This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S TWELFTH VISIT TO RANGOON 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B/D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On March 5, COM met with Leon de Reidmatten 
(UN Special Envoy (SE) Tan Sri Razali's man in Rangoon) and 
got a comprehensive readout of Special Envoy Razali's twelfth 
visit to Rangoon.  The fact that Razali came and twice met 
with Aung San Suu Kyi is good - as is the news that she is 
even more open to dialogue with the regime.  ASSK wants to be 
released immediately - if he SPDC continues in the farce that 
she is not under house arrest or that she is "at home" 
voluntarily, then it will once again prove its callous 
insincerity.  As to the PM's protests of wanting to do his 
best to move the road map process along but being hog-tied by 
Senior General Than Shwe, we should remain skeptical.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On March 5, COM met with Leon de Reidmatten (UN 
Special Envoy (SE) Tan Sri Razali's man in Rangoon) and got a 
readout of Special Envoy Razali twelfth visit to Rangoon. De 
Reidmatten was present at Razali's two meetings with Aung San 
Suu Kyi (ASSK) and accompanied the SE to the meeting with 
Prime Minister (PM) Khin Nyunt (but was not privy to the 
actual meeting).  He also took part in the SE's meeting with 
U Tin Oo (the senior NLD leader only recently released from 
prison into house arrest), and accompanied the SE to a 
meeting with Labor Minister U Tin Winn. 
 
¶3. (C) De Reidmatten confirmed that Razali had complied with 
the SPDC's instructions forbidding any formal meetings with 
diplomatic representatives (read EU and the U.S.).  He also 
said that Razali had requested a second meeting with the PM 
but it never came about.  The SE also requested a meeting 
with General Maung Aye (the Army Commander in Chief), but the 
PM said there was no need for this as "Maung Aye is with me." 
 The SE's request for a meeting with SPDC Chairman Senior 
General (SG) Than Shwe was met with the excuse that the SG 
was traveling, "probably on purpose", according to de 
Reidmatten. 
 
¶4. (C) De Reidmatten emphasized the following points: 
 
-  Razali said that the PM wanted a new role for Razali that 
would move the process forward - he wanted the SE to be more 
than a "facilitator." 
 
- the PM made "very clear" to the SE that all parties would 
be invited to participate in the National Convention. 
 
-  Razali believes that the PM has "internal problems" in 
that Than Shwe is an obstacle to moving the process forward. 
 
- the PM has little room to maneuver and is "at the mercy" of 
Than Shwe. 
 
-  the PM said the SE's proposal for a tripartite group 
(government, NLD, ethnic groups) to initiate a dialogue on 
the transition process was "premature" and progress could 
only be made "step by step." 
 
-  the PM was anxious to tout progress in the regime's 
dialogue with ASSK, showing photos of three meetings between 
her and the Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence, General 
Kyaw Win. 
 
-  The PM made a point that the regime "does not want 
interference in its dealings with the NLD." 
 
¶5. (C) De Reidmatten said that Razali's strategy is to 
"strengthen Khin Nyunt" by getting other countries that have 
influence with the regime (read Than Shwe) to push for more 
support for the PM (de Reidmatten suggested that it would be 
very useful if the U.S. could approach the Chinese to use 
their influence in this capacity).  De Reidmatten provided 
COM with a draft of the planned March 5 press release by 
UNSYG Annan which states "The Special Envoy believes that the 
PM should be given a full mandate to follow through on the 
transition to democracy." 
 
¶6. (C) De Reidmatten's readout of the SE's two meetings with 
ASSK had some highs and lows.  ASSK appears to be in fine 
health and spirits, "better than ever."  However, she is 
frustrated by the fact that although the regime told her in 
November that she would meet with the PM in December, Than 
Shwe has blocked the encounter. 
 
¶7. (C) ASSK also wants out - now! She asked Razali to push 
hard for her release, and for the release of the three other 
members of the NLD Central Executive Committee that remain 
under house arrest.  She said that the SPDC road map is a 
possible way to achieve change, but unless she is free to 
work with the NLD leadership there can be no negotiations. 
De Reidmatten quotes her as saying "after all it (read the 
NLD) is a democracy even if I am the boss" and that those who 
claim that remaining under house arrest is part of her 
political strategy are absolutely wrong.  Razali plans to 
make this clear in the UNSYG statement to be released March 
¶5. 
 
¶8. (C) ASSK told Razali that she was very supportive of the 
sanctions and that she had told the SPDC that she was.  De 
Reidmatten said ASSK was angry about the regime's accusations 
that she was too much under the influence of the U.S. and the 
U.K., and said that such accusations "were an insult."  ASSK 
also said she was aware of the efforts of the Unites States 
and the U.K. on behalf of her, and her party, and was deeply 
appreciative. 
 
¶9. (C) ASSK said she recognizes the efforts of the PM and 
feels that he is trying to move the process along.  She said 
she that she is willing to work with the PM.  But, according 
to de Reidmatten (who knows her very well) the possibility of 
ASSK and Than Shwe ever having a dialogue is becoming more 
remote.  ASSK will talk to Than Shwe if she has to, but there 
is so much bad history between them that it will probably not 
result in anything positive. 
 
¶10. (C) Moving to the SE's other meetings, de Reidmatten 
characterized the meeting with U Tin Oo as being more for the 
purpose of verifying the elderly NLD leader's state of health 
(good).  U Tin Oo was surprised to see the SE - he had been 
brought to a government guest house by his MI warders and was 
expecting to see ASSK.  U Tin Oo was reluctant to speak on 
anything other than the events of May 30 (confirming what we 
all know - it was brutal and government sponsored).  As to 
the meeting with Labor Minister U Tin Winn, de Reidmatten 
said it was useless and not worth recounting.  Razali had 
tried to engage the Labor Minister on various subjects, to no 
avail. 
 
¶11. (C) Despite the fact that Razali's UN handlers said there 
would be no meetings or briefings for diplomats, Razali did 
have some meetings with individual diplomats, including a 
private meeting with the Japanese ambassador and a three-way 
meeting with the French Ambassador and the German Charge. 
There was also a spur of the moment lunch with the Malaysian, 
Australian and Italian ambassadors. 
 
¶12. (C) Comment:  The fact that Razali came and met with ASSK 
twice is good - as is the news that she is even more open to 
dialogue with the regime.  If the SPDC continues in the farce 
that she is not under house arrest or that she is "at home" 
voluntarily, then it will once again prove their callous 
insincerity.  As to the PM's protests of wanting to do his 
best but being hog-tied by the Senior General, we should 
remain skeptical - especially after his alleged comment that 
"Maung Aye is with me."  End Comment. 
Martinez