This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000680 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS TO AID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER EAID IZ AF PK YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: 3/20/04 ABIZAID MEETING WITH SALEH: CT OPS IN 
YEMEN, PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN; IRAQ; ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 
 
 
Classified By: Edmund J. Hull, Ambassador for reasons 1.5 (a) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  During his 3/20/04 visit to Sanaa, GEN 
Abizaid, accompanied by Ambassador and senior staff, called 
on President Saleh.  Saleh asked about ongoing Pakistani CT 
operations in Waziristan.  He asserted that good intelligence 
and money to spread around were more effective in tribal 
regions than large military operations, and predicted that 
Pakistani forces would find it hard to sustain the 
deployment.  Saleh reviewed significant recent CT successes 
in Yemen, including the apprehension of Cole suspects Badawi 
and Quso,.  He was visibly pleased to receive from 
Ambassador a letter of congratulations from FBI Director 
Mueller.  Saleh noted that Yemen,s harsh topography and 
limited resources could have made the country a "den" of 
terrorism similar to Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan, but 
ROYG commitment and cooperation with the USG had made the 
country secure.  He suggested resumption of U.S. naval 
refueling in Aden.  Saleh appealed for continuing U.S. 
assistance (both security-related and development-related) 
and U.S. pressure for Yemen,s oil-rich Gulf neighbors to 
assist the country as well.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, accompanied 
by Ambassador, called on Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
during a five-hour visit to Sanaa on March 20.  The U.S. 
party also included POLAD Litt, RADM Robb, COL Reynes, OMC 
Chief and DCM (notetaker).  Yemeni officials present included 
FM Qirbi, Defense Chief of Staff Qasimi, Interior Minister 
Alimi, and PSO Chief Qamish. 
 
¶3. (C) GEN Abizaid recalled his useful meeting with FM Qirbi 
during the latter,s early February visit to Tampa and 
Washington, and commended Saleh on the success of 
recent/ongoing counterterrorism operations in Yemen.  He 
noted that the United States appreciates Yemen,s active 
support in the global war on terrorism. 
 
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CT Operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4. (C) Saleh asked Abizaid whether media reports that 
Pakistani forces had surrounded Ayman al-Zawahiri in the 
tribal region of northwest Pakistan were accurate.  The 
General replied that it was uncertain whether or not an HVT 
was present.  He stressed that the initiative shown by 
Pakistani forces was important nonetheless, and assured Saleh 
that U.S. forces were similarly doing their part to keep 
pressure on the terrorists on the Afghan side of the border. 
He expressed optimism over operations in Yemen, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan, noting that Afghan President Karzai continued to 
strengthen his position. 
 
¶5. (C) President Saleh showed considerable interest in the 
Pakistani operation, asking if Pakistani forces would remain 
long in the tribal areas.  Abizaid replied that Pakistani 
President Musharraf understood the need to establish 
authority there, so the forces were determined to remain and 
dominate the region.  Saleh expressed skepticism, stating 
that military operations in tribal regions should be a last 
resort, and effective intelligence, coupled with money to 
spread around, was far more effective.  He recalled previous 
CENTCOM Commander GEN Tommy Franks telling him that groups in 
Afghanistan were always seeking money.  Saleh predicted that 
the Pakistani military would find it difficult to sustain 
operations in the tribal zones. 
 
------------------------------ 
CT Operations in Yemen 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Saleh underscored ROYG determination to work with the 
USG to defeat terrorism despite Yemen,s limited resources 
and difficult geography.  Yemen could have become a worse 
"den" of terrorism than Afghanistan or Pakistan, he said, but 
sustained and successful effort by the ROYG -- and good 
cooperation with the USG on many levels -- had brought 
success.  Consequently Yemen is much more secure both for 
Yemenis and for Americans, said Saleh, and U.S. ships can 
again come to Aden to refuel.  Citing his recent extended 
stay in Marib, the President expressed satisfaction at the 
increased presence of security forces there and in other 
tribal areas of Yemen.  "You will see even more of this in 
future," he said. 
 
¶7. (C) Although Yemen,s tribal regions present difficulties 
similar to those of northwest Pakistan, said Saleh, the ROYG 
had enjoyed greater CT success because of effective 
intelligence.  Saleh recounted several recent successes, 
including the apprehension of Cole suspects Jamal al-Badawi 
and Fahd al-Quso, on March 18, the March 19 capture of two 
others who had been with them, and the expected imminent 
capture of others.  He pointed to the capture of 10 fugitive 
terrorist suspects in recent days, a number which Interior 
Minister Alimi amended to eight.  (Note: MOI forces have 
taken the lead in recent CT operations, as has become the 
norm in Yemen over the past year.  MOD forces are typically 
in a back-up role.  End Note.)  Saleh accepted the amendment, 
concluding that "We have effective intelligence and we spend 
money, which is better than large military operations." 
 
¶8. (C) In addition, said Saleh, the ROYG had made productive 
use of dialogue to rehabilitate extremist sympathizers who 
had not yet engaged in violent operations.  PSO Chief Qamish 
noted that the dialogue program had succeeded in two areas: 
(a) some jailed suspects had come to realize their error and 
repented; and (b) some fugitive suspects had been induced to 
surrender because they knew that dialogue, rather than death 
or indefinite incarceration, awaited them.  Interior Minister 
Alimi pointed out that dialogue was possible only/only with 
suspects who had had no involvement whatsoever in planning or 
carrying out criminal acts.  Saleh commented that the absence 
of a dialogue option contributed to the USG,s difficulty in 
managing the issue of Guantanamo detainees.  Ambassador 
informed Saleh that the USG was addressing the issue, and 
that a ROYG delegation was being invited to visit the Yemeni 
detainees held at the Guantanamo facility. 
 
