussed efforts to 
combat radiological terrorism during February 24-25 talks 
held in Israel.  The parties reviewed existing institutional 
structures and technologies as well as strategy and 
approaches for research, development, testing and evaluation. 
 Also discussed was the role of science and technology in 
support of operational and public affairs challenges in 
responding to a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) event. 
The need to develop advanced technologies to detect RDD's and 
respond to such an event was of paramount concern, as well as 
the training of first responders and avoiding public panic. 
Both sides agreed that an RDD event -- designed for mass 
disruption rather than mass destruction -- could have 
devastating economic and psychological impacts in excess of 
direct damage to human health. 
 
¶2. (C)  Further collaboration on radiation detection, 
dispersion modeling, performance standards, testing protocols 
and unconventional explosive detection will be considered 
under the umbrella of the Joint Counterterrorism Group 
Working Group on Homeland Security.  Israel is among few 
countries undertaking serious research and development toward 
combating an RDD event, and would be a logical USG partner 
for further cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (C) The USG delegation was led by Robert Harward, 
Director for Strategy and Defense Issues, Office of Combating 
Terrorism, NSC, and Dr. Holly Dockery, Director of 
International Affairs, Science and Technology Directorate, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  It included officials 
from DHS, the Department of Energy (DOE), National Institutes 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Embassy Tel Aviv 
ESTHoff.  The Israeli delegation was led by Gideon Shavit, 
Director of External Relations, Israel Atomic Energy 
Commission (IAEC), and included officials from the IAEC, 
Ministry of Defense, National Security Council, Israeli 
Police, Ministry of Environment, Israeli Security Agency, 
Israeli Defense Forces, and Israeli Institute of Biological 
Research. 
 
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WORKSHOP FOCUS ON S&T ROLE IN RDD EVENT 
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¶4.  (C) The meetings were held at the Soreq Nuclear Research 
Center outside of Tel Aviv, the centralized location in 
Israel for radioactive detection capabilities (explosive 
detection is centralized at Police/Israeli Security Agency 
facilities, and chemical/biological detection at the Israeli 
Institute of Biological Research).  The parties reviewed 
existing institutional structures for RDD detection and 
management of an RDD event, and explained the results of 
recent Table Top Exercises conducted to simulate responses to 
such an event.  The principal lessons learned included the 
need to better train first responders, the development of 
refined standards for decontamination ("how clean is 
clean?"), and the public affairs challenges in preventing 
panic and media frenzy.  Additionally, the USG team 
emphasized the need for science and technology 
representatives to be engaged from the start in exercise 
planning, and not just in assessing the performance of 
existing technologies.  This would optimize data collection 
and evaluation of technological performance. 
 
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GOI HIGHLIGHTS CARGO RISK TO CIVIL AVIATION 
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¶5.  (C) A session on aviation security reviewed the latest 
systems and technologies in detecting RDD as well as other 
explosive devices.  Ram Arnon of the Israeli Security Agency 
explained that the GOI is now moving to 100 percent physical 
screening of cargo, a change from past practice of screening 
based on profiling and the bill of lading.  In Arnon's view, 
given the stepped-up screening of passengers, the next large 
aviation event is more likely to occur from cargo placed 
aboard passenger jets.  The U.S. delegation reviewed advances 
in aviation security technologies, as well as new screening 
systems and technologies being evaluated at the test bed of 
the Port Authority of NY/NJ. 
 
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CLEAN-UP STANDARDS:  HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN? 
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¶6.  (C) On mitigation and decontamination issues, both 
delegations reviewed existing standards both for permissible 
radiation exposure to first responders as well as acceptable 
levels for post event clean-up.  The USG del explained our 
policy that decontamination levels be considered on a 
site-specific basis, with the guiding principle of attaining 
as low a contamination level "as reasonably achievable" 
(ALARA).  DHS officials noted the importance of separating an 
RDD event from normal environmental clean-up standard when 
assessing proper decontamination levels.  The GOI briefed the 
US delegation on their new standards for acceptable dosage 
limits for first responders, bringing them more into accord 
with current international standards.  These new limits 
recognized the distinction between those applicable to 
remedial action and those for life saving activities, the 
latter having a higher threshold. 
 
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS CHALLENGES 
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¶7.  (C) The IAEC gave an extensive briefing on public affairs 
issues and working with the media, having recently held a 
seminar on these issues with local media and other 
policymakers.  They emphasized the general lack of knowledge 
in the public concerning RDD (and association with nuclear 
devices), and the potential for media frenzy and panic.  The 
GOI is identifying and preparing a list of speakers to 
address key issues and avoid a vacuum filled by "experts" who 
might send an inappropriate message.  Dr. Dockery indicated 
that the GOI analysis dovetailed with the USG analysis, 
although we have yet to hold a formal exercise on this issue. 
 Dockery noted that in the U.S., like Israel, public 
attitudes about radiation are very backward, and emphasized 
the need for a consistent and coordinated governmental 
message should an event occur.  She added that in many cases 
of public disasters (e.g. earthquakes), the local media 
outlets provide more helpful, practical advice to the public 
than the national media, which tends to focus more on 
dramatic visual images. 
 
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FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES 
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¶8. (C) The GOI del presented a proposal for follow-up 
activities that included the following:  table top exercise 
on public affairs, a meeting on dispersion models, a USG 
seminar to Israeli first responders, a follow-up meeting on 
technologies for detection of illicit trafficking of 
radioactive materials, a discussion of USG decontamination 
doctrine and procedures, and mutual visits to exercises. 
Dockery and Harward explained that certain of these issues 
were beyond the purview of this delegation (comprised of S&T 
officials), but that we would pass their suggestions on to 
the appropriate offices and agencies.  The USG would be 
prepared to consider, however, certain follow-up under the 
auspices of the Homeland Security Working Group of the JCG. 
Specifically, we would look into the suggested follow-up on 
dispersion models in association with an MOD-Department of 
Defense meeting planned for April, as well as further 
discussions concerning detection of unconventional 
explosives.  Additional areas of cooperation suggested by the 
US del include linkages between explosives and RDD detection, 
as well as the use of the Soreq testing facilities to conduct 
joint experiments and testing of RDD devices. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment.  The meetings were useful and both 
delegations accomplished internal goals.  The GOI has for 
some time expressed interest in establishing closer links 
with civilian USG counterparts engaged in homeland security 
issues. The Israelis view DHS as a newly established 
counterpart in this respect, and this RDD meeting represents 
an inroad into further collaboration.  For the USG, there are 
few countries which share the same risk profile concerning 
RDD events and which are actively engaged in the R&D required 
to combat this form of terrorism.  Israel would be a logical 
partner for increased collaboration given their interest and 
technical expertise in this field. 
 
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