This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001278 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT EUN ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: EUROPEANS MAY BE FROM VENUS, BUT PRODI IS FROM 
NEPTUNE 
 
 
Classified By: POL M/C TOM COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (b, d) 
 
1 (C) Summary:  EU Commission President Romano Prod 
demonstrated again March 27 why he rivals PM Berusconi in 
polarizing Italian politics, this timewith an open letter 
outlining the center-left oposition's Iraq policy.  The 
piece was vintage Prdi: convoluted and dense, it managed to 
favor boh withdrawing Italy's 2700-man contingent from Iraq 
and continuing the deployment.  In a nod to the panish 
Socialists, Prodi was clearly trying to ue lingering 
opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedo to bolster support for 
Italy's ever-fractious cnter-left opposition in the run-up 
to June Euro-Parliament elections.  Whether Prodi's position 
relects his own tortured reasoning or an attempt to embrace 
the divergent positions on use of force, the result was clear 
as mud.  Apart from his own conflict of interest in 
campaigning from Brussels, Prodi's latest gambit did make one 
thing clear to us: that the Berlusconi government remains a 
steadier partner than any possible successor government from 
the center-left. End Summary 
 
Prodi's Bottom Lines: Bring Troops Home... 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Although he has still has a day job in Brussels, 
Romano Prodi seems to be running full-time for Italian Prime 
Minister (an election unlikely to occur before the end of 
2005 at the earliest).  Judging from the reactions to Prodi's 
open letter, one would think the leader of Italy's 
center-left commanded something beyond the loyalty of 
hard-core supporters (like, say, military units).  But in a 
country where domestic political discourse often has more in 
common with opera, Prodi's "manifesto" was the equivalent of 
an aria -- loud, lengthy and kind of hard to understand. 
 
¶3. (U) Prodi declared that a center-left government would: 
 
-- draw inspiration from Italy's constitution on questions of 
international security; 
 
-- never accept use of force if it served solely to resolve 
an international dispute or bring about regime change; 
 
-- require UN authorization for virtually any military 
intervention. 
 
Operation OIF was and remained illegitimate, Prodi argued, 
because it failed to obtain approval of the UN or any other 
international entity. A center-left government would not have 
participated in nor given its approval to OIF.  By extension, 
the current "occupation" was a continuation of an unjustified 
and illegitimate war that was clearly incapable of restoring 
peace and security to Iraq. An Olive Tree Coalition would 
choose to bring Italian intervention to an end. 
 
...unless, of course, they should stay 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Having declared an unequivocal bottom line, Prodi then 
changed keys.  "These are not the terms in which the problem 
must be addressed."  Because the Iraqi people were being 
exposed to disorder and constant terrorist threat, the 
international community's intervention was fully justified on 
humanitarian grounds.  Moreover, a military element was 
necessary to help ensure its success.  Such an intervention 
needed to be legitimized by a new UNSC resolution.  Since a 
precipitate withdrawal would make the situation worse, Europe 
had to seize the opportunity to work more closely with the 
U.S. and establish an increasingly closer relationship in 
support of the UN. In this context, an immediate withdrawal 
of Italian troops would not make much sense. 
 
¶5. (U) Prodi urged an immediate return to the "worldwide 
coalition against terrorism" that was forged after September 
¶11.  Terrorism was "the single most important threat to the 
free world since the Second World War." (Comment: We presume 
he skipped over Soviet imperialism to avoid offending the 
Olive Tree's red roots.) There was no alternative to credible 
military deterrence if one wants to preserve, guarantee, or 
impose the peace. 
 
¶6. (U) Circling around to Europe, Prodi argued that European 
citizens wanted their leaders to craft a "tool" to extricate 
them from current insecurity.  If a European constitution was 
already in place, "we would already have been able to put in 
place a common army," but in its absence common defense and 
police cooperation activities were underway.  A link-up among 
intelligence services is still to come. 
 
¶7. (U) Reactions were strong and largely predictable.  The 
 
 
leaders of the center-left parties comprising the Olive Tree 
were supportive, though most appeared caught off-guard by 
Prodi's timing.  Leaders within the Berlusconi government 
rejected Prodi's arguments; Deputy Prime Minister Fini 
lambasted Prodi for "playing double-games" and FM Frattini 
criticized his 'illegitimate' foray into Italian domestic 
politics.  Perhaps the most telling critique came from 
European Affairs Minister Buttiglione: "I couldn't figure out 
Prodi's exact position on the issue." 
 
Comment: Prodi's Conflicts of Interest 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Prodi's manifesto was his attempt to rally the 
faithful, and perhaps attract some swing support, by thumping 
on the "illegitimacy" of OIF and the current transition in 
Iraq.  It's hard to tell if its opacity was a reflection of 
Prodi's own logic, the difficulty of trying to reconcile 
wildly divergent views among the center-left parties on 
legiQmate useQf force, or both.  (We agree with many 
Italian commentators who believe that Prodi's nickname in the 
headlines - "The Professor" - reflects a deliberate campaign 
style of appearing eloquent and brilliant without actually 
saying anything).  At this point, it's too early to tell if 
Prodi's manifesto will yield practical results in the June 
Euro-Parliament elections -- results the center-left would 
try to build on in the next national contest.  But it 
demonstrates how difficult it would be for a center-left 
Italian government to grapple with the rapid, flexible 
responses and imaginative thinking required in the global war 
on terrorism.  The mental gymnastics Prodi engages in -- 
trying to capture in theory the anti-war sentiments of his 
coalition while simultaneously advocating a more realistic 
set of criteria in practice -- are reminiscent of the last 
center-left government's agonizing over NATO's use of force 
in Kosovo.  A center-left government wouldn't be disastrous 
-- it would be a reliable partner on a wide range of issues 
-- but it would complicate any operations or initiatives 
involving use of force. 
 
¶9. (C) Not lost to some Italian journalists was the hypocrisy 
inherent in one of the strongest critics of Berlusconi's 
conflicts of interest openly trying to influence a 
member-state's internal politics while serving as Commission 
President.  And, to be fair to the center-left as a whole, 
the leaders of the two largest parties (Democratic Left and 
Daisy) have described to the Ambassador a much more 
sophisticated position, a preference for keeping Italian 
troops in Iraq with an expanded mandate for the UN on the 
political side. Still, if Prodi's recent statements were to 
determine the actual policy of a center-left government, we'd 
better hope that the Berlusconi government succeeds in 
becoming the first postwar Italian government to serve out 
its entire term in office -- and is then reelected. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2004ROME01278 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL