This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 SANAA 000626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2014 
TAGS: ASEC PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 9, 2004, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 28688 
     ¶B. SANAA 2534 
     ¶C. SANAA 1945 
     ¶D. SANAA 2440 
     ¶E. SANAA 2434 
     ¶F. SANAA 375 
     ¶G. SANAA 521 
 
Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
----------------- 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
------------------ 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  Demonstrations 
 
¶A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country 
that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American 
demonstrations? 
 
There are not organized, clearly defined communities as such, 
but ad hoc groupings of Yemeni Muslims are predisposed to 
oppose U.S. policy in Palestine/Israel, Iraq and elsewhere, 
and occasionally demonstrate to express their views. 
 
¶B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
There were small demonstrations at mosques in Sanaa (not sure 
about other places) to protest al-Moayad's extradition to the 
U.S. in Fall 2003. 
 
Since September 2003, there have been regular reports, in the 
press and from other sources, of arrests following clashes 
between police and worshippers at the Grand Mosque in Sanaa. 
The disturbances during sermons include protesters shouting 
"death to America death to Israel" and other anti-American 
and anti-Jewish slogans. 
 
On March 21, 2003, a march of 5-7,000 people protesting the 
war in Iraq was stopped by police approximately 1/4 mile from 
the U.S. Embassy; the demonstrators initiated violent 
confrontations that resulted in the death of several police 
and protesters. 
 
In March, 2003, Yemenis held several demonstrations opposing 
war in Iraq, most near the UN headquarters complex in Sanaa, 
Tahrir Square and Old Airport Road, all several miles from 
the Embassy. 
 
In Winter 2002 - 2003, Yemeni women held demonstrations in 
front of the German Embassy protesting the arrest of Sheikh 
al-Moayed in Frankfurt, Germany, on terrorism charges. 
 
¶C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of 
U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
The usual sites for anti-American gatherings are in areas of 
Sanaa away from the Embassy; however, the above-mentioned 
March 21, 2003 event took place nearby. 
 
¶D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? 
 
Depending on the location, up to several hundred people. 
Peaceful demonstrations protesting the war in Iraq have 
ranged from approximately 1,000 to 100,000, by some media 
accounts.  Local press routinely carry inflated estimates 
ranging from half a million to one million-plus. 
 
¶E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered 
by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by 
domestic issues? 
 
U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military/law enforcement 
counter-terrorism endeavors, as well as ROYG cooperation with 
same. 
 
¶F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Generally peaceful.  Demonstrations must be coordinated and 
approved by ROYG in advance; consequently, the vast majority 
are peaceful.  If not approved in advance, ROYG forces will 
disband a demonstration. 
 
¶G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to 
USG property or injuries to USG employees? 
 
No; however, Yemeni police and protester fatalities in March 
2003 were due in large part to the intervention of host 
government security protecting the U.S. Embassy. 
 
¶H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our 
perimeter security line? 
 
No. 
¶I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
Yes, directed at specific policies, including child labor, 
education and bringing mosques under government control. 
Several anti-government demonstrations occurred in Sanaa and 
Aden. 
¶J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of 
U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
No. 
 
¶K. What is the average size of an anti-government 
demonstration? 
 
Fairly small, approximately 50 to 200 individuals, similar to 
anti-U.S. protests. 
 
¶L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Generally peaceful. 
 
¶M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to 
USG property? 
 
No. 
 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  Macro Conflict Conditions 
 
¶A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or 
intrastate conflict? 
 
No, Yemen is not engaged in any ongoing internal or external 
conflict.  Host country is cooperating with U.S. efforts to 
identify and stop/attack terrorist targets within Yemen.  In 
this regard, the ROYG has demonstrated willingness to engage 
in fairly large-scale police/military operations against 
identified terrorist individuals or cells -- e.g. in Abyan in 
July 2003 and February/March 2004. 
 
¶B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is 
limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war? 
 
N/A 
 
¶C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic 
facilities located in this region? 
 
N/A 
 
¶D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate 
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American 
orientation? 
 
N/A 
 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Host Country Capabilities 
 
¶A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained? 
 
U.S. assistance has enabled Yemen to develop a competent 
counter-terrorism strike force (see below), but regular 
police/law enforcement are often corrupt, poorly trained and 
underpaid.  For example, an average officer earns 60 USD per 
month.  A captain with 20 years experience earns only 120 per 
month.  A Brigadier General earns 300 USD per month.  This 
economic condition -- reflecting Yemen's widespread poverty 
(average per capita income is less than USD 400 countrywide) 
-- fosters widespread corruption that possibly could be 
diminished with increased remuneration. 
 
Further, law enforcement agencies face numerous challenges 
regarding planning, coordination and execution of complex 
counter-terrorism operations.  Reliance on manpower is 
emphasized over the use of technology.  Agencies have 
difficulty maintaining operations security and have 
difficulty operating in a nighttime environment. 
 