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Cooperation with Saudi Arabia 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Saleh added that cooperation with the KSA was also 
important to CT success in Yemen.  Recently captured 
terrorist suspects had large quantities of Saudi currency, 
illustrating the connection between extremists operating in 
the two countries.  In fact, said Saleh, the influx of Saudi 
money to extremists remained a problem even though the 
terrorist network in the Arabian peninsula had been greatly 
diminished by U.S. and regional CT efforts.  He noted that 
the ROYG had turned over 15 extremists to the Saudis, 
routinely provided Saudi counterparts with information 
gleaned from interrogations, and needed the Saudis to share 
information and hand over Yemenis arrested in KSA.  Saleh 
observed that religious extremism had evolved in the region 
over a period of 60-70 years, so defeating it would take 
work, time and money.  It could not be achieved overnight, 
said Saleh, but he was convinced that Crown Prince Abdullah 
and Deputy MININT Mohamed bin Nayef were serious about doing 
so. 
 
------------------------- 
FBI Director,s Letter 
------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador also congratulated President Saleh on 
Yemen,s recent CT successes, and presented him with the 
Arabic text of a message from FBI Director Robert Mueller 
offering congratulations on the capture of Cole suspects 
Badawi and Quso,.  Saleh read the text carefully and was 
visibly pleased.  He commented that this was the first time 
he had received such an expression of thanks from the USG 
over a CT success, despite Yemen,s many successes while 
cooperating with the USG in the war on terrorism. 
 
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U.S. Assistance to Yemen 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Saleh again stressed that Yemen was committed to 
"maximum cooperation" with the USG in fighting terrorism 
despite the country,s limitations.  He said Yemen needed 
assistance in many areas, not only in security, intelligence 
and military affairs, but also development assistance -- 
particularly in education, medical care and agriculture.  "We 
depend on the generosity of U.S. assistance," he said.  Saleh 
emphasized that he also hoped the USG would urge Yemen,s 
neighbors, particularly KSA and Qatar, to be similarly 
generous in aiding Yemen.  He noted that some other states in 
the region exert pressure on Yemen due to its close 
cooperation with the USG, and that KSA had even cut some 
financial assistance because the Saudi leadership had an 
exaggerated idea of the scale and type of aid Yemen was 
receiving from the United States.  GEN Abizaid said the USG 
would do what it could to assist KSA in its own CT effort and 
to foster Saudi-Yemeni cooperation. 
 
¶12. (C) Saleh expressed appreciation for the EDA boats 
recently received for the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), but 
appealed to GEN Abizaid to convey to Washington the message 
that Yemen needs continuing assistance.  As an example of the 
sort of help Yemen needs in the security sector, Saleh noted 
that the Yemeni military had an antiquated French 
communications system.  He indicated that Yemen would welcome 
rehabilitation or replacement of this system by the USG. 
Such aid will both increase ROYG capabilities and boost the 
morale of police and security forces to work with the USG to 
achieve further CT successes, he said. 
 
¶13. (C) GEN Abizaid reiterated U.S. appreciation for Yemen,s 
positive role in the war on terrorism, stating that he and 
the Ambassador would convey the message on continued U.S. 
assistance. The General said he would immediately advocate 
enhanced intelligence sharing, continued training for Yemeni 
military/security forces and cooperation to strengthen the 
YCG.  Intelligence sharing is especially significant, he 
said, because the more each side knows of what the other 
knows, the better they can achieve CT success together.  GEN 
Abizaid added that he also understood and would convey to 
Secretary Rumsfeld the importance of the sort of non-military 
 
SIPDIS 
assistance Saleh had mentioned, particularly in tribal areas. 
 
----- 
Iraq 
----- 
 
¶14. (C) Turning to the situation in Iraq, Saleh asked the 
nationality of infamous terrorist suspect Abu Musab Zarqawi. 
GEN Abizaid replied that Zarqawi was Palestinian, but 
acknowledged the President,s assertion that Zarqawi was 
thought to hold Jordanian nationality.   Saleh,s point 
appeared to be that Middle Eastern terrorists originate in 
many places, not only Yemen.  In response to Saleh,s 
question about the significance of al-Qaida as a threat in 
Iraq, Abizaid listed, in descending order, four main sources 
of the terrorist threat in Iraq: (a) Zarqawi; (b) Ansar 
al-Islam; (c) Al-Qaida; and (d) Baathi loyalists.   He noted 
that U.S. forces in Afghanistan had not encountered forces 
affiliated with al-Qaida in more than five months, although 
Taliban forces had been engaged as recently as the previous 
week.  Saleh commented that many extremists claim to be 
Yemeni who actually are not, and asserted that 95 percent of 
the extremists in Yemen were actually born in Saudi Arabia. 
"We Yemenis are not all terrorists!" he proclaimed. 
 
¶15. (C) Comment.  President Saleh was clearly pleased that 
the timing of GEN Abizaid,s visit coincided with the 
apprehension of Cole suspects Quso, and Badawi and other 
significant CT successes.  Saleh,s appeal for U.S. economic 
assistance and U.S. pressure on oil-rich neighbors to aid 
Yemen was an updated variation on an important theme. 
Economic development (especially in regions predominantly 
tribal and traditional) is no less important than continuing 
FMF and other channels of direct security-related assistance 
if CT gains in Yemen are to be sustained for the long term. 
Post is coordinating with CENTCOM and CJTF/HOA to institute a 
program of Civil Military Operations to provide visible, 
beneficial projects.  More broadly, it is essential for the 
USG to maintain a significant level of ESF, in addition to 
the highly successful USDA food aid programs of recent years, 
in order to maintain a robust, broad based in-country 
development program as a counterpart to ongoing CT engagement. 
 
HULL