This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL IZ BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI VIEWS ON IRAQ: WONDERING ABOUT IRAQI 
SHIA, AND SUNNI BUY-IN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann. Reasons 1.4(B)(D). 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary:  Bahrain's King Hamad remains concerned 
about the extent of Shia and Iranian influence in Iraq but is 
strongly supportive of our efforts there.  His son the Crown 
Prince urged us to take care with the de-Baathification 
process to avoid alienating Iraqi Sunnis.  The King and Crown 
Prince both recognized that reestablishing the Iraqi state is 
a long-term process.  The Crown Prince commented that he 
could imagine Iraq's permanent government set up in 2006 
might look like the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s: 
pro-Western, no threat to its neighbors but plagued with 
problems of corruption and bad governance.  This outcome, 
while not ideal, would be a big plus over the Iraq of Saddam 
Hussein.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S)  Bahrain's King Hamad bin Issa told CENTCOM Commander 
General Abizaid on March 24 that he fears Iraqi instability 
after the turnover of sovereignty to an Iraqi government on 
June 30.  Hamad discounted the political courage of the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC) and expected the IGC would not make 
tough political decisions about Iraq's future over the coming 
months.  Hamad sharply criticized Ayatollah Sistani for 
engaging too much in politics in such a way that would 
aggravate sectarian divisions in Iraq.  He urged the U.S. to 
be careful of Iran's trying to use Iraqi Shia to aggravate 
the situation in Iraq.  General Abizaid assured the King of 
American commitment to reestablishing stability in Iraq.  He 
also highlighted the Coalition's effort to build up capable 
Iraqi security forces.  Achieving durable stability in Iraq 
would be a long process, he concluded, and Iraq would need 
the help of the United States as well as its neighbors. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Ambassador explained to the King, Crown Prince and 
Foreign Minister on March 28-29 the key events and issues 
over the next year as it now looks.  The U.S. is committed to 
the June 30 transfer of sovereignty.  The Coalition 
understands that the IGC must be more credible and is looking 
at ways to establish a credible Iraqi authority which will 
receive power on June 30.  The U.N. might be able to offer 
useful ideas and will definitely be part of the process.  At 
the end of 2004 or early 2005, there will be national 
elections to elect a temporary parliament.  In order to 
prepare for those elections, the UN, CPA and the IGC are 
working on a new electoral law and how to establish an 
election commission to oversee the polls.  The temporary 
parliament will then operate under the framework established 
by the temporary administrative law - a "temporary 
constitution" designed to compel competing Iraqi groups to 
work together.   The temporary parliament will have a 
three-man presidency and will also name the rest of the 
government.  It also will prepare the draft permanent 
constitution.  Once drafted, that constitution will go to a 
public referendum and if approved new elections to establish 
the new, permanent government will be held.  All three 
Bahraini officials underlined their support for the process 
as laid out. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Bahrain's Crown Prince, Shaikh Salman bin Hamad, 
told Ambassador that the Bahraini government has two main 
concerns about Iraq over the next six months.  First, he 
urged that the de-Baathification process in Iraq be 
undertaken in such a way as to not alienate the majority of 
Iraq's Sunnis.  Salman commented that with Ahmed Chelabi  in 
charge the odds of alienating most Iraqi Sunnis seem to be 
higher.  Bahrain and other Gulf states want to see Iraq's 
Sunnis brought into the process.  The Ambassador noted 
greater contacts in recent months between the Coalition 
Provisional Authority and Sunni leaders, and he pointed to 
Sunni political groupings and associations starting to form 
in order to take a more active role in the future Iraqi 
government.  Second, Salman urged that the United States 
stand up a capable Iraqi defense force to assume a great 
burden on the war against terror in Iraq.  Ambassador Neumann 
pointed to progress to date and assured Salman that 
establishing adequate Iraqi security forces is a high 
priority for the United States and the Coalition. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Salman observed that rebuilding the Iraqi state 
almost from zero is an enormous challenge.  He mused that 
over the longer term if the United States is successful in 
Iraq, he could imagine that Iraq might resemble the 
Philippines of the 1980s and 1990s. Salman said in this case 
Iraq would be pro-western, and would represent no threat to 
its neighbors. It would have a better record on human rights 
as well.  It also, however, would be plagued with problems of 
poor government and corruption.  Salman concluded that 
despite these shortcoming, such an Iraq would be a vast 
improvement in the strategic picture from what Iraq had 
represented under Saddam and that it could further develop 
over time. 
NEUMANN