On the other hand, Yemeni law enforcement agencies have shown 
a willingness to cooperate with U.S. and Western law 
enforcement agencies -- e.g. in the relatively proficient 
forensic investigation of the M/V Limburg attack in October 
¶2002.  The United States has provided equipment and extensive 
training to the Central Security Forces (CSF), a 
para-military unit of the Ministry of Interior. 
 
In mid-September 2003, the ROYG disrupted an 
al-Qaeda-affiliated cell operating in Sanaa targeting Western 
interests.  The cell was headed by Afghanistan-trained Amr 
al-Sharif.  The government provided further information on 
the ROYG's investigation into the cell's activities and 
members, particularly information on several arrests in Yemen 
and Saudi Arabia.  (Note: see answer to Transnational 
Terrorist Indicators question 6B for additional information). 
 
In cooperation with Yemeni officials, the FBI actively 
participated in the investigation of the December 30, 2002 
shootings of three American health care workers in Jibla. 
The perpetrators -- Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel, the shooter, 
and Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah, the planner -- were tried, 
convicted and sentenced to death in separate trials in 2003. 
On December 1, 2003, a three-judge panel affirmed the death 
sentence of al-Kamel, who will appeal the decision to the 
Yemen Supreme Court.  Court officials expect that the 
conviction will be upheld and passed to President Saleh, who 
is likely sign off on the order to carry out the sentence. 
Post representatives attended al-Kamel's trial and appeal 
proceedings, which were relatively transparent and openly 
reported in the local media. 
 
Al-Kamel coordinated the attack with Ali al-Jarallah, who was 
convicted of both the Amcit murders and the assassination of 
Yemeni Socialist Party Deputy Secretary-General Jarallah Omar 
in a separate trial in Sanaa in October 2003.  Al-Jarallah is 
also expected to appeal his conviction and sentence.  No 
specific date has been set for the executions. 
 
¶B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? 
 
Some officers have received DS/ATA training, however, the 
full impact of this training will be manifest only over the 
long term.  The Regional Security Office does maintain 
high-level contacts within the Ministry of Interior who 
received ATA training. 
 
In July - August 2003, 24 host government police 
investigators from across the country participated in a 
two-week DS/ATA Terrorist Crime Scene investigation course 
taught by Evidence Response Team FBI special agents. 
 
The CSF is the counter-terrorism (CT) arm of the Central 
Security Organization (CSO).  The CSF has been equipped by 
the U.S. and trained by U.K./U.S. personnel for the past year 
and will continue into the next fiscal year.  They are ROYG's 
intended primary CT force. 
 
In June 2003, the newly-formed CSF CT unit was dispatched to 
the Hattat mountains in Abyan province ostensibly to hunt 
down and bring to justice those responsible for an attack on 
a Red Crescent medical convoy the week before.  However, this 
was a cameo appearance.  In fact, front-line CSO troops were 
actually engaged.  CSO troops were at the lead of this effort 
when Ministry of Defense forces became bogged down by 
harassing gunfire from the surrounding hills.  Over a three 
day period, CSO troops engaged those responsible and 
completed their mission.  CSO was sent out the following week 
to complete mop-up operations. 
 
Per reftel G, beginning in early March 2004, Yemeni 
counter-terrorism operations were conducted by the CSF and 
Ministry of Defense forces in the Abyan region for 
approximately one week.  Yemeni authorities informed Post of 
the capture of al-Qaeda element Raouf Naseeb on March 3, 
¶2004.  The Minister of Interior and Yemen Special Operations 
Forces commander noted on March 8, 2004, the capture of four 
USS Cole escapees from Aden prison. 
 
¶C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, 
widespread corruption inside their agencies? 
 
Yes, see question 3A. 
 
¶D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of 
deterring terrorist actions? 
 
The intelligence services are moderately professional. 
Despite ongoing engagement and considerable CT successes, 
they have limited capability. 
 
¶E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S. 
Embassy requests or information and support? 
 
Yes, but often grudgingly.  Intelligence services rarely 
volunteer information.  Yet on some occasions the ROYG takes 
the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments -- e.g. 
in the case of ROYG success in September 2003 in disrupting a 
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell. 
 
¶F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in 
recent years, have host country security services been able 
to score any major anti-terrorism successes? 
 
Yes. 
 
¶G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and 
allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective 
security? 
 
Yes. 
 
¶H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major 
airports in the country? 
 
Poor, but the ROYG is receptive to additional U.S.-funded 
equipment and security training.  This view is corroborated 
by an October 2003 visit to Sanaa by a two-person 
Transportation Security Administration assessment team. 
 
¶I. How effective are customs and immigration controls 
agencies? 
 
Ineffective but improving.  Since February 2002, Somali and 
Ethiopian refugees have been entering Yemen at a reported 
rate of approximately 1,500 per month, adding to the 60,000 
refugees previously registered.  They are settling on the 
southern and western coasts, forming criminal and 
prostitution rings along clan lines.  Criminal related 
violence is on the rise.  With USG assistance, the customs 
and immigration services are attempting to standardize and 
modernize equipment and coverage. 
 
¶J. How effective are border patrol forces? 
 
In the recent past ineffective; however, a current surge of 
more than 7,000 troops from MOI/MOD resources and increased 
cooperation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (to include 
collaboration on intelligence and smuggling information) has 
generally improved the effectiveness of border patrol forces. 
 
 
-------------------- 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF)  Anti-American Terrorist Groups 
 
¶A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in 
country? 
 
Yes. 
 
¶B. If yes, how many? 
 
Four are known: Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Yemen Islamic 
Jihad; al-Qaeda Sympathizers; Yemen Hizballah. 
 
¶C. Have these groups carried out anti-American attacks within 
the last 12 months? 
 
No. 
 
¶D. Were any of these lethal attacks? 
 
N/A. 
 
¶E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
N/A. 
 
¶F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, 
or related targets? 
 
N/A. 
 
¶G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific 
regions or do they operate country-wide? 
 
N/A. 
 
¶H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any 
U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions? 
 
N/A. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups 
 
¶A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not 
anti-American) in country? 
Yes. 
 
¶B. If yes, how many? 
Two: National Liberation Front (MAWJ) and the Right to 
Self-Determination Movement (HATM). 
 
¶C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital or in 
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? 
 
No known incidents of this type. 
 
¶D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? 
 
None known. 
 
¶E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these 
attacks? 
 
No. 
 
 
----------------------- 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF)  Transnational Terrorist Indicators 
 
¶A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a 
presence in country? 
 
Yes.  Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), al-Gama'a 
al-Islamiyya (AKA: The Islamic Group), Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG), Algerian Islamic Group GIA), Salafi 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Hizballah.  The Iraqi Intelligence 
Service maintained a presence in Yemen prior to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. 
 
In late February 2004, information indicated that the 
militant wing of PLO faction al-Fatah was at a 
meeting/seminar hosted by Kan'an, a charity that supports 
Palestinian causes. 
 
¶B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an 
operational cell?  Financial cell?  Support cell?  Propaganda 
cell? 
 
Al-Qaeda: all of the above.  Other groups may have links or 
cooperate with al-Qaeda. 
 
Per reftels D and E, on 09/28/2003, the ROYG Minister of 
Interior held a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador and various 
other Western ambassadors to discuss ROYG's disruption of a 
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell targeting U.S, other Western and 
Yemeni objectives.  Highlighted was the targeting of the U.S. 
Ambassador's motorcade and the British Embassy in Sanaa. 
 
Per reftel F, on 02/14/2004, ROYG Minister of Interior held a 
meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to advise that ROYG 
officials were investigating a possible plot to attack the 
Ambassador. 
 
¶C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? 
 
The Yemeni government is an active partner of the USG in the 
war against al-Qaeda and affiliated groups.  ROYG officially 
supports Palestinian groups, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad 
and Hizballah, but support is mainly rhetorical and does not 
extend to operational activities. 
 
¶D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
the country that have a relationship with any of these groups? 
 
Per reftel C: 
 
Organization, Nationality. 
-- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia 
-- Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication, 
Saudi Arabia 
-- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia 
-- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia 
-- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia 
-- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia 
-- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia 
-- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia 
-- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain), Saudi Arabia 
-- Islamic Union (Quebec), Saudi Arabia 
-- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE 
-- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE 
-- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic 
Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
-- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE 
-- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House), UAE 
-- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE 
-- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari 
-- Islamic Relief, UK 
-- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE 
-- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE 
-- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait 
 
¶E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country 
that are sympathetic to these groups? 
 
Public sympathy for pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli groups is 
widespread. 
 
¶F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of 
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, 
Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential 
anti-American terrorist acts? 
 
Foreign hostile intelligence services, e.g. Syria, are 
primarily focused on information gathering for their own 
countries' interests, not to assist anti-American groups in 
country with terrorist activity. 
 
¶G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and 
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile 
terrorist elements? 
 
Yemen likely has among the highest number of weapons per 
capita in the world, with easy access to varieties of 
explosives.  Weapons and explosives are easily attainable. 
Gun markets are large and well stocked. 
 
Though Yemen is awash in numerous types of weapons, the 
Yemeni cabinet approved a series of amendments to a 1992 gun 
control law intended to bolster regulation of weapons 
possession and trafficking.  These amendments must gain 
approval by the Yemeni Parliament before becoming law. 
Parliamentary opposition to the amendments remains 
significant; more than 150 MPs have reportedly signed a 
petition to quash the gun control law that is still under 
discussion.  Accordingly, Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh 
Abdullah al-Ahmar has publicly described possession of 
weapons as a Yemeni symbol of manhood. 
 
In a separate effort, the ROYG has initiated a weapons 
buy-back program, at a reported cost of 38 million USD, 
intended to acquire Man Portable Air Defense Systems 
(MANPADS), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and a variety of 
other heavy weapons from civilian weapons markets.  Citing 
the acquisition of over 1,400 MANPADS from January to June 
2003, ROYG says the program is a success.  There are 
problems, however, such as: 1) cataloguing weapons; 2) ROYG 
paying over market value; and 3) the sustainability of the 
weapons buy-back program. 
HULL