This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR BURNS/SATTERFIELD; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2009 
TAGS: ECON KWBG KPAL IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF GAZA PULL-OUT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  We assess that an Israeli pull-out from the 
Gaza Strip in and of itself will not result in any major 
improvements in economic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza 
over the short to medium term.  The manner in which the 
pull-out is executed could have an economic impact: leaving 
in the "dead-of-the night" is the worst case scenario.  By 
contrast, a coordinated withdrawal, complete with certain 
guarantees from Israel, could set the stage for eventual 
economic recovery in Gaza.  It will make greatest sense for 
the settlements and infrastructure to be handed over to a 
credible, trusted international custodian for a fixed 
transitional period.  Israel should guarantee access to trade 
with Israel and external markets post-withdrawal.  The 
ability of Palestinian laborers to work in Israel is less 
critical but should continue for humanitarian reasons.  The 
donor community will need to retain robust assistance levels. 
 In para 6, we offer specific "markers" we might use with the 
Israelis to influence their decision making on 
post-withdrawal economic issues. 
 
Note: This cable is one of three messages by Embassy Tel Aviv 
with initial thinking about the implications of an Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza.  The other two cables address the 
political/institutional and military/security implications of 
withdrawal. End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Pull-Out Will Not Result in Economic Boom 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Economic improvements in Gaza resulting from more 
mobility as a result of a unilateral Israeli pull-out are 
likely to be marginal at best, at least in the immediate 
term.  Overall, mobility restrictions have been fewer within 
Gaza than in the West Bank. The key for Gaza businesses has 
not been their ability to deliver products within the Strip 
but rather getting inputs in from Israel and abroad and 
exporting final products outside of Gaza.  The pull-out will 
have some localized impact, especially as southerners are 
able to access the better labor markets of Gaza City and as 
people from currently enclosed communities are allowed 
freedom to engage in economically productive activities and 
to market and trade goods and services. 
 
¶3.  (C) We and our contacts do not believe an Israeli 
pull-out will result in increased foreign or domestic 
investment in the short to medium term.  A critical factor in 
investment decisions is the security environment, and given 
the situation of the past few years, we are unlikely to see a 
post-Oslo-like investment bounce, as investors wait and see 
what happens on the ground.  Continued donor assistance, 
particularly large infrastructure projects, will be required 
to be a motor for growth and sustenance of the Palestinian 
economy. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Economic Impacts of Co-ordinated 
or Unilateral Pull-Out 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Economic stability and growth cannot be disaggregated 
from political stability.  Gaza has been in a downward 
security spiral for the past several months with a series of 
high profile clashes and murders and an overall diminishing 
sense of law and order.  Clearly most of the security 
problems within Gaza are due to internal Palestinian power 
struggles and we expect these to continue after the 
withdrawal.  However, there are steps that Israel could take 
which would tip the scales towards more stability.  A 
coordinated versus a unilateral withdrawal is key among those 
measures.  "Leaving in the dead of night" is the worst 
possible scenario.  As one contact put it, without 
coordination, people are likely to "throw themselves against 
the electrified fences" in order to gain control of the 
settlement infrastructure and resources.  While this contact 
was exaggerating for effect, we do believe that a unilateral 
withdrawal would provoke a serious and probably violent 
competition for settlement resources.  Moreover, unilateral 
withdrawal is also likely to strengthen rejectionist groups, 
thereby feeding into the competition which already exists 
between them and the PA.  Clearly the current security 
environment in Gaza contributes to the poor state of the 
economy.  When we asked over ten economic experts for their 
opinions about post-withdrawal Gaza, all said that Gaza's 
economic future depends, first and foremost, on what happens 
politically.  Israel's withdrawal should be managed in a way 
that promotes improved security, or at a minimum, does not 
actively contribute to further deterioration. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Trade Access is the Key to Economic Survivial 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  It is imperative that following the Israeli 
withdrawal trade access to Israel and other external markets 
be expanded and improved.  If Israel were to implement a full 
economic disengagement and close the border, there would be 
an economic/social catastrophe.  Karim Nashishibi, IMF 
representative, predicted this scenario would lead to "riots 
in the streets, food shortages, you name it."  According to 
officials from both the World Bank and the Fund, were the GOI 
to cease allowing Gazans into Israel for work, there would be 
little impact on the broader economy -- this because the 
workers are so few compared to the population size. 
Nevertheless, this program does provide wages for roughly ten 
thousand individuals and their families per day.  Israel 
therefore should be encouraged to continue this program on 
humanitarian grounds.  In addition to a coordinated 
withdrawal, Israel should turn over the settlements and their 
infrastructure intact to a trusted, transparent, credible 
international custodian for a fixed transition period. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Keeping the Status Quo is Not Good Enough 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) If Israel were to take the steps outlined above - 
coordinated withdrawal, keep borders open, and continue 
allowing workers into Israel - we could expect a continuation 
of the grim status quo.  However unemployment at over 30 
percent and poverty in excess of 60 percent is not 
sustainable and maintaining the status quo should not/not be 
our goal.  We offer the following suggestions as "markers" 
that Washington might wish to use in discussing withdrawal 
plans with GOI interlocutors: 
 
¶A.  Trade 
 
-- Ensure access to external markets (including the West 
Bank) and ability to 
import inputs and other goods.  Specifically, improved 
operations at Karni 
crossing, re-opening the airport, including building cargo 
facilities and 
reinvigorating work on Gaza seaport. 
 
-- Work to expand trade with Egypt and region as a whole. 
 
-- Establish infrastructure and systems to allow goods to 
pass through Rafah. 
 
¶B.  Investment/General Growth 
 
-- Agree to Gaza gas project. 
 
-- Re-allow Israeli investors into the Gaza Industrial Estate 
with appropriate 
security arrangements.  Consider having a third party private 
company take over 
logistics and security at Karni and the GIE in order to 
improve efficiency and 
address Israeli security concerns. 
 
-- Continue robust donor assistance, particularly investments 
in 
infrastructure. 
 
-- Allow fishing along length of Gaza Strip up to full 20 
nautical miles 
stipulated by Oslo. 
 
-- Ensure complete internal freedom of movement. 
 
¶C. Settlement Disposition 
 
-- Coordinate the pull-out with a group comprised of PA 
officials, civil 
society, and international actors. 
 
-- Turn over the settlements to a credible, trusted 
international custodian for 
a fixed transitional period. 
 
-- Turn over settlement infrastructure intact.  Don't "scorch 
the earth." 
 
-- Facilitate continuation of existing marketing and 
transport arrangements for 
goods produced in settlements 
 
¶D.  Economic Cooperation 
-- Continue and improve current coordination on 
trans-national issues such as 
water and electricity. 
 
-- Continue/strengthen cross-border industrial parks. 
 
-- Continue, and ideally, increase the number of workers in 
Israel. 
 
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KURTZER