This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA, PM, S/WCI 
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2014 
TAGS: OVIP PREL MARR IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 368 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 379 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 728 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 758 
 
Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Mister Secretary, welcome back to Kuwait.  The 
Kuwaiti leadership is looking forward to meeting with you. 
We are seeking to confirm an appointment with the Foreign 
Minister, Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, on 
Thursday evening, March 18, and a meeting with the Prime 
Minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, Saturday 
morning, March 20. 
 
(U) KUWAIT:  THE ONE INDISPENSABLE ALLY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Kuwait was the one indispensable ally for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  It is unique:  the only Arab state where both 
the government and public opinion openly supported us in 
eliminating Saddam Hussein's regime by force.  The Kuwaitis 
understand that they need us to succeed in Iraq, and they are 
eager to help.  They have provided strong political support 
to the Iraqi Governing Council, most recently by inviting 
Iraq to the Neighboring Countries Ministerial held here 
February 14-15, as a full and equal participant.  The 
Government and private sector are working together to 
crystallize a creative vision of an Iraq integrated into the 
Gulf region and beyond.  Kuwait's total pledge at the Madrid 
Conference, $1.5 billion, encompasses about $1 billion 
already spent in support of the liberation of Iraq, including 
over $122 million for humanitarian operations.  The GOK says 
it will consult with the Iraqis on how best to spend the 
remaining half-billion dollars. 
 
(C) SHARING THE BURDEN 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The GOK continues to view the US as its long-term 
partner and protector.  It understands, perhaps better than 
most, that even though we do things in a very heavy, 
expensive way, we get results.  They like being on the 
winning team, and feel vindicated for having sided with us in 
the liberation of Iraq.  That said, this is a small country, 
rich on a small scale, and our Iraq operations dwarf its 
income.  The Kuwaitis also want their contributions 
acknowledged, and they need to know what we expect them to 
provide and for how long.  The GOK's Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) 
fuel for US and Coalition forces remains a pending issue: 
from $8 million in 2002, it skyrocketed to well over $400 
million in 2003, and is projected to be around the same level 
for 2004.  This represents about 22 percent of jet-fuel 
production, 4.5 percent of government revenues from oil 
sales, and 1.2 percent of GDP, proportionately equivalent to 
some $150 billion in the US.  Since A/S Bloomfield's 
successful visit in January (refs A, B), the fuel has 
continued to flow at the rate of about 1.3 million 
gallons/day (worth approx. $1.2 million), but who ultimately 
will pay for it remains undetermined. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) A serious Operational Impact:  reaching final 
agreement on the AIK fuel issue is critical to our continued 
ability to deploy forces into Kuwait.  In but the most recent 
example of deployment problems caused by this lack of a final 
agreement, in February CENTCOM requested the basing of two 
(2) EC-130H Compass Call aircraft at Kuwait,s Ali al-Salem 
Airbase.  These aircraft were being deployed specifically to 
provide jamming and sophisticated electronic warfare support 
to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are 
responsible for the majority of coalition casualties in Iraq. 
 The Chief of Staff of the Kuwait Armed Forces did not allow 
the deployment based on the need to reach an arrangement on 
the provision of fuel.  Essentially we are now unable to move 
any additional aircraft into Kuwait without resolution of 
this issue.  To date, ground force deployment has not been 
affected (presumably because the forces are rotating to Iraq 
and not remaining in Kuwait).  However, the freeze on 
aircraft basing is having an increasingly serious operational 
impact.  Request you raise the issue of AIK Fuel with the 
Prime Minister, encouraging his government,s continued 
support to the US and Coalition through provision of this 
fuel and resolution of what appears to be an 
inter-ministerial financing disagreement. 
 
¶5.  (C) With the fall of Saddam's regime, Kuwait is in the 
process of reviewing its security and defense requirements. 
The Ministry of Defense is increasingly concerned with its 
budget, and is beginning to evaluate the costs associated 
with support to U.S. and Coalition Forces.  We expect 
exercises, Foreign Military Sales, Assistance in Kind, and 
Burden-sharing costs to receive close scrutiny.  Kuwait has 
already scaled back participation in bilateral military 
exercises, we believe primarily for budgetary reasons.  OSD 
will host the bilateral Joint Military Commission (JMC), the 
first since 1999, on March 30-31 in Washington.  Kuwait's 
Minister of Defense, Shaykh Jaber Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah 
will attend.  Immediately following, on April 1, SECDEF and 
Deputy Secretary Armitage are scheduled to host a ceremony to 
honor and finalize the designation of Kuwait as a Major 
Non-NATO Ally (MNNA).  Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed 
al-Sabah is scheduled to attend the MNNA ceremony. 
 
¶6.  (C) Our estimate of Kuwait's financial support to the 
US-led coalition follows for the period 1 November 2002 - 31 
October 2003: 
 
- Kuwait MOD Budget: $2.145 billion. 
 
--- Burden-sharing payments to US amount to $207 million. 
Includes costs for base operations, supplies, personnel 
support and military exercises. 
 
--- Assistance in Kind (AIK).  Estimated cost sharing of $73 
million. Includes fuel, food, TELECOM, laundry, and utilities 
for 20,000-40,000 US military personnel. 
 
--- Foreign Military Sales (FMS):  Kuwait also pays $308 
million in FMS payments to the US Treasury annually. 
 
--- Total paid to the U.S.: $644 million or 30 percent of MOD 
budget. 
 
