This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000397 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, L. AROIAN, M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER ON TALKS STALEMATE, POSSIBLE 
ELECTION BOYCOTT 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 351 (B) HARARE 312 (C) HARARE 298 AND 
     PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai told 
the Ambassador on March 2 that MDC and ZANU-PF delegations in 
South Africa March 1 each rebuffed South African government 
efforts to convene a meeting between the two.  He was 
encouraged by President Mbeki's meeting with the MDC 
delegation and by the South African leader's response to a 
recent letter Tsvangirai had conveyed.  Tsvangirai advised 
that in the in the run-up to next March's scheduled national 
parliamentary election, the party would lay out explicit 
conditions necessary for a free and fair election and would 
continue to weigh a boycott if conditions were not met.  He 
asserted that the party had gotten past publicized divisions 
associated with candidate selection for the upcoming Zengeza 
parliamentary by-election and expressed confidence that the 
party would carry the election absent significant 
manipulation by the ruling party.  END SUMMARY. 
 
South African Effort Stymied 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Tsvangirai told the Ambassador over lunch at the 
Residence that an MDC group, including Party Vice-President 
Gibson Sibanda, Secretary-General Welshman Ncube and Deputy 
Secretary-General Gift Chimanikire, visited South Africa 
 
SIPDIS 
early in the week to follow up on a meeting party 
representatives had had with a South African delegation 
(including Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad and Ambassador Ndou) 
the week before.   Visiting South Africa at the same time was 
a ZANU-PF delegation that included principal talks-on-talks 
negotiator Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa.  Tsvangirai 
reported that the South Africans had suprised the Zimbabweans 
by proposing the two groups meet each other, an offer each 
delegation declined.  He said the MDC delegation had demurred 
because neither party would have had any mandate; he surmised 
that ZANU-PF refused because it lacked instructions as well. 
Tsvangirai reported that the MDC group did meet with 
 
SIPDIS 
President Mbeki but that he lacked details on the meeting. 
 
¶2.  (C) Tsvangirai added that he had a productive letter 
exchange with Mbeki on the heels of Mugabe's birthday 
outburst, in which Mugabe appeared to rule out talks with the 
MDC and castigated African leaders for their lack of unified 
solidarity with him (ref A).  Tsvangirai said he had sent 
Mbeki a letter in which he urged him to be more circumspect 
in his public comments on Zimbabwe and interparty talks; 
Mbeki had responded with appreciation for the MDC's 
constructive and flexible posture on dialogue, emphasizing 
that Zimbabwe's political crisis would have to be resolved by 
Zimbabweans and not an externally dictated solution. 
 
¶3.  (C) Tsvangirai asserted that the SAG wanted to increase 
contacts and to deepen its relationship with the MDC and was 
frustrated by ZANU-PF's intransigence.  He implied that just 
weeks ago, the SAG appeared to be complicit in ZANU-PF 
efforts to freeze Tsvangirai outside negotiations, 
essentially serving to drive a wedge among MDC ranks and 
delegitimize Tsvangirai.  He said the tone of Mbeki's letter 
suggested Mbeki was rethinking South Africa's equities in 
dialogue and its relative relations with the two parties. 
 
Elections: To Boycott or not to Boycott... 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning to elections, Tsvangirai indicated that the 
party will be attaching highest priority on addressing the 
country's election environment, recognizing that MDC cannot 
possibly compete successfully in next March's parliamentary 
elections without significant changes being undertaken very 
soon.  Tsvangirai planned to conduct a briefing of the 
diplomatic community to this effect on March 3 (reported 
septel).  The government's withdrawn invitation to the UN 
election assessment team laid bare its intention to conduct 
an unacceptable election and sharpened the situation's 
urgency.  He suggested SADC norms and standards offered 
non-threatening benchmarks in that Zimbabwe had subscribed to 
them already.  He pondered aloud the potential utility of a 
letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. 
¶5.  (C) Tsvangirai stressed special concern about ruling 
party plans to manipulate food stocks to its electoral 
advantage, consistent with prior practices.  He maintained 
that the GMB was clearing its existing stocks because it was 
not sufficiently treated to survive long storage; people were 
already complaining that some distributed stocks were rotten. 
 Adequate rains assured a decent harvest throughout much of 
the country and the government would supplement stocks with 
imports.  The MDC could compete in areas where most of the 
population was food-sufficient, but government control of 
food distribution in other areas would give it potentially 
decisive advantage. 
 
¶6.  (C) Tsvangirai observed that there were compelling 
arguments each way on the prospects for a boycott, and the 
issue would be subject to ongoing debate within the party. 
For now, though, the party did not have to take a decision 
that would ultimately depend on the government's 
responsiveness in ameliorating the election environment. 
 
¶7.  (C) Tsvangirai did not elaborate on prospects for mass 
action, noting only that the party was "looking at options." 
He reported that the party was reviewing the methodology of 
mass action and recognized that stay-aways would not work. 
He reiterated the importance of coordinating a broad alliance 
with civil society.  No single organization "owned" a 
potential process of mass action and each would be 
responsible for mobilizing its own constituency.  He 
discounted potential disagreements over priorities and 
methodology among the MDC and civil society players, 
maintaing that all recognized the need to resolve the 
political crisis first in order to open the democratic space 
all needed to address their separate priorities. 
 
By-election Preview 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Responding to adverse publicity over the party's 
contentious selection of a candidate to stand in the Zengeza 
parliamentary by-election scheduled later this month, 
Tsvangirai asserted that the difficulty was resolved and 
 
SIPDIS 
would not prejudice MDC chances in that contest.  He allowed 
that the party needed to refine its selection process; in the 
meantime, however, he had to "step in" to stop in-fighting 
that was distracting the party from its ultimate objective of 
retaining the seat.  He maintained that divisions surrounding 
the selection were not lasting and he expected to campaign in 
the urban jurisdiction on Sunday without any problem. 
 
¶9.  (C) Tsvangirai recognized that the yet-to-be scheduled MP 
by-election for Lupane could prove more problematic for the 
party.  A rural district, Lupane was more remote and thus 
more vulnerable to manipulation by violence and politicized 
food distribution.  The ruling party also was co-opting 
significant portions of the electorate through manipulation 
of influential chiefs, a practice that could be decisive in 
Lupane. 
 
Leadership Shake-Up? 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Tsvangirai was somewhat evasive when queried about a 
rumored shake-up in the party's leadership.  Alluding to 
press reports of fisticuffs between Shadow Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Moses Mzila-Ndlovu and senior adviser Eliphas 
Mukonoweshuro, he conceded that there had been a 
"regrettable" incident and that the party was going to 
reorganize its structures on international relations. 
Embassy will report on personnel shifts and other intra-party 
tensions via septel. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Internal distractions are complicating the MDC's 
uphill electoral struggle.  The opposition will have a hard 
time getting an uncompromising ruling party to address severe 
imbalances in the electoral environment, even superficially. 
Indeed, Chinamasa's reported announcement February 25 that 
the GOZ had no intention of making any changes to its 
electoral laws seemed calculated to goad the MDC toward a 
boycott.  Notwithstanding both parties' snub, Mbeki's quiet 
effort to facilitate a meeting will serve to buoy the MDC, 
which has little prospect of commanding ZANU-PF's attention 
by itself. 
SULLIVAN