This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000962 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PTER SP PSOE
SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTION: POPULAR PARTY STILL IN SHOCK 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen Fitzpatrick per 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
Summary 
 
¶1. (C) The Popular Party remains in shock over the March 14 
election results.   The government vehemently rejects charges 
it withheld information on al Qaeda for election benefit. 
The PP accepts defeat but members complain the Socialists 
manipulated the March 11 terror attacks to turn the electoral 
tables on the PP.   The PP does not exclude working with PSOE 
on common issues such as counterterrorism and defending the 
constitutional order.    PP reps are concerned about 
Zapatero's pledge to withdraw troops from Iraq, but believe a 
new UN resolution might allow Zapatero to save face and keep 
the troops there.   End Summary. 
 
Accepting the Election Results 
 
¶2.  (C) The mood in Popular Party circles, following the PP's 
unexpected electoral defeat March 14, is a mixture of shock, 
depression, anger and, now that a few days have passed, 
resignation, according to PP contacts.    They make clear, 
however, as PP leader Mariano Rajoy has said in public 
statements, that the PP will not dispute the legitimacy of 
the March 14 election results.   This is despite the fact 
that many in the PP believe the Socialists and their allies 
manipulated the fear and emotion surrounding the March 11 
terrorist attacks for electoral gain.   Office of the 
President Parliamentary Affairs Director Ignacio Fernandez 
told us March 18 that the PP, as "a serious and responsible 
party," would avoid undermining GOS institutions by casting 
doubt on the legitimacy of the vote.    Coordination on 
transition is going well, he said.    Vice President Javier 
Arenas is already holding meetings with Zapatero's number two 
(and likely Vice President), Jesus Caldera. 
 
GOS Denies Charges It Manipulated March 11 Investigation 
 
¶3. (C) PP contacts react strongly, however, to charges that 
the government withheld information related to the 
investigation for fear of electoral consequences. 
Fernandez and other emphasized to us that Interior Minister 
Acebes was not covering up by declaring, only hours after the 
March 11 attacks, that there was "no doubt" ETA was 
responsible.   Fernandez conceded that, in hindsight, it had 
probably been a mistake for Acebes to make an unequivocal 
declaration of ETA culpability so soon.   However, Fernandez 
and other PP contacts have stressed to us that his statements 
reflected the police analysis at the time.   On March 18, the 
GOS released police reports from March 11 in an effort to 
substantiate that point. 
 
Presumed ETA Role 
 
¶4. (C) Acebes' Chief of Staff, Miguel Temboury, reiterated to 
us that the GOS had expected a massive ETA attack in Madrid 
on the eve of the elections.   He reminded us that in both 
December 2003 and February 2004, Spanish police foiled major 
ETA attacks including, on Christmas Eve, an attempted 
bombing, using explosives concealed in backpacks, of trains 
going to Madrid.   Furthermore, Fernandez pointed out, al 
Qaeda had never conducted a terrorist attack in Spain before. 
  Fernandez noted that naturally "everyone," including 
opposition party leaders and the Basque nationalists, blamed 
ETA in the early hours.   The only exception was ETA's 
political wing, Batasuna.   The GOS suspected Batasuna of 
disinformation, hence Acebes' statement early on that 
Batasuna's mention of "Arab resistance" as the culprit was 
"miserable." 
 
Appearances Hurt 
 
¶5.  (C) Nonetheless, PP contacts affirm that appearances are 
what often matter most in politics, and the appearance of a 
cover up was extremely damaging.   This combined with 
widespread anti-Iraq war sentiment and raw fear turned the 
tides.    The cascade began when Acebes began to reverse 
himself late on March 11 after police found a van (near the 
train station where the bombed trains came from) with 
detonators and an audiotape of Koranic verses in it.   On 
Saturday March 13, election eve, Acebes announced the arrests 
of three Moroccans believed linked to terror cells and on 
March 14, within a few hours of the opening of the polls, 
came word of the release of a video tape, purportedly from al 
Qaeda, blaming the bombing on Aznar's involvement in Iraq and 
pledging more attacks if Spanish forces are not withdrawn. 
Meanwhile, also on election eve, anti-PP demonstrators by the 
thousands gathered at PP headquarters in Madrid denouncing a 
cover up.  The influential and pro-PSOE Prisa media group, 
which includes El Pais, fueled the flames.   The timing, 
Fernandez noted, could not have been worse and the PP, 
because of the suspension of campaigning before the election, 
could not answer back. 
 
Loyal Opposition 
 
¶6. (C) Fernandez said that the PP is reflecting on what else 
went wrong in the campaign.  He said that the campaign's 
media and information strategy was lacking.   He noted that 
there may be a PP Congress in the next few months, which 
could usher in leadership changes.    Fernandez said the PP 
would, as Rajoy has announced, seek to work with the 
Socialists on matters of state, notably counterterrorism and 
defending the Spanish constitutional order against Basque and 
Catalan nationalist efforts to further loosen central 
authority.    Rajoy has pledged the PP will be a "loyal 
opposition." 
 
Concerns About PSOE Foreign Policy, Iraq, EU 
 
¶7. (C)  To the extent possible, Fernandez said, the PP would 
like to cooperate with PSOE on foreign policy.   However, he 
said the PP was deeply concerned about Zapatero's pledge to 
withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq by June 30 absent UN 
control over the mission.     He said the view in the PP was 
that this would be caving in to terrorists.   Fernandez 
speculated that if the US, France and Germany were able to 
agree on a UN resolution that would grant UN authority over 
the Iraq mission, Zapatero could be able to save face and 
agree to keep Spanish troops in Iraq.    Fernandez added that 
if Zapatero did not stand up for Spanish voting strength in 
the new EU constitution, the PP would make that a major issue 
in the June 2004 EU parliament elections. 
 
Aznar 
 
¶8. (C) In closing, Fernandez said that the vote was a 
personal blow for Aznar.   Having made counterterrorism the 
center of his presidency, Aznar's team, ironically, had been 
repudiated as a result of a terrorist attack.    Aznar 
"didn't deserve this," Fernandez concluded. 
ARGYROS