This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000368 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL KTIA BA JUSLBA KICC
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN AND ARTICLE 98:  SLOW MOTION 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 322 
 
     ¶B. MANAMA 336 
     ¶C. MANAMA 283 
 
Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford, reason 1.5 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  The Bahraini Government is still pondering what to 
do about bringing our signed Article 98 agreement into 
effect.  Charge on March 16 again asked the MFA Minister of 
State whether the Government would agree to a confidential 
exchange of notes.  The Minister, clearly annoyed that Charge 
was again raising the subject, said some legal experts inside 
the Government believe the Article 98 agreement must go to 
the Parliament to be ratified.  Others in Government 
disagree, and the argument is ongoing.  Charge pointed out 
that the American law originally envisioned that the U.S. 
Government would suspend some kinds of military assistance to 
those countries which failed to finalize Article 98 
agreements; we could not exclude that this might happen to 
Bahrain as time goes by.  We had warned the GoB about this 
when we began the process two years ago, Charge recalled.  He 
urged the GoB to decide upon a course of action and move 
ahead. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Minister said he had received a report from the 
meeting in Washington between NEA PDAS Larocco and the 
Bahraini Ambassador.  The GoB has the message, he stated 
flatly.  He then asked Washington to understand the GoB's 
situation.  Anti-American sentiment in the Parliament now is 
very strong and the elected lower house will not approve the 
Article 98.  At the same time, the MFA does not want to go 
around the Parliament if the law requires that the agreement 
go to the deputies for ratification; the experience from the 
parliamentary investigations of financial sector misdeeds 
shows the harm which can come to a Ministry responsible for 
legally dubious policies.  The Government is trying to find a 
middle ground solution that enables it to bring the agreement 
into force and yet scrupulously follows the law and 
parliamentary preogatives.  In the meantime, the Minister 
stressed, the GoB will not turn over a U.S. servicemember to 
the ICC. 
 
¶3.  (C) Separately, POL/ECON chief learned on March 16 from 
the deputy director of the legal advisor's office at the 
Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (attached to the Prime Minister's 
Office) that Cabinet Affairs had decided the Article 98 would 
have to go to the Parliament because it relates to the rights 
of individuals.  It has told the MFA the only way to move 
forward is through the Parliament. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Comment:  The Minister is not exaggerating about 
Parliament.  As we have reported in recent months (see refs b 
and c for example), the Parliament is more assertive and it 
has caused powerful ministries such as Finance major 
headaches when it disagreed with Ministry policies (refs b 
and c).  Our read of the ascendent Islamist bloc in the 
Parliament is that they would never agree to the Article 98, 
perceiving it as a special favor to the American military for 
which they have no affection. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Comment Continued:  The MFA is searching anxiously 
for a way out of sending the Article 98 to Parliament.  We 
are doubtful that the MFA will find it quickly if at all.  In 
the meantime, they are holding the signed agreement.  We are 
confident that the GoB would not turn over a servicemember to 
the ICC.  The bilateral military relationship, centered 
around the longstanding, and basically trouble-free, presence 
of NAVCENT's headquarters, is the cornerstone of our 
bilateral relationship.  The GoB went out of its way to 
provide access to facilities for OEF and OIF; it deployed air 
and naval forces in support of U.S. forces in those 
operations.  IMET and FMF assistance are key to boosting 
Bahraini forces' interoperability with our own in such 
operations.  Cancelling that assistance because the 
Government is reluctant to face a losing confrontation with 
its democratically elected parliament over an issue which has 
never before been a problem in our bilateral relationship 
would send a message to the Bahraini leadership that we 
neither value their contributions nor trust their word.  Ford 
FORD