This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL AF IT AFGHANISTAN IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: GETTING TO YES ON AN ITALIAN-LED AFGHAN FSB 
 
REF: A. ROME 960 
 
     ¶B. ROME 927 
     ¶C. ROME 860 
     ¶D. ROME 798 
     ¶E. ROME 668 
     ¶F. MULTIPLE E-MAILS 
 
Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (C)  The Government of Italy, at very high levels, has 
indicated a willingness to contribute more to Afghanistan and 
to support ISAF expansion beyond Kabul.  The Italians concur 
that rapid action to stabilize Afghanistan is of the highest 
political priority; they also share our conviction that 
succeeding in Afghanistan is key to the war on terrorism, 
regional security, the battle against narcotics, and support 
for democracy and human rights.  They have been consistently 
willing to contribute a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), 
since our first request they lead one in Ghazni in November 
¶2003.  They are considering the request to stand up a Forward 
Support Base (FSB), but have concerns.  If we can help them 
address those concerns, working in coordination with SHAPE 
and the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC), and be 
specific (and sure) about what we want and where, it 
increases the likelihood that they can make the significant 
contribution we -- and they -- want.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------- 
HISTORY 
------- 
¶2.  (C)  In November 2003, the U.S. asked Italy to lead a PRT 
in Ghazni.  In February, the day before Defense Minister 
Martino was to announce Italy's leadership of the Ghazni PRT, 
we abruptly asked Italy to steer clear because we determined 
Ghazni was not ready for transfer to ISAF command.  The 
Italians then coordinated with SHAPE -- as we asked -- to 
find a new PRT site.  As a result of those consultations, 
they focused on Herat.  This week, we told them the Herat PRT 
should remain under OEF command -- fortunately with a bit of 
notice.  At a March 25 meeting originally called to make a 
firm decision on the Herat PRT, Prime Minister Berlusconi, 
Defense Minister Martino, and Foreign Minister Frattini 
instead determined that Italy would not/not pursue the Herat 
PRT due to USG concerns. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT:  IMPEDIMENTS TO AN FSB 
------------------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C)  Italy understands the political and historical 
imperative of success in Afghanistan.  The GOI has been with 
us in Afghanistan from the outset of OEF, and is determined 
to continue.  The GOI at a very high level wants to make a 
still more significant contribution; the MFA Special Envoy 
for Afghanistan told us Secretary General Vattani had 
instructed the MFA to be as forward-leaning on the NATO 
(SHAPE) request as possible.  Under Secretary for Asia 
Boniver has repeatedly assured us of her Government's 
political will to do as much as possible in Afghanistan, and 
specifically to lead a PRT.  The political side of the MFA 
has been cautiously forward-leaning on the FSB, as well -- 
but they do not control military assets nor maintain the 
mil-mil relationship with SHAPE.  In the end, the Defense 
Ministry must decide if Italy has the resources to lead an 
FSB.  DefMin Martino is solid politically; he is a stalwart 
pro-NATO and pro-U.S. member of the Berlusconi Government. 
But he is also an astute politician, and understands that 
putting Italian soldiers at risk has to be done in a way that 
portrays the Government in the best possible light to the 
electorate. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The GOI, however, faces political and resource 
constraints.  In Afghanistan, the political constraints are 
fewer then in Iraq.  The Italian public largely supported the 
war against terrorism and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 
continues to do so.  The majority in the center-left has not 
questioned renewal of funding for the continued Italian 
support to Afghanistan. (In fact, during the recent debate 
over funding for Italy's military missions abroad, the 
center-left sought to vote on funding for the Iraq mission 
separately, so that they would be free to support the 
remaining missions, including in Afghanistan.)  However, the 
approach the Government uses toward Parliament and the public 
emphasizes the civilian aspects of the Afghanistan mission -- 
nation building, democracy building, institution building, 
 
reconstruction.  A civ-mil PRT fits perfectly within this 
scenario.  A purely military FSB is more of a stretch.  We 
may need to emphasize the role the FSB plays in support of 
PRTs. 
 
¶5.  (C)  A more difficult hurdle for the GOI is resources, 
human, material and financial.  A PRT would be financed 
jointly from MFA and MOD coffers.  An FSB, according to 
Martino's diplomatic adviser, would likely be funded 
exclusively by the financially-strapped MOD.  The Italians 
are also concerned about the manpower needed for an FSB.  The 
military is near the limit on the number of forces it can 
deploy abroad.  Finally, the GOI has questions about what 
specific assets are needed for an FSB, and how flexible the 
requirements on the lead nation are.  They have repeatedly 
worried about their ability to provide enough helicopters and 
aircraft, for example.  These concerns need to be addressed 
with the Italians.  The March 24 meeting between Italian 
Embassy DCM Stefano Stefanini and DASD Collins may have begun 
to allay some of the Italian concerns, as we understand 
Collins reassured Stefanini that the U.S. did not expect a 
lead nation to be singly responsible for an FSB.  Rather, 
that nation would identify what it could provide and work 
with SHAPE to identify others to bring additional capability. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Perhaps paradoxically, given the greater resource 
requirement, we think it might be easier for Italy to stand 
up both a PRT and an FSB, rather than an FSB alone.  As 
noted, civilian-focused reconstruction and democracy building 
are far more palatable to the Italian public than straight 
military operations.  They are, in general, an easier 
political sell.  A PRT would, we think, bring with it more 
MFA involvement (and therefore MFA money).  We do not suggest 
that it is guaranteed the Italians would agree to do both, 
but suggest we remain open to any Italian linkage.  We do 
question whether Italy would be willing to lead a PRT and an 
FSB in separate locations.  For reasons both of economies of 
scale and security, we presume they would prefer to co-locate 
any such efforts. 
 
-------------- 
GETTING TO YES 
-------------- 
¶7.  (C)  The Italians want to do more in Afghanistan.  They 
had planned to announce an Italian-led PRT in Herat at the 
March 31-April 1 Berlin Conference; it was to be the keystone 
of Italy's package of deliverables.  We think they are 
disappointed that they will bring to the table "only" a 
continuation of their approximately 45 million Euro annual 
financial contribution and ongoing leadership of judicial 
reform efforts.  If an FSB is what Italy could best 
contribute, we think it's doable.  It means, though, that the 
USG, in coordination with SHAPE and the ESC, must be specific 
on what we want, what flexibility an FSB lead nation would 
have, what support the U.S. and/or NATO can give -- and 
where, precisely, we want the Italians to set up shop.  On 
this last point, in particular, we must give advice that is 
specific and timely.  Delaying action or failing to 
communicate will only set the stage for failure to get the 
Italian contributions we want.  As it now stands, the 
Italians understand that an eventual FSB would be based in 
Herat.  We have seen suggestions that SHAPE might prefer a 
different location.  We need to be clear with the Italians on 
location, the sooner the better. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Kabul Minimize Considered. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
NNNN 
 2004ROME01229 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL