This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  PARAMARIBO 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR -- MSEIBEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON NS
SUBJECT: SURINAME POLITICAL PARTY SNAPSHOT: PALU: THE 
"TAINTED" PARTY 
 
REF: 01 PARAMARIBO 866 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  Established in 1977, the Progressive Workers and Farmers 
Union (PALU) is yet another marginal party trying to escape 
extinction in Suriname's crowded political scene.  Under the 
leadership of party leader Iwan Krolis, the mostly Creole 
party of 1,000 members uses its single National Assembly 
seat to advocate the development of the country's 
agricultural and logging sectors.  The party's greatest 
obstacle to political power is concern about the party since 
it was the sole political party willing to form a civilian 
government with the military regime immediately after the 
latter murdered 15 prominent opposition leaders in December 
¶1982.   Many Surinamers believe that PALU supported the 
murders and/or took advantage of the tragedy to gain 
political power.  In its defense, PALU claims that the party 
felt compelled to re-introduce democracy to Suriname, a 
responsibility no other party wanted to take on after the 
murders.  Even if voters looked past the party's ties to the 
military regime, the party faces an uphill battle as its one 
electoral district, Suriname's smallest, is expected to 
become a fierce battleground in the upcoming 2005 elections. 
End Summary. 
 
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PARTY OVERVIEW 
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¶2.  With its single National Assembly seat (out of the 
country's 51 seats), the Progressive Workers and Farmers 
Union (PALU), comprised of neo-socialist intellectuals, is 
yet another marginalized party in Suriname that is 
struggling to stay alive.  Led since its 1977 founding by 
party chairman Iwan Krolis, the predominantly Creole 
opposition party of 1,000 members maintains a low-profile 
while promoting a limited platform: development of the 
country's agricultural and, to a lesser extent, logging 
sectors. 
 
¶3.  During a recent conversation with the Embassy, Krolis 
elaborated on the party's aims, voicing support for 
additional government incentives to stimulate the 
agricultural sector (i.e., by providing cheap loans and 
subsidies for inputs like fertilizer and equipment.)  In 
addition, Krolis, who is also head of the Foundation for 
Forest Management (SBB), advocated sustainable forestry 
through granting full authority to the SBB to permit the 
country to more effectively exploit its rich timber 
resources. 
 
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PALU TAINTED BY TIES TO BOUTERSE"S REGIME 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Krolis cited PALU's involvement in the early 1980s with 
the military regime as the greatest obstacle to broader 
political support.  In the party's early years, PALU 
remained a small, marginalized party.  With the military's 
rise to power, Embassy sources say, the PALU saw an 
opportunity to gain entry to the government by supporting 
the military regime.  By 1982, Surinamers began to clamor 
for the military to fulfill its 1980 pledge to return the 
country to civilian rule.  In support of the military 
regime, PALU members tried to dampen those demands by 
warning the more vocal government critics that there might 
be dire consequences of openly opposing the regime. 
 
¶5.  After the December 1982 military regime's murder of 15 
government opponents, PALU joined the military regime (in 
February 1983) in a coalition government leading many to 
conclude that PALU was at least morally complicit in the 
murders.  PALU party leaders Iwan Krolis and Errol Alibux 
are included in the official list of December 1982 murder 
suspects; the investigation into the murders is still 
ongoing. 
 
¶6.   Alibux served as prime minister in the coalition 
government from February 1983 to January 1984.  (Note: 
Alibux later joined military strongman Desi Boauterse's NDP 
political party in 1997, serving as Minister of Natural 
Resources and Finance under the Wijdenbosch Administration. 
Alibux was convicted of corruption in November 2003.  End 
Note.)  The military-PALU coalition government was short 
lived.  PALU was ousted in January 1984 in the wake of labor 
strikes protesting a tax hike to raise revenue after the 
Netherlands ceased making payments to Suriname as stipulated 
in the 1975 treaty granting Suriname its independence and 
 
 
3.5 billion Dutch guilders (1.75 billion USD) in development 
assistance. 
 
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KROLIS RESPONDS TO HIS CRITICS 
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¶7.  In his conversation with the Embassy, Krolis vigorously 
denied critics' charges that PALU had encouraged the 
military regime to violently quell the rising opposition. 
Krolis insisted that the party had only warned the public 
about possible drastic actions by the military prior to the 
tragedy.  In PALU's defense, Krolis insisted that the party 
did not sanction the murders nor did it take advantage of 
the tragedy to gain political power.  He maintained that the 
party only formed a civilian government with the military 
regime to help re-introduce democracy to Suriname since 
there were no other parties willing to step up to the plate 
to fulfill this important function in the wake of the 
murders. 
 
¶8.  Krolis claimed that while in office, PALU worked 
diligently to convince the military to work with civilians 
to unite the country.  These efforts, he said, culminated in 
PALU's organization of the February 25, 1983, reconciliation 
day, "Brasa Dee," to bring supporters and opponents of the 
military together.  Critics, however, dismissed the one-time 
event as a largely symbolic gesture that did little to calm 
the fears civilians harbored toward the military.  Referring 
to the party's 1984 ouster, Krolis portrayed the party as a 
victim of the military regime.  Despite its removal from 
power, PALU continued to strive for the country's political 
and economic development.  Its work on preliminary 
discussions between the military regime and rebels who waged 
the 1987-1992 Interior War, Krolis claimed, contributed to 
the 1992 Accord for National Reconciliation and Development. 
(Note: Embassy sources dispute Krolis' version of the PALU's 
involvement in negotiating the 1992 Accord, maintaining that 
PALU made no contribution to the agreement.  End Note.) 
 
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LOOKING AHEAD TO THE 2005 ELECTIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  With its questionable ties to the Bouterse regime, as 
well as its limited mandate, its small size, and its lack of 
financial resources, PALU faces an uphill battle in the 
upcoming 2005 elections.  In the 2000 elections, PALU 
captured one of two seats in Coronie, Suriname's smallest 
electoral district, a rural district populated mostly by 
Creoles and Javanese.  In 2000, the PALU realized that with 
only 300 votes needed to win one of Cornonie's two seats, 
the major political parties had ignored this potentially 
influential district.  PALU focused its meager campaign 
funds on this small rural district, promoting its 
agricultural platform, easily winning its single National 
Assembly seat.  In the upcoming 2005 elections, however, 
other political parties have realized the error of their 
ways and have already begun actively courting Coronie's 
voters.  PALU will likely have to double its efforts if it 
is to retain its only National Assembly seat. 
 
¶10.  Regarding the party's strategy for the 2005 elections, 
PALU National Assembly member Anton Paal told the Embassy 
that the party will adhere to the game plan it followed in 
the 2000 elections -- it will field candidates in the three 
districts where the party's power base is located 
(Paramaribo, Wanica, and Coronie).  He said that the party 
would like to field candidates in more, if not all, of the 
country's ten districts but is unable to do so due to 
financial constraints.  At this time, there are no plans for 
PALU to enter into a coalition with other political parties, 
but Paal hinted that the party would consider teaming up 
with a partner, including Bouterse's National Democratic 
Party (NDP), if asked. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11.  PALU remains a party haunted by its past.  Although the 
December 1982 murders took place over two decades ago, many 
Surinamers direct some of their anger over the murders at 
PALU, while, ironically, former military strongman Desi 
Bouterse and his supporters enjoy significant support -- so 
much so that they are the largest opposition group in 
Suriname.  For now, PALU's main hurdle is surviving the 2005 
elections; it faces an uphill battle as it tries to hold on 
to its one National Assembly seat in Coronie, which is 
expected to become a major electoral battleground in the 
2005 elections.  Failure to win a seat increases the 
 
 
likelihood that much-maligned PALU will wither away.  End 
Comment. 
 
FAUCHER 
 
 
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