- Previously planned and agreed construction.  Kuwait has 
previously agreed, and began construction of, Camp Arifjan in 
order to move ARCENT/CFLCC current operations off Camp Doha. 
Funding for completion has been delayed by GOK.  This delay 
has resulted in extending &split base8 operations for CFLCC 
at increased cost and loss of efficiency.  Request you 
suggest that Kuwait fully fund the remaining $55 million in 
construction that it has previously agreed to complete.  An 
extensive program of safety and maintenance upgrades to 
Kuwait,s airbases has likewise been delayed, apparently for 
financial reasons.  While not as mission critical as the Camp 
Arifjan project, this $50 million project also should be 
completed by Kuwait as they have previously agreed. 
 
- In addition to the above, Kuwait continues to provide as 
AIK fuel for US forces associated with Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM operating in/from Kuwait; through February 2004, this 
is estimated at 551 million gallons worth $463 million (rate: 
 $0.84/gal.), currently averaging 35 million gallons per 
month. 
 
¶7.  (S) Strategic Aerial Port of Debarkation/Embarkation 
(APOD):  The principal APOD servicing not only Kuwait but 
also Iraq is located at Kuwait City International Airport. 
Kuwait has requested the US relocate that operation to enable 
it to pursue commercial development there.  CENTCOM is 
staffing a proposal to relocate the APOD to Kuwait,s Ali 
al-Salem Airbase, to include a significant amount of 
construction of runway and facilities.  While Kuwait has not 
been formally engaged on these plans it has been informally 
notified.  We expect that CENTCOM and OSD will soon engage 
Kuwait in discussions seeking its approval of the concept and 
exploring possible burdensharing of the potential $500 
million construction costs involved. 
 
¶8.  (C) Iraq Debt Relief:  Secretary Baker obtained the Prime 
Minister's support for substantial reduction of Iraq's debt 
this year.  The GOK has made clear it intends to act in 
concert with the Paris Club, and only when there is a 
sovereign Iraqi government to negotiate with directly. 
Iraq's bilateral debt to Kuwait is estimated at $8 - 15 
billion.  This is apart from Gulf War reparations which are 
dealt with by the UNCC under UNSC resolutions. 
 
(C) COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Although general CT cooperation has been excellent 
throughout OEF, since a change in Ministers of Interior last 
summer, the GOK has become slow to grasp the seriousness of 
the Sunni Islamist threat among Kuwaitis.  It needs to 
respond more quickly and substantively to our requests for 
information on Kuwaiti Sunni extremists, especially those 
active in Iraq. 
 
(C) GUANTANAMO 
-------------- 
¶10.  (S) Improved cooperation would strengthen the GOK's case 
on Guantanamo detainees:  during Secretary Rumsfeld's 
February 22 visit, Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah spent much of 
their meeting pressing for the Kuwaiti Guantanamo detainees 
to be repatriated.  Even after SECDEF made clear they are 
dangerous individuals, he insisted he wanted them back, 
stating they could be incarcerated pending trial and the GOK 
could adequately monitor their activities if they were 
released.   Recent reports that British detainees would be 
released from Guantanamo have increased domestic political 
pressure on the GOK to bring the Kuwaitis home.  The GOK's 
critics argue that this should be easy if its relations with 
us are as good as it claims.  Of course such arguments 
conveniently ignore the strong measures the UK and other 
governments have promised to take against repatriated 
detainees. 
 
(C) ARTICLE 98 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Kuwait signed an Article 98 agreement with U/S 
Bolton last June but after deciding not to join the ICC 
itself has dragged its feet on bringing the agreement into 
force.  This is no surprise, given the GOK's basic policy of 
maintaining good relations with all major powers, especially 
UNSC members.  In a hopeful sign, the Foreign Minister told 
the Ambassador March 6 (ref D) that Kuwait will not be a 
party to the Rome Statute and does not need or want to seek 
parliamentary ratification of the Article 98 agreement.  He 
did not dispute the Ambassador's argument that an Article 98 
agreement could be useful even between two non-signatories, 
and left the impression that the GOK will soon notify us of 
entry into force. 
 
(C) IRRITANTS 
------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Trafficking In Persons:  Since you raised the issue 
with then-Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shaykh Dr. 
Mohammed al-Sabah (now Foreign Minister) last April, the GOK 
has made progress on the major TIP problem in Kuwait, the 
exploitation of (mostly female) domestic servants by some 
employers.  The GOK has not fully engaged with us, however, 
and lags behind other GCC states that have had more time to 
come to grips with the issue because they were listed in the 
TIP Report earlier than Kuwait. 
 
¶13.  (C) Special 301:  After a promising upsurge in 2002, 
Kuwait took little action to protect IPR in 2003.  Its rate 
of piracy of optical media is considered the worst in the 
Gulf, partly because other states have made dramatic 
improvements in the past few years.  In keeping with 
industry's recommendation, Kuwait is likely to be escalated 
to Special 301's Priority Watch List this year (ref C). 
 
¶14.  (U) US Visas:  Student-visa applications in Kuwait rose 
about 25 percent in 2003, rebounding from the post-9/11 
decline.  The Kuwaiti government and public have not made an 
issue of the recent requirement for biometric data 
(electronic fingerprint) collection. 
 
(U) RECOMMENDED PRESS EVENT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Post recommends a roundtable with editors-in-chief 
of local newspapers (5-6 individuals). 
 
¶16. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
JONES